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RATIO > RACE.

In opposition to the theory of Salvioni and the *Rom. Etym. Wb.*, who had posited Ital. *razza* "race" = *generatio*,¹ I have already (*Z. R. Ph.*, LIII, p. 300) endeavored to prove, by phonetic and semantic reasons, that the Latin *ratio* in a learned form is at the bottom of our modern expressions for "race"—or, more specifically, of the Italian *razza*, from which the other languages seem to have borrowed;² my point of departure was

¹ The last edition of Kluge's etymological dictionary of German by A. Götze (1934) still gives (as Lokotsch did in 1927) the Arabic *ra's* "head" as the etymon of *race*. This etymon has, however, long been discarded by Romance philologists, and for a variety of reasons: (1) this Arabic word appears in Spanish *res*, Port. *rez* "head of cattle" which contain the sound -s- (not the -z- of Sp. *raza*) and the Arabic *imela* (*a>e* as in Port. *Tejo*, the Arabicized form of *Tagus*): there is no trace of either phoneme in Sp. *raza*; (2) thus far the first attestation of the word is not in the Pyreneic peninsula (Nebrija does not list it and the Sp. passages I quoted in my first article must be interpreted otherwise, cf. *Hisp. Review*, 1940), so that there is little likelihood of Arabic influence; (3) it must be a principle of our etymology to turn to an oriental word only in the event that there is no explanation of a Romance word forthcoming from the Latin-Romance stock, cf. Sainéan, *Les sources indigènes de l'étymologie française*.—The dissertation of Hans Flasche, *Die begriffl. Entwicklung des Wortes ratio im Franz. bis 1500* (Bonn, 1935) denies categorically the equation *race* = *ratio*, without giving any reasons.—As for the Belluno *naraccia* "race" (with the variants in Ruzzante *nar(r)ation*) which seemed to Salvioni to be the missing link between *generatio* and *razza*, I consider it = *narratio* in the meaning "denomination, description" (e.g. according to Du Cange *narratio feodata* or *nominatio* was a list of fiefs with their description, already in Latin *cibos . . . narrare* "to enumerate"—for the meaning "kind, species" cf. the Engl. *description*).

² I think, however, that the date of the first appearance of our word in

such an example as the Ciceronian passage cited by Georges: *dissenserunt de generibus et rationibus civitatum* (Georges translated: "Verhältnis, Beschaffenheit, Natur, Art und Weise, Einrichtung"). It was, at the time of the publication of my article (1933), a malicious pleasure to propose to Germany the idea: "Das Wort, das heute im *Gegensatz* zu 'Geist' verwendet wird, hat also einen höchst geistigen Ursprung."

Romance is much earlier than has been hitherto believed: first I shall mention the Catalonian poet Auzias March († 1458), who says:

Bondat, virtut han perduda sa *raça*
cossos humans han molt disminuhit.

Here, in accordance with the commonplace mediaeval pattern of melancholy complaints on the decline of ages, abstract virtues are represented as having lost their vitality; that *raça* is thought of in a fleshly way is proved by the following *cossos humans* "human bodies [have lost of their valor]." The Catalonian dictionary of Aguiló which gives this text mentions also a *Cançoner de Zaragoza* which I am unable to date but which also has our word in the characteristic connection with animals: *qui té falco, ocell o ca* [= *canis*] *de bona rassa . . .* But older than all these attestations is the Provençal passage of Bertran de Born listed in Levy's *Prov. Supplement-Wörterbuch*, s. v. *rasa*:

Rassa vilana, tafura,
Plena d'enjan e d'usura,
D'orguohl e de desmesura . . .

A. Tobler, Chabaneau, and A. Thomas saw in this the Fr. *race*, but Gröber answered with the "vicious circle" statement that this word is not to be found in the Middle Ages. Suchier pointed to Du Cange's item *rassa* "conjuratio" to be found in mediaeval Latin texts originating in France, and Levy gives several juridical prose passages with an O. Prov. *rassa* "Abkommen, Vereinigung, Bund, Komplott" (where *rassa* is sometimes coupled with *trassa* as in the Du Cange texts which also show *monopolium*—both words meaning something like "conspiracy"); he proposes for the passage in B. de Born the interpretation "Vereinigung, Bande." But it is obvious that *rassa vilana, tafura* means "race," "people" and is synonymous with *gens* in O. Prov.: *avol gens tafura* "méchante gent perfide" (G. Faydit, quoted by Raynouard s. v. *tafur*), *gent christiana* "gent chrétienne" (B. de Ventadour, Raynouard, III, 460), and *la gent trotte-menu* of La Fontaine (cf. note 11). From "race, people, troop" (this last meaning is attested several times for *gent* in O. Prov., cf. Levy) it is not far to "gang, conspiracy."—There is still in the poems of Bertran de Born the recurrent *senhal* (pseudonym) for Geoffrey of Brittany, with whom he was closely associated in his fight against his father Henry II of England: *Rassa*, the meaning of which has not yet been cleared up. But since the *razo* (anonymous prose prologue of one of Bertran's love poems *Rassa, tan*

In 1938 Angelico Prati in *L'Italia dialettale*, XIV, pp. 182 ff. adduced substantial evidence to support my etymon—an etymon which Canello (*Riv. d. fil. rom.*, I, p. 132) had already proposed. Prati pointed out: (1) in Italian writers from the 13th century on *ragione*, the popular representative of *ratio*, occurs with the meaning "quality, species, sort" (of animals, herbs), e. g. Brunetto Latini: *E tanti altri animali . . . di sì fera ragione, E di sì strana taglia*, and the Venetian dialect still has *rason* in the same sense; (2) the first attestation of *razza* is a masculine *razzo* (said of a horse) in the 14th century poem *Intelligenza*; in Pulci we find the feminine *razza*. Prati also found *ratio* "genus, progenies" in the *Lex Salica* (5th century), though Du Cange is not quite sure of this interpretation in the one passage from this work that he cites.

I am aware, however, that the semantic development is not yet quite clarified: it is to the purpose of attempting such a clarification that the following lines are devoted.

While reading Professor Lovejoy's masterly book *The Great Chain of Being* I was struck by the following passage (p. 87) which resumes the teaching of Thomas Aquinas:

God in willing himself wills all the things which are in himself; but all things in a certain manner pre-exist in him by their types (*rationes*).

creis e monta e poja . . . says: *Bertrans de Born si s'apelava Rassa ab lo comte Jaufré de Bretanha* (while the poem itself calls Geoffrey *Rassa*—a contradiction which nobody has as yet pointed out), we may assume that each of them called the other by the same name and that "[member of the same] gang" was a very appropriate familiar name. (Whether the family name *Rassa*, *Raxa*, etc. found by D. Serra, *Dacoromania*, IV, p. 539 in 15th century documents of Canavese, Piedmont, where the appellative *rassa*, *raša* in the meaning "race" exists today, is connected with this Prov. name is doubtful.) There is still another *rassa* in Guiraut Riquier's Prov. didactic poem about jongleurs, which was addressed to King Alfonso X of Castile in 1275: here it is said of bad jongleurs: *e que menon vils rassas a deshonor riven*; this must mean something like "who play bad tricks," and may have to do with *rassa* "gang" (or with the other Span. *raza* treated in *Hisp. Review*, loc. cit.). Thus, the contention that *race* "race" is unknown in the Middle Ages is no longer tenable: with Bertran de Born we are back in the XII century and Provence is the very first Romance country to show our word. It must be granted that this first attestation has a *rassa* "evil race" (pejorative).

The Thomistic use of *rationes* "types" occurs in a sentence which clearly develops the Platonic conception of the *ideas* pre-existent to things: according to this Christianized Platonism—which may be epitomized in the lines of the 16th century French poet Dubartas:

Or donc avant tout temps, matière, forme et lieu,
Dieu tout en tout estoit, et tout estoit en Dieu—

God, as *the Idea* of the universe, contains in himself all the ideas of the things, which are integrated in one great being: one may perceive the Christian fixation of the monotheistic tendency to be found in Platonism.³ Thus *rationes* is a rendering of *idéai* and

³ The earliest extant treatment of all the (Platonic) ideas as thoughts of God is that of Philo Judaeus. Here is a statement of Dr. L. Cohn's in the introduction to his translation of Philo (*Die Werke Philos von Alexandria*, pp. 15-16):

Philos Gottesbegriff und seine Lehre vom Monotheismus beruht natürlich auf der biblischen Anschauung vom einig einzigen Gotte: für Philo ist Gott mehr als Platons "Idee des Guten." Aber alle näheren Bestimmungen, mit denen er den Begriff ausstattet, und alle Attribute, die er Gott beilegt, hat er aus der griechischen Philosophie, teils aus Plato teils aus dem Stoizismus, genommen . . . Die ihm eigentümliche Lehre vom Logos und den göttlichen Mittelkräften ist aus einer Verbindung der Platonischen Ideenlehre und der stoischen Lehre von den wirkenden Kräften in der Natur (*λόγοι σπερματικοί*) hervorgegangen. Gott selbst steht nach Philo als unendliches Wesen zu hoch, als dass ihm unmittelbare Berührung mit der endlichen Schöpfung, mit der Materie, zugeschrieben werden dürfte . . . Er verkehrt daher mit der Welt und wirkt auf sie nur durch Vermittelung der göttlichen Kräfte und des Logos. Philos Logos entspricht im allgemeinen dem Logos der Stoiker, die ihre "Weltseele," d. h. die das Weltall beseelende und durchdringende göttliche Vernunft auch mit diesem Ausdruck bezeichneten. Bei den Stoikern aber ist die Weltvernunft oder die beseelte Materie, wie bei Heraklit, mit der Gottheit identisch, der stoische Standpunkt ist Pantheismus. Mit der jüdisch-religiösen Anschauung ist nun aber die Lehre von der Immanenz Gottes unvereinbar, für einen gläubigen Juden wie Philo war die Transzendenz und das außerweltliche Dasein Gottes ein feststehender Grundsatz. Daher verband er—vielleicht hatte das vor ihm schon Posidonius getan—die als Teile der Weltseele wirkenden Kräfte der Stoiker mit den Ideen Platons. Diese Ideen oder geistigen Kräfte (*νοηταὶ δυνάμεις*) nimmt Philo ebenso wie Plato ausserhalb der Welt an, aber nicht ausserhalb der Gottheit, er denkt sie sich vielmehr in Gott selbst (daher *δυνάμεις θεοῦ*), von ihm ausgehend und das Weltall durchdringend und alles belebend und ordnend (wie die stoischen *λόγοι σπερματικοί*). Alle diese Ideen oder göttlichen Kräfte haben ihren Mittelpunkt in der obersten Idee (*ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν*), in der göttlichen Vernunft, im Logos; in dem Logos sind alle Kräfte oder Wirkungen Gottes zu einer Einheit zusammengefasst.

Thus, *ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν* (an amalgam and derivative of the Aristotelian

can shift to the meaning "types" (> "races") precisely because all the different *rationes* of things are integrated in the creator of things.

Now I had only to consult Part I, Question XV, Article II of the *Summa Theologiae* (the chapter bearing the title "Utrum sint plures ideae" [scil. in Deo]) where I found a quotation by Thomas of Saint Augustine, lib. LXXXIII, Quaest. 9, 46:⁴

[ideae sunt] principales quaedam formae, vel *rationes rerum* stabiles atque incommutabiles quae ipsae formatae non sunt; ac per hoc aeterna ac semper eo modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur: sed cum ipsae neque

εἰδος εἰδῶν and of the Hebrew pattern "King of kings") = *λόγος*. There is a significant sentence in *De opificio mundi* (26): . . . οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκ τῶν *ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἀλλον ἀντιχείρων ητον θείον λόγον τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα*. God first created the bodiless "ideas" of things and then, after these "patterns" (*παραδειγμάτα*), the things themselves, e. g. *ἀέρος ιδέαν* (29), the ideas of the morning and evening: *ὅλως οὐδὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλὰ πάντα ιδέαι καὶ μέτρα καὶ τύποι καὶ σφραγίδες εἰς γένεσιν ἀλλων δούλων δούλων σωμάτων* (34)—note that "ideas" and "types" are presented as identical.

⁴ The Augustinian passage is to be found in Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XL, 39 ("De ideis"). It is preceded by the statement:

Ideas igitur latine possumus vel *formas* vel *species* dicere, ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur. Si autem *rationes* eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedemus; rationes enim graece *λόγοι* appellantur, non *ideae*; sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit,

and at the end of the chapter there reappears the same idea of the (perhaps equivocal) use of *ratio* as a translation of *ἰδέα* with the apology that it is not the question of terminology that matters, but the understanding of the underlying truth:

Quas *rationes*, ut dictum est, sive *ideas*, sive *formas*, sive *species*, sive *rationes* licet vocare, et multis conceditur quod libet, sed paucissimis videre quod verum est.

This passage is most important for our equations *ratio* = *idea* = *forma* = *species*—as if Augustine were conscious of the literal rendering (*ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur*) of the etymological value of *ἰδέα* and perhaps found the translation of *ἰδέα* (or *λόγοι*) by *ratio* extant (though I am not able to trace it back to classical writers).—There are two linguistic currents well-known in patristic writers: purism and graecism (cf. *baptisma*, which Tertullian attempted to render by (*in*)*tinctio*, Rheinfelder, *Kultsprache u. Profansprache*, p. 47). C. T. Balmus, *Étude sur le style de Saint Augustin* (1930), p. 87, insists on the purism of Augustine who, though knowing Greek quite well, introduced only three Greek words into his *Confessions*. As a matter of fact, *idea* had already been used by Cicero and Seneca.

orientur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dici-
tur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur
et interit

and Thomas concludes:

Cum in mente divina sint omnium rerum propriae rationes, plures ideas in ejus mente esse necesse est.

The French edition with commentary of the *Somme Théologique* prepared by F. Lachat (Paris, 1880, I, p. 324) translates the *rationes rerum* of the Augustinian passage as "leurs types immuables et permanents" and that of the Thomistic conclusions as "les exemplaires de tous les êtres."

There are several other passages in this chapter and the following one of the *Summa* which contain our *ratio* "idea, type":

Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur; sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non possit, nisi apud eum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partis ejus. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint proprie rationes omnium rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quaest. ut supr.⁵ quod "singula propriis rationibus a Deo ornata sunt." Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sunt plures ideae.

⁵ The whole passage reads as follows (Migne, *loc. cit.*):

Quis autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus, quamvis nondum possit haec intueri, negare tamen audeat, imo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae sunt, id est *quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam natura continentur*, ut sint, Deo auctore esse procreata, eoque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere . . . ? Quo constituto et concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita. Nec eadem ratione homo, qua equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur *propriis sunt creata rationibus*. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente creatoris? . . . Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse; atque *has rerum rationes principales* appellat ideas Plato: non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae sunt, et ejusmodi atque incommutabiles manent; quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est, quoquomodo est.

I have underlined the passages *in suo genere propria quadam natura* and *has rerum rationes principales* because an identification of the "ideas of things" with "natural types" is here latent.

In the French translation we find:

or on ne peut avoir l'*idée* d'un ensemble, d'un tout organique, sans avoir celle des parties qui le composent: l'architecte, par exemple, s'efforcerait vainement de concevoir le *plan* d'un édifice, s'il n'en connaissait point les bases. . . . Dieu a donc *les images* de toutes les choses: "Il a," dit saint Augustin . . . , "les types du [read: de] tout ce qu'il a créé"; en un mot, il a plusieurs idées.

One may observe (1) that the French rendering of *ratio* reveals the identification in modern thought *ratio* = *idée*, since it replaces the former by *idée*, *image*, *type*, whereas Augustine and Thomas distinguish between *propriae rationes*, as the ideas of the parts of a whole, and the *idea* of the whole which God has; (2) that *species*, which we generally know as "species, type," is very close in meaning to *idea* and may be translated by *plan*: *species* and *ratio* come close together in an association wherein their differences tend to be obliterated—indeed *species* renders *εἶδος*, the near relative or *ἰδέα* (cf. C. G. L.: "species—*εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*" [sic]). L. Schütz, in his *Thomas-Lexikon* gives the translation "Erkenntnisform, Erkenntnisbild" and identifies the expression *species exemplaris* with *forma exemplaris*.

Further on we find *species*, *idea*, and *ratio* used also as synonyms:

Unaquaeque autem creatura habet *propriam speciem*, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem: sic igitur in quantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut *propriam rationem et ideam* hujus creaturae, et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures *rationes proprias* plurium rerum, quae sunt plures *ideae*.

(Lachat translates the last *rationes* by "natures particulières"; later on, in a repeated comparison of God with an architect, *idea vel ratio domus* is rendered by "l'*idée*," and *plures rationes rerum vel plures ideas esse in intellectu ejus [Dei] ut intellectus* by "c'est là connaître *les types et les raisons des êtres . . .*")

In the next article (III) Thomas declares:

Ideae sunt *rationes* in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet; sed omnium quae cognoscit Deus, habet *proprias rationes*; ergo omnium quae cognoscit, habet *ideam*,

and he goes on to say that the Platonic ideas are the principle of cognizance and of production of things: as principle of production they may also be called *exemplar*, "les exemplaires et les types des êtres"; as principle of cognizance *ratio* = "les raisons des êtres" (for *exemplum -ar* and their Greek antecedent *ταπάδειγμα* cf. H. Kornhardt, *Exemplum* [Göttingen, 1936]).

Here Lachat⁶ puts a very enlightening note concerning *rationes rerum*:

Dans *raison des choses, ratio rerum*, le premier terme est la traduction de *vóos* ou de *λόγος* esprit ou verbe. . . . Ces mots signifient ce par quoi l'intelligence raisonne ou se parle à elle-même; c'est la forme, la similitude, l'image, l'idée des choses; c'est aussi ce que les espèces intelligibles représentent, la nature ou l'essence des êtres. Ainsi le mot *raison* désigne: primitivement la faculté qui perçoit, l'intelligence; puis, secondairement, ce que l'intelligence perçoit, l'idée; puis, dans un sens plus éloigné encore, ce que l'idée représente, la nature des êtres. On voit que dans ces deux dernières significations, le terme dont il s'agit exprime le contenant pour le contenu.

The conception of *raison des choses* as a *raison objective* had been opposed to the *raison subjective* or *raison de l'homme* by Cournot in the 19th century (Lalande, *Voc. de la philosophie, s. v. raison*, G: "principe d'explication au sens théorique; raison d'être; ce qui rend compte d'un effet" with the example taken from Cournot: "Une de ces facultés [par lesquelles l'homme dépasse l'animal] est celle de concevoir la *raison des choses*" and the

⁶ Schütz in his *Thomas-Lexikon* translates *ratio* by "Verständnis, Plan" in a passage like: "necesse est quod *ratio ordinis rerum* in finem in mente divina praeeexistet, *ratio autem ordinandorum* in finem proprie providentia est" or "in quolibet artifice praeeexistit *ratio eorum quae constituuntur per artem". The passages with *ratio* as a synonym of *idea* are listed partly under his item *ratio* ("Idee, Begriff, intellektuelle Vorstellung"), partly *s. v. idea* (e.g. "in divina sapientia sunt *rationes omnium rerum* quas supra diximus *ideas*, id est *formas exemplares* in mente divina existentes"). Then Schütz *s. v. ratio* has also an item "Seinsmoment, Anlage" (*rationes seminales* "keimhafte Anlagen"—*rationes causales* "ursächliche A."—*rationes ideales* "ideenhafte oder vorbildliche Anlagen": *rationes seminales* = the Stoic *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι* which contains the biological nuance perceptible even in the Aristotelian determination of *eidos*—*λόγος*. Meillet-Ernout, *Dict. étym.*, mention only the "calque" of *ratio* according to *λόγος*, not the influence of *λόγια*—nor do they list the Augustinian meaning "type."*

explanation: "Il oppose la raison, en ce sens, soit à la simple causalité efficiente, soit à la démonstration logique . . ."). The original Platonic theory of ideas itself was a systematic substitution of the *causa cognoscendi* for the *causa essendi*.

Thus in *ratio* there converge several Greek terms: λόγος (λόγοι), νοῦς "the cognitive instrument of man, reason" and (as Lachat seems to imply, though he fails to bring this out) ὑδέα "the idea of things pre-existent to their nature," ἔδος "the nature of things"—and also αἰτία = *causa*.⁷ The *propriae rationes* are very similar to the *propriae species*: the different natures of things, to the "types of things"—these latter being very close to the mediaeval conception of the *proprietates* or *dignitates, virtutes rerum*, the proper qualities of things. *ratio* lent itself to a rendition of all these Greek notions precisely because it was capable of shades of meaning both subjective and objective: "the human reason" and "the nature of things accessible to human cognizance." Latin, poorer in words than was Greek, would, at any rate, have had to crowd into one word notions which may seem contradictory to us, if all these meanings had not already been comprehended, however confusedly, in the technical term λόγοι of the Platonizing Stoics whose terminology dominated later antiquity. For mediaeval man the comprehensiveness of this word *ratio* was fertile: the intellect could pass from the nature of things to the idea of them as pre-existent in God's mind, from the content to the container of thought: this was the truth stored up for the believer in the word *ratio*, which seemed to contain an "etymon," a "truth." Probably the fact that the term *species*, also, covered the range from "species" to "example, form, idea" made it possible for *ratio* "idea," "type," to meet it halfway.

By now it has become clear that Augustine, before Thomas, had already brought about the adaptation of the Latin word to Platonic philosophy (we have seen two quotations from Augustine in the text of Thomas). And it was precisely the notion of

⁷ In fact, when Tertullian speaks of the Platonic theory, he refers to *causae* where Augustine has *rationes* (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, II, 678):

Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibles . . . quas appellat ideas, id est formas, exempla, et caussas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus sensibus.

There may even be included in *ratio* the nuance of κόσμος "the rationally ordered world" = δ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος of Philo (see note 3 *supra*).

rationes rerum as ideas of distinctive parts of the whole which led to the semantic development "types" (< "races"⁸)—a term descriptive of the "natures of things" which in the course of time came to be used without any memory of the philosophical background, God's ideation; these *rationes* became, as it were, secularized "ideas."

What a significant comment this affords on the modern "racial" beliefs! As these are "abandoned, forsaken" by God, so the notion of divine participation is lost in the term "race." It is not merely a pun if I say that modern racialism is not only "geistverlassen" (as I intimated in my first paper) but also "god-forsaken." And the Augustine who says so often in the much-quoted chapter that only the pure religious and charitable mind can approach intuition of those God-willed ideas of things would surely protest against the modern rationalistic anticipation of an "idea of a race" as representing an encroachment on God's *λόγος*, and an absurd attempt to see with "bodily eyes" what only spiritual vision may attain to:

[the anima rationalis of man] Deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum charitate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intelligibili perfusa quodam modo et illustrata cernit, non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale, quo excellit, id est per intelligentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit beatissima.

The solely biological approach to a divine idea, in the stead of recourse to the *visio beatifica*, would be pure heresy to this Father of the Church. But this same modern, biological approach (which has been purposely emphasized in the recent German coinages *artfremd*, *arthhaft*, *arteigen*, *artbedingt*, with *Art* serving as in *die Arten der Tiere!*) is, we must admit, anticipated in some way by the semantic development of *ratio* to "species" alone (without the idea of the divine mind in which the species pre-exists): we may find *ratio = species* in such a French text as Oresme's translation (14th century) of the Aristotelian *Ethics* (VIII, 12, quoted by Littré—a passage which I am unable to locate): "Honneur, prudence et delectations sont de diverses raisons et espèces quant à leur bonté." (Godefroy translates too

⁸ *species* which, as we said, means as well *τύπος* as *ἰδέα*, develops likewise the meaning "race" in old Fr. (2 examples in Godefroy, *s. v. espece*).

freely by "manière, méthode"). Here is, represented in French, the Aristotelian connection of *λόγος* and *εἶδος* from which the long course of development took its start.

The same connection of *espèce* with *race* is to be seen in Olivier de Serres (16th century) : "Contemplés curieusement les espèces des raisons qu'y verrés, afin d'en tirer, en la saison, des races, s'il y en a, qui vous agréent"; Littré, who quotes these lines, warns us to use (in zoölogical reference) *espèce* as representing a broader conception in respect to "race": *espèce bovine*, but *race bovine de Durham*—a distinction which has not been respected by the language. It is to be noted that Italian *razza* was used mostly of animals, as *razza di cani*:⁹ Tommaseo-Bellini says, "Razza è tuttodi più di bestie; d'uomini, familiare, non sempre in dispr. [ezzo] però";¹⁰ in French, the expression *méchante petite race!*, said to children, implies that they are little animals—cf. a similar use of *canaille*; the same holds for Spanish: Oudin *s. v. raça* says: "en lignage de personnes [= for human beings], se prend en mauvaise part, comme de race de Juifs, ou de Mores."

The Italian novelist Panzini in his *Viaggio con une giovane*

⁹ The Toscane proverb *chi troppo ride, ha natura di matto; chi non ride è di razza di gatto* shows a relationship on the one hand to "nature," on the other to "species of animals."

¹⁰ This remark is important: the pejorative use of *razza*, *race*, etc. is probably (but see note 2 *supra*) not the original one in Romance, as is clearly shown by the text of the Italian *Intelligenza* (*destrier di grande [!] razzo*), as well as by others listed by Tommaseo-Bellini. The use of *cavallo di razza* and, subsequently, of Fr. *un écrivain de race* is an emphatic one: "of a good race" (cf. *un homme de goût, de qualité = de bon goût, de bonne qualité*); an expression of this sort insists on the "born writer"—as if to be born such were a matter of heredity. Nor would a pejorative use be in keeping with the lofty tone of the late Latin texts. The reason why the Italian word was borrowed by the French (if it was borrowed, see note 2 *supra*) is yet to be found: Wind, *Les mots italiens introduits en français au XVI^e siècle*, does not mention it in her chapter on horses (pp. 163-67), but *cavallo di razza, far (tenere) razza, razza* "stud," etc. could well find their place therein among the many words borrowed from Italian (*cavalier, cavale*, etc.). I recall the remark of Oudin, *Tesoro* (1675) on Span. *raça*: "Race ou haras de chevaux excellents, que l'on marque pour estre reconnus; chaque Prince ou Seigneur y fait mettre sa marque particulière"—princely studs from Spain and elsewhere were perhaps an Italian fashion! (cf. the English "a studde or *race of mares*," from a Privy Council Act, 1547 [NED]).

ebrea (1935) reveals the genuine feelings of Italians of that time when faced with German *razzismo*: they were able to think only of zoölogical expressions like *razza di cane!* The same writer in his *Dizionario moderno* (edition of 1927) emphasizes that *di razza* is said of animals, especially of horses and "talora per estensione" of human beings; this use, according to him, comes from French (*cheval de race*). This latter assertion, however, is not true (for already in Pulci [14th century] we find *Lor capitano er' un di franca razza*), but it betrays the feeling of the Italians in the period around 1927. The evolution of this feeling and of the corresponding connotation of the word can be traced in comparing the article *razza* in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* (1935) and the postscript to this article in the appendix of 1939 from the pen of Virginio Gayda. The first passage states that *razza* is a zoölogico-biological notion, *popolo* a sociological, and *nazione* a political one;¹¹ that, consequently, there is only an Italian people and nation, not one Italian race; that there is no Jewish and ("the worst error") no Aryan race.¹² But four

¹¹ It must be noted that Fr. *race* was often equivalent to "people," e.g. in the first example of Lemaire de Belges: *il estoit extrait de la mesme rasse et pais des Turcs; la race des financiers*, equal to La Fontaine's use of *la gent trotte-menu* (= *gens, stirps*), and the *rassa* of Bertran de Born, etc. In Spanish *el dia de la raza*, celebrated on the same day in the European peninsula and in Latin America, is surely the festival, not of a Latin race, but of a people, a civilization. When Rubén Darío in a kind of *carmen saeculare* predicts the deeds of a Latin "race" he chooses the word derived from Lat. *stirps*: *La latina estirpe verá la gran alba futura*. On the other hand, *nation* was sometimes not very different from *race*, as is shown by the O. Fr. idiom *nace* (*nate*) *que nace* (*nate*) "a way (litt. an inborn way of being) is what a way is," i.e. a way of its own holds fast; Catalonian *nèscia*, *nissaga* "progeny," "descendants" (R. E. W., 5848a), old Vicenza *nagia* "nascita," and Friulan *naje* "genia, plebaglia" which Salvioni explains by *natalia* (R. E. W., s. v.) but in which I prefer to see a *natio* (a back-formation from **nagione*, cf. the *nagia* in Old Vicenzian and Canavese *rasa, rasa*, from **ragione*).

¹² It has become traditional to quote the words of Mussolini to Emil Ludwig in 1932:

Rasse: das ist ein Gefühl, keine Realität, 95 Prozent sind Gefühl. Ich werde nie glauben, dass sich die mehr oder weniger reine Rasse biologisch beweisen lässt . . . Entsprechendes wird bei uns nie vorkommen . . . Der Nationalstolz braucht durchaus keine Delirien der Rasse.

One may also cite the sentence of a great Italian scholar which serves as the motto of the *Revue de linguistique romane*: . . . *razze latine non esistono; esiste la latinità*. . . .

years later Gayda declares that the "Italian race" is to be defined by the following statements: (1) "La popolazione (!) dell' Italia attuale è nella maggioranza (!) di origine (!) ariana e la sua civiltà è ariana"; (2) since the invasion of the Longobards there has been no "movimento di popolo" capable of influencing "la fisionomia razziale della nazione"; (3) the Jews "consider themselves" everywhere as a "razza diversa dalle altre." The choice of ambiguous terms, the refusal to define race biologically, and the "escapism" of basing oneself on movements "of populations" and on racial *feelings* (i. e., of the Jews, at that, not of the Christians) could hardly be carried further.

In Germany *Rasse* (originally written in the French way *Race*¹³) was likewise first confined to animals. The *Deutsches Wörterbuch* contains the Herder passage where *Menschenrasse* is characterized as an inappropriate, metaphorical, "ignoble" neologism:

gingen wir wie bär und affe auf allen vieren, so lasset uns nicht zweifeln, dass auch die menschenrassen (wenn mir das unedle wort erlaubt ist) ihr eingeschränktes vaterland haben und nie verlassen würden,

and in Schiller's "Wallensteins Lager" the use of *Rasse* for human beings gives an impression of "coarseness":

Wachtmeister: Ja ihr gehört auch so zur ganzen masse.
Erster Jäger: Ihr seid wohl von einer besondern rasse?

Today it has, even and precisely when used of men, the purely zoölogical connotation: a staunch believer in racial values (G. Moldenhauer, *Die neueren Sprachen*, 1940, p. 22), when faced with French phrases like *race picarde*, *normande*, etc., must state that nothing is more confusing than the homonymy coupled with semantic divergence of the two words German *Rasse* and French *race*: one could not translate *race picarde* by German *Volk* or *Stamm* (which involve according to Moldenhauer "Ganzheit") and, of course, not by *Rasse*: "Denn französisch 'race' hat im Lauf der Jahrhunderte eine *Begriffsspanne* erhalten, die vom Menschengeschlecht über *Volk* oder irgend eine willkürlich

¹³ This is to be found sporadically in German in the 17th century; in the 18th it was borrowed more systematically, probably as a consequence of the achievements of French biologists who endeavored to define the "race," and whom Kant followed in 1775.

abgegrenzte blutsmässige Einheit, über Fürsten-, Adels- und bürgerliches Geschlecht, Sippe und Familie bis zur Nachkommenschaft (sogar in Gestalt eines Sprosses) reicht, von Belegen aus Tier- und Pflanzenreich ganz zu schweigen." Thus, German *Rasse* has no *Begriffsspanne* and has completely severed its ties with the universalistic *ratio*.

Now we must consider the question: from which of the Latin uses of the word *ratio* was the Augustinian and Thomistic use derived? The monograph of Mr. A. Yon, *Ratio et les mots de la famille de reor* (Paris, 1933) is rather parsimonious in regard to information about later Latin, but we can safely guess which were the Latin germs of the later semantic development. *Ratio*, according to Yon, meant originally "count, calculation" ("compte"), and was a technical term belonging to the language of the accountant (*rationes reddere = rendre compte*); from this we come to the interpretation given by Yon (p. 174) "premeditation," "reflexion" (e. g. Cic.: *consilium est aliquid faciendi non faciendive excogitata ratio* "l'intention est le calcul réfléchi de . . ."; *mulier abundat audacia, consilio et ratione deficitur* "she is lacking in thoughtfulness"). Now we know that the Platonic *ἰδέα* could be rendered by a word implying "pre-existing thought" (cf. Forcellini: "modo, metodo, ordine, regola"). The previous development of *λόγος* from Plato, through Aristotle, to the Stoics enables us to understand the identification of *ἰδέα* (of which Yon does not speak) with *ratio*.¹⁴

On the other hand the meaning "reason why," "cause, motive," derived from "to give account" > "to give reasons," could lead to the objective use of *rationes rerum* "raison des choses" (cf. Fr. *raison d'être* "the rational ground of existence") —and also to the meaning defined by Forcellini "genus, natura, conditio, qualitas": *modo, qualità, natura* (Cael. Aurel. *sui ratione* "ex sua natura"): indeed, the reason for the existence of something converges with the nature of the thing, this motivates that.

¹⁴ Debrunner, *Idg. Forsch.*, LI, p. 206 attests a neo-greek *λογί* from 300 A. D. on, with the meaning "class, sort (of goods)," "Art und Weise" and "regard" ("Rücksicht"); he compares the similar meanings of Latin *ratio*. In our present state of information we may not judge which of these words precedes, or derives from, the other. *λόγος* in O. Gr. had the meaning "account, calculation" and it is assumed by Ernout-Meillet and Yon that the meaning "reason" was given to *ratio* under the influence of *λόγος* "account" and "reason."

Our study has brought out the laicization and trivialization of concepts belonging to the religious philosophy of early Christianity—a laicization beginning already in the middle ages and carried still further by the modern world. It is sad to have to state that the popular mind was unable to retain the wide range ascribed to a notion by speculative geniuses. But, on the other hand, it is comforting to see that our most popular notions have their roots in the speculations of great thinkers such as Plato, Philo, Augustine, and Saint Thomas.

Thus we may end¹⁵ with the well-poised statement of James Howell (1650), so opposed to the *πάντα ῥεῖ* evolution current in linguistics of today, which Miss Wind selected as a motto for her monograph (cf. note 9) :

For languages are as slow rivers, (that) by insensible alluvions take in and let out the waters that feed them, yet are they said to have still the same beds.

LEO SPITZER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

ADDENDUM.

Eric Voegelin has dealt in *The Review of Politics*, II, p. 283 with the history of "The race idea." While still endorsing the Arabic origin of the word, he sees in the conception of the race "the last link in a historic chain of body ideas": it presupposes the Greek idea of the "likemindedness" of men, the Christian idea of the *corpus mysticum* with its emphasis on the pneumatic tie uniting all the believers, and, finally, a non-Christian anthropology trying to bridge the gulf between flesh and spirit; according to Mr. Voegelin this anthropology emerges in the middle of the nineteenth century but is latent in Goethe's conception of the "demonic personality." It seems to me that this non-Christian anthropology was likely to be revived with the Renaissance ideas of the body and with its pantheism and that the Platonic and Christian idea of species as realizations of pre-existent *rationes*, as stressed in this paper, must be taken into consideration for the history of the word. Interesting examples of the eighteenth century use of *race*, *Rasse* are to be found on pp. 296-7 of Mr. Voegelin's study.

¹⁵ I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Cherniss for his suggestions concerning my treatment of ancient philosophical terms.

SOLON'S AGRARIAN LEGISLATION.

I

In an admirable book¹ which marked the end of a long and fruitful life, W. J. Woodhouse recently put the study of Solon's agrarian legislation on an entirely new footing. My purpose in this article is to take issue with part of his presentation of the conditions leading to the crisis which Solon was called upon to resolve, and to correct somewhat his picture of the effects of Solon's legislation.

Briefly, Woodhouse views the development of the agrarian crisis in seventh-century Attica as follows:

1. Land in Attica had in early times been divided among the citizen families, and was in pre-Solonian times held under a system of family (*genos*) tenure. Individual lots (*kleroi*) were hereditary and inalienable.² Hence all loans were secured upon the person of the debtor, not upon his land; yet, before Solon decreed his *seisachtheia*, the land had passed into the hands of a few large landholders.³ How are we to explain this apparent contradiction?

2. The economic development of the seventh century—especially the widespread use of money and the expansion of commerce, with their effect on agricultural prices—destroyed the economic self-sufficiency of the independent small farmer. The only agricultural enterprise now profitable in Attica was large-scale production of olives and wine for export. The result was an “agricultural revolution which substituted ‘long future’ husbandry for ‘short future’ cereal production.”⁴ Under these new conditions, the peasant cultivator, lacking capital, found it difficult to maintain himself on his land,⁵ while the aristocrat cast about for additional land in which to invest his idle capital.

¹ *Solon the Liberator. A Study of the Agrarian Problem in Attika in the Seventh Century* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1938). This book will hereafter be referred to by the abbreviation W.

² W., p. 75; cf. note 12 *infra*.

³ Cf. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians*, 2, 2, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν . . . καὶ οἱ δανεισμοὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἤσαν μέχρι Σόλωνος, and 4, 5.

⁴ W., p. 164; cf. p. 65.

⁵ To buy mature, fruit-bearing olive trees would demand a large capital

3. The situation was thus set for the passage of land from small independent farmers to wealthy proprietors: it merely remained to circumvent the traditional inalienability of the land. A fiction was soon developed to suit the need: in form, but not in intention, it was essentially the "sale with option of redemption" (*πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*) of fourth-century business practice. The needy farmer who borrowed from the neighboring lord no longer pledged his body as security; instead he gave his land, under this fictional "sale." The "option of redemption," unlimited in time, preserved the true title in the family of the debtor. "The contract did not . . . transfer ownership, but only possession."⁶ Moreover, the seller was retained on his land as a tenant.

4. As a tenant, he paid his lord a rent which, in effect, constituted interest on the lord's loan. However, instead of being fixed (as in the fourth century) according to the amount of the loan, or "purchase price," which must have been substantially less than the true value of the *kleros*,⁷ the interest-rent was in the seventh century fixed arbitrarily at one-sixth the annual produce of the tenancy.⁸

5. When, because of poor crops or other reasons, the tenant found himself unable to pay the rent and survive, his arrears of rent were funded as a new loan, at interest of one-sixth. The land being already encumbered, *this new loan was secured upon the debtor's body*. When he defaulted on this new debt, he was *ἀγώγυμος* and could be sold into slavery to satisfy the debt.⁹

6. "In the course of time, and in response to new needs," the nobility developed "an alternative and upon the whole a less inhumane" method of dealing with defaulting tenants. "Under this new method, the likelier sort of insolvent debtors, instead of being sold abroad or kept in Attika as chattel slaves, became hinds or serfs, along with wife and family, on their creditors'

outlay. To buy young trees and raise them to maturity would necessitate capital to tide the peasant over the long unproductive years, since olives "do not bear a full crop for sixteen or eighteen years, and it is forty to sixty years before they are at their best" (A. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*⁸, p. 54).

⁶ W., p. 150.

⁸ Cf. W., pp. 124, 156-158.

⁷ Cf. note 23 *infra*.

⁹ Cf. W., especially pp. 157-158.

estates. . . . These serfs it was that constituted the class known as Hektemors, a class of hereditary villeins bound to their lord's estate, perhaps in many cases to the very holdings which for generations they and their ancestors as free peasants had once possessed in perpetual succession by right of primordial allocation. Henceforth as serfs they must cultivate for the benefit of their respective lords their assigned parcels of ground, drawing a sustenance allowance at a flat rate of one-sixth the annual yield.”¹⁰

Thus “the noble families of early Attika had by Solon’s time succeeded in bringing under their control perhaps the majority of the holdings of the peasantry of their day, and not the holdings alone, but also, by the operation of the law of personal security for loan, the bodies of a large number of the peasants themselves.”¹¹

In Woodhouse’s system as outlined above, points 1 and 2 hardly admit of dispute.¹² Further, I find myself in agreement through point 4 and with the proposition that reduction to Hektemor

¹⁰ W., p. 160.

¹¹ W., p. 97; cf. pp. 156, 200.

¹² The last serious attempt to reject the now prevalent view that the land was held in family ownership was that of H. Swoboda, *Beiträge zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte* (in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Roman. Abt.*, XXVI [1905], pp. 236-245). F. E. Adecock, in *Cambridge Ancient History*, IV, p. 34 and note 1, follows Swoboda, but on pp. 42-43 he seriously modifies his position in the direction of the generally held view. Here, as so often, Woodhouse summarizes the case admirably (p. 81): “Naturally it is out of the question that we should be called upon to stand and deliver chapter and verse in proof of the legal inalienability of family estate, for Attika, previous to Solon’s time. It is indeed not susceptible of direct proof in so many words referable to some primitive legal Code. We are necessarily confined to reasonable inference from such fragments of practice and statement as have survived. . . . Fragmentary as is the evidence, it is sufficient to allow us to assert that the entire congeries of estates in Attika was historically simply a number of ‘allotments,’ that at some time or other had been officially distributed in perpetuity to the citizen households. What legal sanctions were in operation in early days to prevent alienation, or whether there ever had been any definite sanctions at all, we cannot say. To part with family estate was one of the things that were ‘not done’; the group feeling was against it, let alone the fact that in the earliest times tenure of allotment was also a man’s title to citizenship.” Cf. also note 46 *infra*.

status develops as an alternative to enslavement.¹³ But I consider all these facts and premises capable of a simple, logical explanation. I find Woodhouse's reasoning in points 5 and 6 superfine, and even self-contradictory in places.

Put still more briefly, Woodhouse's hypothesis attempts to show that, by preferring the land of peasant debtors to their persons as security, the creditor lords succeeded in getting possession not only of the debtors' land but eventually also of their persons as well. To this end, he is compelled to create the dichotomy:

- a) principal debt secured by fictitious "sale" of land with option of redemption,
- b) rent-arrears debt secured on person;

so that enslavement for default, or its alternative, reduction to Hektemor status, can proceed only from the second debt. This is precisely the central flaw in Woodhouse's system. In the first place, Aristotle calls the tenants Hektemors when they have not yet defaulted on their rent.¹⁴ In the second place, and more important: was not the first debt also secured ultimately on the person of the debtor, since legally, with the land inalienable, "no other form of security was at all possible"?¹⁵ Surely it is wrong to deduce from Aristotle that *only* tenants who did not pay their rents were liable to distraint and enslavement. Aristotle follows immediately with the explicit statement that "loans for all were upon the body until (the time of) Solon,"¹⁶ and Woodhouse, commenting, himself remarks, "Although the old law of debt, under which the peasant's person was security, could give the creditor his debtor's body, it could never give him his debtor's land."¹⁷ Was not the "sale with option of redemption"

¹³ Basic to Woodhouse's and my argument is the assumption that loans were contracted, as a general rule, outside the *genos*. This view seems justified by what we know of the existence of rich families and poor families in post-Solonian Attica. However, where—as no doubt sometimes happened—the loan was contracted within the *genos*, the situation would not be radically altered, since even within the family the *kleroi* must have passed according to fixed lines of succession.

¹⁴ *Const. Ath.*, 2, 2, καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτήμοροι· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἡργάζοντο τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀγρούς... καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν, ἀγώγιμοι καὶ αὐτὸι καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς ἐγίγνοντο.

¹⁵ W., p. 74.

¹⁶ *Const. Ath.*, 2, 2 (note 3, *supra*).

¹⁷ W., pp. 155-156.

precisely a fiction designed to circumvent the inalienability of the land and transfer to the land-seeking capitalist at least the right of possession and exploitation, if he could not have outright ownership? What legal form would the execution of the first debt, thus privately compounded between the two parties, have taken? Certainly not foreclosure of the farm—the land was inalienable. The only legal execution available was execution upon the person of the debtor.¹⁸

We have here the explanation of *why* the indebted owner was retained on the land as a tenant. Woodhouse thinks that by the perpetual option of redemption and the retention of the debtor as tenant for life¹⁹ "the inalienable legal interests of the corporation of the family would be fully recognized and safeguarded."²⁰ But the family interest is sufficiently protected by the law: the land is inalienable. The perpetual option of redemption is an inevitable corollary of that law. The retention of the debtor as a tenant on the farm is for the protection, not of his family, *but of his creditor's claim to possession*. In other words, the creditor is compelled to retain the debtor on the land in order to retain the land against any possible claim by the debtor's next of kin. He cannot simply put the debtor off the land, for the debtor is the titular owner. He can, of course, proceed to sell the defaulting debtor into slavery in execution of the debt, but this will satisfy the debt, and the *kleros* will immediately devolve, free of debt, to the enslaved debtor's next of kin. Enslavement of the defaulting debtor and retention of the debtor's land by the creditor are mutually exclusive.

Woodhouse sees this problem and faces it courageously. And it is the further refinement to which he is driven to fit this situation within the framework of his scheme that perhaps best reveals the invalidity of that scheme, which is designed, as we have seen, to permit the passage into the creditors' hands of both the debtors' land and their bodies. Within Woodhouse's system, where enslavement results from and satisfies only default on the second

¹⁸ Woodhouse himself states this explicitly, p. 125 (quoted p. 153 *infra*).

¹⁹ Woodhouse thinks that "the vendor, and his heirs in tail, had absolute right of tenancy" (p. 154). This is, of course, a pure assumption, and an entirely unnecessary one if we believe that land was held under a system of family tenure.

²⁰ W., p. 150.

(rent-arrears) debt, there passes to the debtor's next of kin not an estate, but merely an option of redemption. The validity of this conclusion that only the option passed to the next of kin is open to serious question: since, as pointed out above, the original loan must also have been secured in the last analysis on the person, why should not enslavement have satisfied that debt too? Still, to confine ourselves to Woodhouse's own argument on this point, if the next of kin is able to avail himself of the option to redeem, the creditor loses the land which he has acquired for a song, from which he is getting a very profitable return, and which he desires above all to retain. Therefore—see the position to which Woodhouse is driven even on his own premises—in order to be able to produce the insolvent debtor whom he has sold into slavery and thus foil, in case of need, any claim of a next of kin, the creditor "sold the insolvent tenant . . . to some friend across the border, retaining the option of redemption, though he never expected to use it."²¹ What is this but an involved confession that, at bottom, enslavement of the defaulting debtor and retention of the debtor's land by the creditor are mutually exclusive under a system of family land tenure? The second is an extra-legal, private agreement in place of the traditional, legal first. It cannot be both substitute and adjunct.

Thus Woodhouse's dichotomous scheme collapses on its own premises. In its place we may set a view at once simpler and in harmony with the evidence. In the century before Solon there developed, as a result of changing economic conditions which made the landed aristocracy eager for the acquisition of additional lands on which to grow olives and grapes for export purposes, an extra-legal substitute for personal execution of defaulted debts, which permitted the nobles to circumvent the inalienability of the land and acquire a possessory right over the peasants' holdings. This substitute was the fictitious "sale with option of redemption." By this the insolvent debtor²² trans-

²¹ W., p. 181.

²² In view of what has been said, it is probably preferable, if not unavoidable, to regard the loan as being made under the usual terms of personal security and the fictional sale as being arranged upon default of the loan. In other words, the actual transfer of the land is not security for the loan (as it was in the later *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει* when ownership could be conveyed), but an alternative to personal execution, to enslavement.

ferred to his creditor the possession of his land instead of his body and was retained on the land as a rent-paying tenant. These tenants, who by this means escaped enslavement, were the Hektemors. Arrears of rent, if any, must obviously have increased the original debt and made redemption of the land that much harder.²³

This practice developed because it was more satisfactory than personal execution to both creditor and debtor: the former received a much more profitable and certain return on his loan, "a solid and unwasting asset, which might greatly increase in value as time went on";²⁴ the latter was spared enslavement and remained as a rent-paying tenant on his land. There remained over the debtor's head, of course, a constant threat of enslavement, since the creditor could at any time have recourse to legal, i. e. personal, execution. True, the creditor could not resort to personal execution without losing the debtor's land which he held. But the threat of such action must have given the creditor, while remaining in possession of the land, a control in effect if not in law, of the debtor's person and actions. It would be surprising indeed if he did not avail himself of that advantage.

II

The question of whether the Hektemors retained one-sixth or five-sixths of the farm's produce has thus far been deliberately avoided as being unessential to an understanding of the development of the conditions of land tenure in Attica before Solon. This is, moreover, a question on which universal agreement will probably never be reached on the basis of the sources presently available. In *A.J.P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 54-61, Professor von Fritz argues cogently for the point of view that the Hektemors paid a rent of one-sixth. Perhaps the principal argument of those who reject this conclusion is an "appeal . . . to 'common sense,' with the argument that if the rent to be paid was fixed at

²³ Of course, since the basic security was still the debtor's body, the creditor would, in protection of his own interests, probably not allow the cumulative debt to exceed what he might expect to get if he sold the debtor into slavery. Given the complex of forces at play, however, and the multitude of private arrangements of individual matters available, this problem need have arisen rarely enough.

²⁴ W., p. 72.

only one-sixth of the yield it is 'difficult to see where the oppression came in,' about which the Hektemors are supposed to have made outcry."²⁵ But, unless we are to disbelieve Aristotle's explicit statements (cited in the next paragraph), it was not their economic oppression but their politico-social status "which constituted the gravamen of the complainings of the Hektemor class."²⁶ Woodhouse himself makes this point with his customary lucidity and vigor.²⁷ It is a further reflection of the contradictions inherent in his over-refined system that despite this, he concludes, through the elaboration outlined above, that Hektemors were serfs who surrendered five-sixths of their produce—a status to which they were reduced as an alternative to enslavement for unpaid rent-arrears.

²⁵ W., p. 45. K. von Fritz, *op. cit.*, p. 58, attempts to answer the "appeal to common sense" argument by using the story of Pisistratus and the peasant (*Const. Ath.*, 16, 6) to prove "that in fact a rent or tax, not of one-sixth, but of one-tenth of the produce, was considered a heavy burden even under the better economic conditions of the time of Pisistratus." "The significant fact here," he says, "is not so much the complaint of the peasant . . . but the fact that Pisistratus relieves him from the tax, and so implicitly acknowledges that the complaint was justified." Where that conclusion is implicit in the story I fail to see. The story has it that Pisistratus granted the peasant exemption from *all* taxes because he was "pleased by the (peasant's) frankness of speech and love of work." Admittedly, the story can hardly be expected to give us the true motive for Pisistratus' action. But that is merely admitting that the whole anecdote, which is repeated several times in later writings (e.g., Diodorus, IX, 37) and seems to have been invented to explain how the place on Hymettus called Χωρίον Ἀτελέσ got its name or how the proverb *καὶ σφάκελοι ποιοῦσιν ἀτέλειαν* arose, is hardly admissible as valid evidence.

On the "appeal to common sense" argument Woodhouse is surely right when he says (pp. 47-48): "It is idle to argue that it cannot have been possible for a family to subsist on one-sixth of the produce of its farm, in a country as poor as Attika. Problems of ancient history and economics do not submit to solution after that airy fashion. No one now alive knows on how little a Hektemor of the seventh century before Christ, with wife and family, could make shift to exist. . . . Conversely, elaborate arguments marshalled to prove that a rent of even only one-sixth of the gross yield must at that date have been high enough in all conscience, are but labour lost."

²⁶ W., p. 58.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, and p. 46. Cf. also Woodhouse's statements quoted in the next paragraph and referred to in note 37 *infra*, and von Fritz, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

It would be idle to attempt to deny the obvious connection between the politico-social status and the economic condition of the Hektemors. Equally obvious, however, is the fact that Aristotle, in speaking of them, is thinking in political terms, in terms of the *πολιτεία*: *ἡν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικὴ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναικες. καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἔκτήμοροι . . . χαλεπώτατον μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον ἡν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ δουλεύειν . . . τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὖσης ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις . . .*²⁸ The question, then, becomes: exactly what is meant here by *δουλεύειν*? Woodhouse²⁹ and von Fritz³⁰ both point out that the verb here denotes not actual but figurative slavery. Von Fritz rightly sees that Aristotle's statement that loans were secured upon the person until the time of Solon³¹ is meant to explain this "slavery," but goes on to suggest that it consisted in the fact that: a) the Hektemor could be enslaved if he did not pay his rent; and b) "when the tenant was still able to pay his rent and hence was not yet *ἀγώγιμος*," he was not free to leave the farm, but "he and his family were kept in bondage and had to stay on it either until they were able to buy it back—which may have occurred rarely—or until they were unable to meet their obligations and so, at the will of their creditor and landlord, could be sold as slaves."³² It is worth noting that von Fritz thus, by implication, rightly sees the retention of the debtor on the land as protecting the creditor's interests, although he does not see the details of the situation correctly.³³ He bases his conclusion on the supposition that the Hektemor was anxious to leave the land, the possession of which he had surrendered. But this must have been the exception

²⁸ *Const. Ath.*, 2, 2; 2, 3; 5, 1; cf. Solon, frag. 4 (Bergk), 17-19:

τοῦτ' ἥδη πάση πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἀφυκτον·

εἰς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἥλυθε δουλοσύνην,

ἡ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὔδοντ' ἐπεγείρει.

²⁹ Pp. 58-63.

³⁰ *Loc. cit.*

³¹ *Const. Ath.*, 2, 2 (note 3 *supra*). Von Fritz uses the text of Kaibel and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *καὶ γὰρ δεδεμένοι τοῖς δανείσασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἤσαν μέχρι Σόλωνος*, which is not now generally accepted but gives the same sense.

³² *Loc. cit.*

³³ See p. 148 *supra*.

rather than the rule. Athenian farmers in the seventh century still took very slowly to the new, non-agricultural trades, which, moreover, had not yet shown any important development in Attica. In most cases the Hektemors must have been glad to remain on their land, even at an exorbitant rent. There must have been, on the other hand, many cases where the large landholder would have been glad to oust the Hektemor and have the farm tilled by some of his already large staff of slaves and serfs. He had to keep the Hektemor, as we have seen,³⁴ if he wanted to keep the Hektemor's land.

The best expression of Woodhouse's view, put forth in several places, is the following: "In pre-Solonian Attika, to judge from the silence of our authorities, it was not so much the scale or proportion exacted by way of interest or rent that constituted the grievance of the farming population . . . as the inevitable personal liability in the event of default. The burden of indebtedness, whether in respect of loan or of rent,³⁵ could not be thrown upon the land, but must continue to be borne solely by the person in legal occupancy of the land, or in whom the legal right of such occupancy vested. This in itself marked a grave disability of the unprivileged and poorer section of the community, from the ranks of which the borrowers were derived almost entirely. . . . Hence Solon refused to interfere with interest rates, which either adjust themselves or else defy adjustment by external authority, but made haste to deal with the *standing menace to the borrower's personal freedom* [italics mine]."³⁶

This and related statements of Woodhouse,³⁷ it seems to me, come closest to rendering the full force of δουλεία in the passages under discussion. In contrasting the position of the Hektemors with that of the Helots of Sparta, Woodhouse points out that "there can be no manner of doubt that the Attic Hektemors were theoretically just as indefeasibly members of the Athenian body politic as the proudest aristocrats of those for whose enrichment they must toil."³⁸ At the same time, as Woodhouse justly repeatedly stresses,³⁹ the decision as to the treatment to be accorded the defaulting debtor lay with the creditor—it was he who made the choice between enslavement and reduction to

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁷ See especially pp. 60-61, 63.

³⁵ Cf. note 18 *supra*.

³⁸ W., p. 57.

³⁶ W., pp. 124-125.

³⁹ E. g., p. 158.

Hektemor status. Does not $\tauὸ\ δουλεύειν$ refer, then, to the fact that, because of this threat of enslavement that hung constantly over their heads, the Hektemors were not free agents but virtual slaves? Their greatest grievance was the political use of this threat. For what finer political weapon could the wealthy have had to strengthen their oligarchic rule, to keep the Hektemors silent and obedient, and to prevent them, as far and as long as possible, from uniting in opposition⁴⁰ than the constant threat of enslavement that they held over the heads of the impoverished masses?

III

"Solon was no mere visionary or precipitate doctrinaire grasping a heaven-sent opportunity of putting in practice pet economic and political nostrums."⁴¹ His laws were the result of "his prudential recognition of the tendency of the society of his day to cut loose from the old tribal moralities."⁴² The truth of this general estimate is nowhere so apparent as in the specific matter of land tenure and alienability with which this discussion is concerned. Here Solon's legislation, in effect, merely gave the force of law to a custom that had grown up outside the law. The landed aristocrat was interested in acquiring more land, the indigent, debt-laden peasant in retaining at least his freedom. To their mutual, if unequal, advantage, therefore, they had developed a legal fiction to accomplish those purposes. Solon removed the necessity, for the future, of recourse to the fictional sale. By forbidding the securing of loans upon the person⁴³ he ensured the people against enslavement: this was "the beginning of Athenian democracy."⁴⁴ By cancelling agricultural debts he gave the people back their land.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ As Plutarch, *Solon*, 13, 3, tells us they did. Cf. the statements of Aristotle, *Const. Ath.*, 5, 1, and Solon, frag. 4 (Bergk), 18-19 (note 28 *supra*), that the "slavery" of the people brought about civil war.

⁴¹ W., p. 167.

⁴² W., p. 81; cf. also p. 200.

⁴³ κύριος δὲ γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων Σόλων τόν τε δῆμον ἡλευθέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ εἰς τὸ μέλλον, κωλύσας δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, Aristotle, *Const. Ath.*, 6, 1; πρὸς δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι μηδένα δανείζειν, Plutarch, *Solon*, 15, 3.

⁴⁴ *Const. Ath.*, 41, 2.

⁴⁵ καὶ νόμους ἔθηκε καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐποίησε καὶ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν

But he also permitted a man without sons to bequeath his property, and thus "made property the personal possessions of their owners."⁴⁶ Whether or not "we should properly regard that enactment as but a single element in a whole body of similar legislation,"⁴⁷ Solon here took the first step toward making land legally alienable and permitting the aristocracy to acquire estates in outright ownership, not merely in possessory right. The wealthy thus got something which more than compensated them for any deprivations caused by the laws advantageous to the *demos*.⁴⁸ "Timidly at first, but with increasing frequency as time went on, the old taboo or interdiction was transgressed, so that family estate before very long became fully commercialized, and passed from hand to hand without at any rate any restraint of law."⁴⁹ As Woodhouse justly remarks,⁵⁰ it is now that the true mortgage—and, we might add, the true sale—develops as a legal instrument.

Woodhouse is, however, too sanguine about the effects of Solon's agrarian legislation when he pictures the peasant restored thereby to a position of economic security, with all worries gone.⁵¹

δημοσίων, ἀς σεισάχθειαν καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἀποσεισάμενοι τὸ βάρος, Aristotle, *Const. Ath.*, 6, 1; cf. 12, 4, vv. 5-7 (= Solon, frag. 36 [Bergk], 3-5) and 13, 3, and Plutarch, *Solon*, 15, 3-5. On the nature and effect of this measure cf. W., especially pp. 174-177, 190-195.

⁴⁶ Plutarch, *Solon*, 21, 2, *τὰ χρήματα κτήματα τῶν ἔχοντων ἐποίησεν*. The full significance of this penetrating appraisal of the effect of Solon's measure has been generally overlooked. As far as I know, only M. Wilbrandt has called attention to it (*De rerum privatuarum ante Solonis tempus in Attica statu* [Rostock diss., 1895], p. 50). Plutarch's wording is very precise, and reveals that Plutarch (or his source) understood that land in pre-Solonian Attica was held under a system of family tenure and could not pass out of the family: before Solon's law the *kleros* was something of which its holder enjoyed only the use (*χρῆμα*), thereafter it became his private possession (*κτῆμα*).

On Solon's law cf. Demosth., 20, 102; [46, 14]; Isaeus, 3, 68.

⁴⁷ W., p. 199.

⁴⁸ Cf., in this light, Solon, frag. 5 (Bergk), 3-4:

*οἱ δ' εἰχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἥσαν ἀγητοῖ,
καὶ τοῖσ' ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν.*

⁴⁹ W., p. 199.

⁵⁰ Pp. 199-202.

⁵¹ P. 198: "It is possible that Solon did set a legal limit to the acquisitiveness of the wealthy. More effective is the check that works as it were from within. That is to say, the most effective check is found

Did not the same causes subsist which had driven the peasant to borrow before? Plutarch tells us that Solon was himself aware of the fact that the Attic soil could give but a bare subsistence to those who tilled it.⁵² However Woodhouse may try to hedge about in uncertainty the identity of the recipients of the State loans instituted by Pisistratus,⁵³ the very need for these loans to farmers—their very existence—proves that the causes of borrowing did subsist after Solon. It is true that “from that monstrous evil, the evil of *latifundia*, Attic agrarian history, thanks primarily to Solon, continued free.”⁵⁴ But that was not because Solon set the small landholder and farmer on such a secure economic basis that he would not part with his land; it was because his laws on inheritance assured the constant division of large estates.⁵⁵ Woodhouse is much more realistic when he concludes, “By declaring illegal the lending upon security of the body, Solon could and did guarantee the personal freedom of the borrower; but he did not guarantee, and in the nature of things could not guarantee, the permanent freedom of the rescued estates. For Solon did not declare illegal the giving of security for loan; he declared illegal only a particular type of security. So far as his own action and regulations went, there was nothing whatever in them to prevent every newly liberated farm in Attika from being next day mortgaged up to the hilt and falling ultimately once more into the hands of noble capitalists.”⁵⁶

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

in a general unreadiness of small land-owners and proprietors of moderate estate to part with their holdings. If the land is thus firmly held by the small freeholder, the land-hungry capitalist finds it uneconomical to tempt him to sell—the game is not worth the candle. For what should a man take in lieu of the farm on which he is making a good living?”

⁵² *Solon*, 22, 3: Σόλων δὲ . . . τῆς χώρας τὴν φύσιν ὀρῶν τοῖς γεωργοῦσι γλίσχρως διαρκοῦσαν.

⁵³ Pp. 196-198.

⁵⁴ W., p. 198.

⁵⁵ Cf. [Demosth.], *C. Macart.* (or. 43), *passim*, especially 51, 62; and L. Beauchet, *Histoire du droit privé de la république Athénienne*, III, pp. 442-452 (especially pp. 451-452).

⁵⁶ W., p. 206.

CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES ON THE ISSUES OF SEVERAL GREEK MINTS.

In his competent review of *Olynthus*, IX (*A.J.P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 102-105), Alfred R. Bellinger touched the problem of the extent to which one is justified in admitting an Olynthus provenience among the evidence pertinent to the determination of the date of autonomous Greek coins. It is little doubted, I think, that the body of numismatic evidence indicates with certainty that the areas excavated at Olynthus between 1928 and 1934 (inclusive) were all abandoned in 348 B.C., except for that section of the North Hill called the "Northwest Quarter," which continued to be inhabited until the reign of Cassander.¹ If, then, one finds (in areas other than the Northwest Quarter) autonomous Greek coins which are conventionally dated later than 348 (in the Northwest Quarter, later than *ca.* 316), one must conclude either that the conventional dating is incorrect or that such coins are stray intruders into an abandoned site. It is my purpose in this paper (a) to analyze the numismatic data to determine the odds against the occurrence among the autonomous Greek excavation coins published in *Olynthus*, IX of pieces later than 348 and of pieces later than *ca.* 316, (b) to examine eleven excavation specimens from the autonomous issues of seven Greek mints, conventionally dated between the middle of the fourth and the middle of the third centuries B.C., to find whether such purely numismatic evidence as can at present be used for their chronology supports or contradicts the odds against their conventional date.

The data used to arrive at the odds against the occurrence among the coins which have been found at Olynthus of pieces later than 348 and later than *ca.* 316 are conveniently available in the chronological table drawn up in *Olynthus*, IX, pp. 364-368. In Column I of this table are listed 3528 coins which on numismatic evidence have been dated, certainly or with reasonable assurance, before *ca.* 348. The coins of Column II cannot

¹ Bellinger, *loc. cit.*, p. 103: "So far as the numismatic evidence goes, this contention is overwhelmingly supported." Cf. *Olynthus*, IX, pp. 133-134, 162-163, 368-370; further, see *Olynthus*, VIII, pp. vii-viii, and 1-13.

enter into our calculation of the odds with respect to 348, for these coins belong to series the issue of which began, so far as numismatic evidence indicates, before 348 and continued for some time after that year. Column III, in which are listed all pieces dating with certainty after 348, contains a total of 96 coins. Of this number, 36 coins, distributed among the quasi-autonomous issues of the second and first centuries B. C., Roman imperial, Byzantine, and miscellaneous late issues, must be excluded from our calculation because they are all too late to affect the odds against the occurrence of autonomous Greek coins dating later than 348.² The 111 coins of Column IV likewise must be excluded from our calculation, for this column includes coins of uncertain attribution, coins which are so variously dated in the numismatic literature as to make their chronological classification for the moment impossible, and finally the coins for which I wish to suggest the need of a revision of the dating conventional in the numismatic literature. Basing our calculation, then, on the 3528 coins of Column I and on the 60 coins of Column II (96 — 36), we find that the odds against the occurrence among the Olynthus excavation coins of autonomous Greek pieces dating after 348 are about 98.3 to 1.7, or 58 to 1. Thus of any given number of the autonomous Greek coins found at Olynthus, we may expect *ca.* 98.3% to be anterior to 348, *ca.* 1.7% to be posterior to that date.

To calculate the odds against the occurrence of autonomous Greek coins later in date than *ca.* 316 one must, of course, work with slightly different figures. The total number of coins reasonably dated before *ca.* 316 is 3579 (3528 [Col. I] + 28 [Alexander III] + 23 [Anonymous royal Macedonian issues]); the total number of autonomous Greek coins dating after *ca.* 316 is 9 (3 [Cassander] + 5 [Antigonus, uncertain whether Gonatas or Doson] + 1 [posthumous Philip II, *ca.* 310]). Consequently, the odds against the occurrence among the Olynthus excavation coins of autonomous Greek pieces dating after *ca.* 316 are about 99.75 to 0.25, or 399 to 1. That is to say, of any given number of the autonomous Greek coins found at Olynthus, we may expect

² These 36 coins comprise the second-century B. C. issues of Macedonia (1), the second- to first-century B. C. issues of Thessalonica (4), Roman imperial (14), Byzantine (10), and miscellaneous late issues, such as Venetian, Frankish (?), Turkish, etc. (7).

ca. 99.75% to be anterior to *ca.* 316, *ca.* 0.25% to be posterior to that date.

These odds, both with respect to 348 and with respect to 316, are so overwhelming that I must confess that, when I meet among the Olynthus coins autonomous Greek issues which are dated later than 348 or later than *ca.* 316, I am inclined to suspect their dates in need of revision unless I can find some good reason to the contrary. In the case of eleven excavation coins from issues of Elaeus, Hephaestia, Myrina, Salamis, Megara, Heraclea Pontica, and Cyme—all conventionally dated in periods falling in the century between *ca.* 350 and *ca.* 250 B. C.—it seems to me that in no case does such reason exist, that in several cases sound numismatic evidence can be adduced, even in the present imperfect state of our knowledge of the issues of these mints, to argue an earlier date for the coins in question than that conventionally met.

The autonomous coinage of Elaeus consists of three issues of bronze: (1) Prow | Olive wreath; (2) Athena | Owl; (3) Artemis | Bee. Two specimens of Series 1 were found at Olynthus between 1928 and 1934, one in Block B ii or B iii (the north end of 1928 Trench 7), the other in House A' 9 of the Northwest Quarter. Both Head and Babelon date the series in the second half of the fourth century B. C.³

The coins of all three series were attributed to Elaeus by Imhoof-Blumer in 1883, and described in the order in which they are here listed.⁴ The indications of the relative chronology, in so far, at any rate, as the position of Series 1 with respect to Series 2 and 3 is concerned, are obvious. Series 1 is divided into two groups: (a) the simple types with, reverse, the ethnic abbreviated ΕΛΑ or ΕΛΑΙ;⁵ (b) the types with, reverse, the full ethnic ΕΛΑΙΟΥΣΙΩΝ and a monogramme.⁶ All specimens of Series 2 and 3, so far as I have observed, have on the reverse

³ *Hist. Num.*², p. 259 (*circ.* B. C. 350-281); *Traité*, II, 4, pp. 1003 ff. (seconde moitié du IV^e siècle).

⁴ *Monnaies Grecques* (Amsterdam, 1883), pp. 45-48. In the same year von Sallet independently published an attribution to Elaeus of a specimen of the series Athena | Owl (*Zeit. f. Num.*, X [1883], p. 150; cf. *König. Museen zu Berlin, Beschreibung der Ant. Münzen*, I [Berlin, 1888], p. 263).

⁵ E. g., Imhoof-Blumer, *op. cit.*, p. 45, nos. 33-36.

⁶ E. g., *ibid.*, nos. 37-38.

the unabbreviated ethnic and, in addition, either a monogramme or a subsidiary letter.⁷ In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems a fair assumption that the progression of notations on the coinage from the simple to the elaborate implies for Series 1 anteriority with respect to Series 2 and 3.⁸

Throughout the second half of the fifth century, to the very end of the Peloponnesian War, Elaeus remained an ally of Athens.⁹ And in the following century the town's relations with Athens were very close. In 375/4 Elaeus became a member of the Second Athenian Confederation.¹⁰ In 357/6 Elaeusian ambassadors in Athens, at the outbreak of the Social War, receive the praise of the Athenian State.¹¹ In 346/5 a crown of 70 drachmae voted Athens by Elaeus is recorded among the treasures of Athena.¹² And in 341/0 Athens decreed by law rights for the Elaeusians the same as those enjoyed by the Athenian cleruchs in the Chersonese.¹³ It is rather likely that an Elaeusian coinage of Athenian type (Series 2, Athena | Owl), in style definable as the second half of the fourth century,¹⁴ was being issued in the 'forties, perhaps even a decade or more

⁷ E. g., *ibid.*, nos. 39-41.

⁸ Imhoof-Blumer's order of listing the series has become traditional (cf. Grose, *McClean Collection*, II, pp. 133-134; Head, *Hist. Num.*², p. 259), though it is not universal. Von Sallet and Babelon, for example, switched the Prow | Olive wreath series from first to third place in the order of their descriptions (*Beschreibung*, I, pp. 263-264; *Traité*, II, 4, pp. 1006-1007); I cannot find that they had any special reason for doing so.

⁹ Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I, pp. 270-271; Thucydides, VIII, 102 f., and 107, 2; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, 1, 20 (cf. Diodorus, XIII, 39, 2, and 49, 5; Plutarch, *Lysander*, 9).

¹⁰ *I. G.*, II², 43, B 27, with Kirchner's note *ad loc.*

¹¹ *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), p. 12, no. 4.

¹² *I. G.*, II², 1443, col. II, lines 93 ff.; cf. Demosthenes, XVIII, 92, and Christ, Schmid, Stählin, *Gesch. d. Griech. Litt.* (6th ed.), I, p. 605.

¹³ *I. G.*, II², 228; on the cleruchies see Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I, pp. 444 f., and II, p. 451. Cf. next note *infra*.

¹⁴ Head, *Hist. Num.*², p. 259; Babelon, *Traité*, II, 4, p. 1006 (cf. note 3 *supra*). Babelon speaks of an Athenian cleruchy to Elaeus in 346/5; this seems to be his interpretation of *B. C. H.*, XXXIX (1915), p. 139, where reference is made to the decree *I. G.*, II², 228, which defines the relationship between 'Ελαιούσιοι and 'Αθηναῖοι ἐν Χερρονήσωι; the former term signifies, in Dittenberger's words, non cleruchos Atheniensium, sed civitatem sociam Elaeusiorum (*Sylloge*², 145).

earlier.¹⁵ If this is so, it is not too bold to place the upper limit of Series 1 in the second quarter of the fourth century, at the latest.¹⁶

The fact that two coins of Series 1 were found at Olynthus indicates as very probable the issue of the series before the middle of the fourth century.¹⁷ And numismatic evidence, it seems to me, clearly supports the testimony of an Olynthus provenience.

Of the autonomous bronze of the Lemnian cities Hephaestia and Myrina only the first four series are of interest here: (1) Bearded head | ΛHMNI Ram; (2) Athena | HΦA or HΦAIΣTI Ram; (3) Athena | HΦAI Owl (with symbols, race-torch and branch); (4) Athena | MYPI Owl. At Olynthus were found (between 1928 and 1934) a specimen of Series 2 (in one of Houses E. S. H. 1-3 [1928 Trench 13]) and three specimens of Series 4 (Sections G, M, and Street vi). Head's date for the three Athena series is *ca.* 300 B. C.¹⁸

The reverse of the coins of Series 1 has a slight incuse square; Head has remarked that the bearded head on the obverse is stylistically similar to the head of Zeus on early fourth century coins of Elis.¹⁹ Since this alone of the four earliest series of Lemnos lacks an Athena type, it is perhaps worth noting that Athens lost control of her Lemnian cleruchs at the close of the Peloponnesian War, regained the island in 394/3, and remained firmly in possession until 318.²⁰ Series 2, Athena | Ram, it is not unreasonable to suppose, represents in point of time the second series of bronze issued on Lemnos, for its reverse type connects it with Series 1, while its obverse type connects it with Series 3 and 4. As for these last two, the Athena | Owl issues of

¹⁵ Babelon, *loc. cit.*, proposed to connect the series with his Athenian cleruchs at Elaeus and so to begin its issue in the 'forties (cf. note 8 *supra*).

¹⁶ Only a slight correction of Head's upper date of *ca.* 350 B. C. (*loc. cit.*).

¹⁷ Although one of the two coins was found in the Northwest Quarter, the *terminus ad quem* of which is *ca.* 316.

¹⁸ *Hist. Num.*², pp. 262-263.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 262.

²⁰ Fredrich in *I. G.*, XII, 8, p. 3, and in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Lemnos," col. 1930. Head's date for the series is simply "Before B. C. 350"; Babelon proposed to begin the issue about the time of the Peace of Antalcidas or somewhat later (*Traité*, II, 4, p. 1015).

Hephaestia and Myrina, one may legitimately assume that the similarity of type argues some degree of chronological propinquity, with the Myrina series perhaps somewhat earlier than the Hephaestia series (which carries symbols on its reverse). It seems utterly incongruous to place these three issues with Athena's head on the obverse about the year 300, as is conventionally done, for during the thirty-seven-year period between 318 and 281 Athens was in control of Lemnos only for the twelve years between 307 and 295, and perhaps the period of her control was even less.²¹ On the other hand, if we admit the Athena series into the period before 318, we win a reasonable parallelism for coinage and political history;²² and if we suggest for the Athena | Ram series of Hephaestia an upper date in the second quarter of the century and for the Athena | Owl series of Myrina an upper date somewhat before the middle of the century, with the Athena | Owl issue of Hephaestia beginning somewhat after the middle of the century, all, or at any rate the last two, running on down towards a *terminus ad quem* at ca. 318 B. C., we shall commit no grave violence upon any characteristic of style or fabric exhibited by any coin of the series which has come under my observation.

In the Athena | Ram series of Hephaestia and the Athena | Owl series of Myrina the chief characteristic of fabric is the use of the circular punch; this type of punch was used on the Chalcidic coinage as early as the 'nineties of the fourth century.²³ The style of both Lemnian series is mediocre, to say the least; its striking characteristic is the smallness of the obverse head, a phenomenon by no means foreign to the coinages of the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third centuries (compare,

²¹ It is possible that Demetrius occupied the island before 295, shortly after the Battle of Ipsus in 301; see Fredrich in *I. G.*, XII, 8, p. 4, under the year 301-300.

²² Documents of the period 394-318 designate Hephaestia and Myrina δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖων τῶν ἐν Ἡφαιστίᾳ, δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖων τῶν ἐν Μυρίνῃ (*I. G.*, XII, 8, 15 [cf. 26], 3, 4, 5, etc.); during the period of freedom from Athens before 394 the political units had been called [δῆμος ὁ Ἡφαιστεῖων], δῆμος ὁ Μυριναῖων or Μυριναῖοι (*I. G.*, XII, 8, 2 and 9, the first in the early fourth century, the second in the late fourth century, presumably during a period in which the Athenian domination did not exist).

²³ The small coins of Group J; *Olynthus*, IX, pp. 40 and 87.

for example, the Athena bronze of Demetrius Poliorcetes) but one too that can be fairly paralleled on coinages of the middle of the fourth century and somewhat earlier.²⁴ Von Sallet has remarked a similarity in style and fabric between specimens of the Athena issue of Elaeus and specimens of the Athena issues of Hephaestia and Myrina, all in a large lot of coins which came to Berlin from Smyrna.²⁵ If the date proposed above for the Elaeus coins is correct, von Sallet's observation is further testimony that the date of the Lemnian issues must be moved from the end back to the middle quarters of the fourth century.

Here again, I think, the testimony of an Olynthus provenience, which indicates for Series 2 and 4 an upper date before the middle of the fourth century, is supported by the numismatic evidence.

Of the Salamis issue of bronze, Female head | Shield, two specimens were found at Olynthus between 1928 and 1934, one in House A 11, the other in House A vii 5. In the first edition of the *Historia Numorum* Head dated this Salamis coinage "between circ. B. C. 350 and 318" (so Head-Svoronos, *Ιστορία τῶν Νομισμάτων*, I, p. 488; Büchner in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Salamis," col. 1832); in his second edition (Oxford, 1911) Head lowered his *terminus post quem* to ca. 339, adding to his text a reference to Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.*, IV (1879), p. 250, as though to indicate that in this article could be found the evidence for his new chronology. The dates of Head's second edition were adopted by Babelon in *Traité*, II, 3 (Paris, 1914), the upper date (338 rather than the 339 of Head) stated on the assumption that Philip, after Chaeronea, freed Salamis of its Athenian cleruchs and returned to it its political autonomy (Tant que l'île demeura dans la dépendance d'Athènes elle ne put avoir d'atelier monétaire)—and, as if in justification of this assumption, Babelon gave the same reference to Köhler which had appeared in Head's second edition. It is, then, somewhat disconcerting to find, first, that in reality the thesis for which Köhler argued

²⁴ With the specimen of the Athena | Ram series figured in Grose, *McClean Collection*, II, pl. 151, no. 12, compare *Olynthus*, III, nos. 117, 404, 476, 513, 635 (all before the middle of the fourth century); and with the specimen of the Athena | Owl series figured in Forrer, *Weber Collection*, II, pl. 95, no. 2490, compare the Malis bronze in *B. M. C. Thessaly*, p. 35, no. 3, pl. VII, no. 6 (dated 400-344 B. C.).

²⁵ *Beschreibung*, I, pp. 263 ff.; cf. *Zeit. f. Num.*, X (1883), p. 150.

in this twice cited article was that Athens' dependents might possess the right of coinage during the period of their dependency; second, that so far as the coinage of Salamis was concerned it was Köhler's clearly expressed opinion that the style of the head on the obverse of the coins and the letter forms of the legend on the reverse indicate that the series began in the first half of the fourth century (see *Ath. Mitt.*, IV [1879], pp. 250-264, particularly p. 250, note 1, and pp. 261, 263-264).

In this series of Salamis the most striking element of fabric is again the incuse circle left by the punch die (on which see note 21 *supra*). The style of the head on the obverse is fairly comparable with that of many fine heads on coinages of the first half of the fourth century, as Köhler noted. With McClean, II, pl. 211, no. 21 (Salamis) compare, for example, *Olynthus*, VI, nos. 190-192 and 195, and *Olynthus*, IX, pl. XXX, nos. 15, 17-18 (Chalcidic bronze; see too *Olynthus*, IX, tetrobols A68 and A70-71, Chalcidic silver).²⁶ Perhaps instructive, too, is the comparison of the Salamis coin McClean, II, pl. 211, no. 21, with the drachma of Lamia, Weber, II, no. 2824; the head on the obverse of the latter, which is dated at the end of the fourth century or in the early years of the third, is somewhat less restrained, somewhat fancier in execution than the head on the obverse of the Salamis coin.

It seems to me clear that for the third time numismatic evidence joins the evidence of an Olynthus provenience in supporting a *terminus post quem* before the middle of the fourth century.

One specimen of the Prow | Dolphin series of Megarian bronze was found at Olynthus in the period 1928-1934 (in House A' 10 of the Northwest Quarter). F. O. Waage has made an excellent systematization of seven varieties of this series.²⁷ The crux of the problem of both the relative and the absolute date of these coins is their position with respect to the Megarian Apollo issues of silver and bronze dated at the end of the fourth century.

²⁶ Further, with Weber, II, pl. 133, nos. 3580-3581, with Hunter, II, pl. XXXV, no. 17, and with *de Luynes*, II, pl. LXXXI, nos. 2119-2120 (all Salamis), compare *Olynthus*, III, no. 143 (Bottiaean bronze), *ibid.*, nos. 882-884 (bronze of Sermylia), and *B. M. C. Thessaly*, pl. VI, no. 13 (bronze of Larisa dated in the period 400-344 B. C.).

²⁷ *Greek Bronze Hoards from a Well at Megara* (Numismatic Notes and Monographs, no. 70, 1935), pp. 10-29.

Conventionally the Prow | Dolphin series has been considered later than the Apollo issues, and Waage argued in support of the third-century date for all varieties of the series. It is unfortunate that the evidence which can at present be mustered to support the argument is at best inconclusive;²⁸ the fact seems to be that no good reason has yet been noticed to prohibit the Prow | Dolphin series, in whole or in part, from a date in the second half of the fourth century—at least I have found none.

And in the absence of reasonably sure numismatic evidence to the contrary, it should hardly be considered unlikely that the variety of the Prow | Dolphin series to which the Olynthus excavation coin belongs (Waage's Group VII) was being issued, at the latest, before *ca.* 316 B. C.,²⁹ for that is the testimony of the Olynthus provenience.

One specimen of the series of bronze, Female head with turreted crown | Club, tentatively attributed to Heraclea Pontica and placed up toward the head of a group of uncertain bronze coins classified as third to first centuries before Christ,³⁰ was found at Olynthus between 1928 and 1934 (in House A v 7). Further study of the coin has convinced me that the tentative attribution to the Bithynian mint (cf. *Olynthus*, IX, p. 354) is doubtless correct, moreover that the best numismatic evidence available speaks clearly for a date for the coin in the first half of the fourth century before Christ. The reverse type of the coin found at Olynthus is HPAK above and below a club with head right, the whole in a linear circle. A reverse type for small silver of Heraclea Pontica, dated in the period *ca.* 394-353 B. C., is HPAK above and below a club with head right, above, an ivy leaf.³¹ The obverse type of the coin found at Olynthus is a female head wearing a turreted crown. A very common type for silver at Heraclea Pontica, dating in the second quarter of

²⁸ The primary body of evidence, weight diminution through the varieties of the Apollo issues of bronze and those of the Prow | Dolphin series, appears to come to nothing (cf. *Olynthus*, IX, pp. 348-349).

²⁹ The proposition was made *Olynthus*, IX, p. 350, repeated *ibid.*, p. 371, with note 11.

³⁰ Waddington, Babelon, Reinach, *Recueil Général des Monnaies Grecques d'Asie Mineure*, I, p. 355, no. 65.

³¹ Hunter, II, p. 244, no. 4; Regling, *Sammlung Warren*, no. 985.

the fourth century B. C., is a female head with turreted crown.³² The face on the obverse of the coin from Olynthus is very similar to the face on the obverse of McClean, III, pl. 254, no. 20 of the Heraclea Pontica series, and the fashion of hair-dressing exhibited by the two heads is identical. The characteristic ornament on the circlet of the crown worn by the lady of the Heraclea Pontica series is a palmette between Θ's.³³ Traces of this ornament, worn but quite certain, can be seen on the crown of the specimen from Olynthus (*Olynthus*, IX, pl. XXXII, no. 27). There can be little doubt that this bronze is a product of the mint of the silver issues, the types of which it so closely parallels, and their contemporary.

Once more, I think, numismatic evidence and that of an Olynthus provenience join to attest a *terminus post quem* before the middle of the century.

The earliest autonomous bronze of Cyme consists of four series: (1) Eagle's head | Rosette; (2) Eagle | KY One-handled vase; (3) same types and legend, with magistrate's name on obverse; (4) Forepart of horse, magistrate's name | One-handled vase, monogramme.³⁴ The first two series are conventionally dated ca. 350-320 B. C., the last two ca. 320-250 B. C. In 1934 one specimen of Series 3 was found at Olynthus, in Street v near House A v 6.

As the coinage of Cyme is now arranged, the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries before Christ seem to be periods of some difficulty. The first two series of bronze, and the two silver issues with which they are grouped (Eagle | Forepart of horse, Forepart or head of horse | Rosette), are sometimes compressed into the thirty-year period between 350 and 320,³⁵ sometimes spread over the hundred-and-thirty-year period between 450 and 320.³⁶

³² This type figures on issues attributed to the tyrants Clearachus (364-352) and Satyrus (352-345): *Hist. Num.*², pp. 514-515; *Traité*, II, 2, pp. 1506 ff. It is admitted that these issues may have been in circulation earlier: *Recueil*, I, p. 344.

³³ McClean, *loc. cit.*; cf. *Recueil*, I, pl. LV, nos. 26 ff.; *Traité*, II, 2, pl. CLXXXIII.

³⁴ *Hist. Num.*², p. 553; *Traité*, II, 2, p. 1171; *B. M. C. Troas*, pp. 106-108; cf. *Zeit. f. Num.*, XX (1897), pp. 277-279.

³⁵ Wroth, *B. M. C. Troas*, p. 106; Babelon, *Traité*, II, 2, pp. 1170-1171. Both assume no coinage between 450 and 350.

³⁶ Head, *Hist. Num.*², p. 553.

It seems likely that the upper date of the early bronze should be moved backwards from *ca.* 350 B. C. The specimen of Series 3 found at Olynthus has a typical fourth-century fabric.³⁷ And the eagle on the obverse is closer in style to his fellows on the coinages of Olophyxus (second quarter of the fourth century), Perdiccas III (365-359), and the early Macedonian issues of Alexander III³⁸ than he is to his relatives on, for example, the coinages of the Ptolemies, from the last decade of the fourth century onward, a long succession of large-feathered, stringy, and strutting birds.³⁹ The coins of Series 3, it seems to me, are more at home, so far as matters of style and fabric are concerned, in the middle quarters of the fourth century than in the first two quarters of the third.

A specimen of Series 3 occurred among the coins found in the vertical spaces between the stones of the upper layer of the base of the cult statue of Artemis at Sardis.⁴⁰ Such of these coins as yield a definite chronology range in date from issues of Alexander III to those of Antiochus III (220-187 B. C.). "The coins [of this Basis Hoard] differ so widely in date, and many of the early ones are in such good preservation, that it is difficult to assume that they were all placed in the basis at one and the same time."⁴¹ The Sardis hoard, then, can give us evidence neither to confirm nor to discard the new dating here proposed for the early series of Cyme bronze.⁴²

And once again it appears to me that numismatic evidence combines with the testimony of an Olynthus provenience to point the reasonable conclusion, an upper date for Series 3 of Cyme before the middle of the fourth century.

³⁷ Compare too *B. M. C. Troas*, pl. XX, no. 8, which shows traces of a circular punch.

³⁸ Illustrative comparisons are *Olynthus*, IX, pl. XXXIII, no. 2 (Cyme) and pl. XXX, no. 14 (Olophyxus); further *B. M. C. Troas*, pl. XX (Cyme) and *Ant. Mün. Nord-Gr.*, III, 2, pl. XXX, no. 17 (Perdiccas III) and pl. XXXI, nos. 19, 20, and 23 (Alexander III).

³⁹ Consider *B. M. C. Ptolemies*, p. 3, no. 17, and *passim*; cf. Head, *Hist. Num.*², p. 849.

⁴⁰ Bell, *Sardis*, XI, 1, pp. iv-vi, 15.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. vi.

⁴² Also noncommittal are the two other hoards in which the coins occur: Hill, *Studies Presented to Sir William Ridgeway*, pp. 110-115; Milne, *Num. Chron.*, XIII (1913), pp. 389-398; cf. Noe, *A Bibliography of Greek Coin Hoards* (2nd ed., 1937; *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, no. 78), pp. 243 and 260.

At the beginning of this paper we found that of any given number of autonomous Greek coins discovered at Olynthus *ca.* 1.7% can be expected to date later than 348 B. C. Of the group of eleven coins reviewed here 1.7% gives us something less than one fourth of one coin; we shall deal very generously with the statistics of probability if we place the Megara coin between 348 and *ca.* 316 B. C. We found, too, that of any given number of autonomous Greek coins discovered at Olynthus *ca.* 0.25% can be expected to date later than *ca.* 316 B. C. Of the group of eleven coins reviewed here 0.25% gives us a fraction sufficiently small to be ignored with safety.

PAUL A. CLEMENT.

AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS,
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION IN ANCIENT RHETORIC.

(Continued from p. 50.)

2 (corresponding to section 2, page 39 *supra*). Aristotle, as we have seen, provided a new basis for the theory of the rhetorical argument by constructing the enthymeme in closest analogy to his logical syllogism. Thus any theory of the argument in a later system that shows a distinctly syllogistic complexion would naturally come under suspicion of Aristotelian influence even though in the details it may be found to diverge from Aristotle. A theory of the kind is in fact included in not a few of the later systems, but it must be mentioned at once that the customary name for the rhetorical argumentation which corresponds to the syllogism is no longer "enthymeme" but "epicheireme"; at least this is the term used by Cicero and Quintilian, and there is every probability that Hermagoras too preferred this name. The difference, however, between "enthymeme" and "epicheireme" is not of a purely terminological nature.⁶⁰ For, while Aristotle's enthymeme (like his syllogism) consists of two premises and a conclusion, but may under certain circumstances be reduced to a single premise and the conclusion,⁶¹ the epicheireme has a more complicated form. Its normal type includes no less than four premises and the tendency of the rhetoricians is to regard epicheireses consisting of less than five sentences as a reduction of this normal type. We learn, however, from Cicero's *De inventione*⁶² that another school of thought, which he considers important enough to justify a lengthy discussion of its view, clung to the old tripartite Aristotelian syllogism; and Quintilian actually reverts to this view, after duly informing us that other authors regard four or five or even six parts of the epicheireme as normal.⁶³

⁶⁰ For terminological problems cf. especially Quintilian, V, 10, 1 ff. See also p. 170 *infra*.

⁶¹ *Rhet.* A 2, 1357 a 16-21.

⁶² *De invent.*, I, 57-66. The *Auctor ad Herennium* discusses the epicheireme along different lines and shows less interest in its syllogistic form. See on his discussion (II, 28-30) and on the epicheireme in general Kroll, *Sitzb. Wien. Akad.*, CCXVI, No. 2, pp. 4-17. For Hermagoras cf. Thiele, *Hermagoras* (Strassburg, 1893), p. 134.

⁶³ Quintilian, V, 13 (especially 5-9).

In comparing Aristotle's enthymeme with the normal form of the epicheireme we easily realize what accounts for the difference: whereas Aristotle took the premises for granted the later theorists consider it necessary to prove each of them before combining them in the final conclusion. This is again stated in so many words by Cicero,⁶⁴ who points out that the controversy between the champions of the quinquepartite form of the epicheireme and those of the tripartite form reduces itself to one simple question: If it is necessary to argue in support of one's premises should these arguments be regarded as having an existence independent of these premises and as forming separate parts of the epicheireme or rather as an integral part of the premises which they support. We need not go into the details of this discussion, but we may confidently assume that the epicheireme with its five parts is an outgrowth or extension of the Aristotelian syllogism. In fact Cicero assures us that this form was favored by *omnes ab Aristotele et Theophrasto profecti* and passed from these men to the rhetoricians.⁶⁵ The authors of late *artes* waver between the enthymeme and the epicheireme and show a considerable variety with regard to the definition as well as the place of each of these terms.⁶⁶ Some authors include both, describing the enthymeme as a reduced, the epicheireme as an extended form of the syllogism. We should admit that this description is reasonable and in keeping with the historical origin of these forms.

In *De inventione* the "epicheireme" is treated on a par with "Socratic" induction.⁶⁷ Cicero's Latin name for the epicheireme is *ratiocinatio*, and the distinction in his system between *ratiocinatio* and induction obviously echoes Aristotle's distinction between enthymeme and *paradeigma*, i. e. between syllogism and induction (*ἐπαγωγή*). But in *De inventione* the theory of *in-*

⁶⁴ *De invent.*, I, 60 f.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 61. Cf. Kroll, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶⁶ Hermogenes describes the enthymeme (*περὶ εὑρ.*, III, 8) as an argument to be used after the epicheireme and as reinforcing it. Apsines (ch. 10) and Minucianus (*περὶ ἐπιχειρ.*, 2, 3) regard the enthymeme and the *παράδειγμα* as parts or forms of the epicheireme. For the theory mentioned in the text see especially Julius Victor, 9, 11; Fortunatianus, 2, 28; Cassiodorus, 12, 15. Cf. Dionysius Hal., *De Isaeo*, 16 where he observes that Lysias prefers enthymemes whereas Isaeus favors epicheiremes (Thiele, *op. cit.*, p. 135).

⁶⁷ *De invent.*, I, 51-56. For Aristotle see p. 39 *supra*.

ductio and *ratiocinatio* is preceded by a discussion not only of the material of the argument but also of *necessaria* and *probabilis argumentatio, complexio, enumeratio, simplex conclusio, signum, credibile, comparabile*, etc.⁶⁸ It is not suggested (and it would be difficult to believe) that all these forms should be fitted into the syllogistic procedure or resolved into the epicheireme. Post-Aristotelian rhetoricians obviously added a great amount of material to the old Peripatetic stock. As a result, those writers of *artes* who were anxious to include as much as they could of the new material found it increasingly difficult (if they attempted it at all) to bring order, system, and unity into the great variety of argumentative forms. It cannot be our aim to unravel the various threads and to write the history of the *locus de argumentatione*. Let us rather note with gratitude that Quintilian is more restrained than some others, since he concentrates on the *loci argumentorum*, the *exempla* (for which he refers us to Socrates and Aristotle, see p. 170 *supra*), the epicheireme, and, of course, on the refutation of these forms.⁶⁹ Yet he too separates *signa* as well as *credibilia* (*σημεῖα* and *εἰκότα*) from the syllogistic procedure as represented by the epicheireme. For him they are not even *argumenta*, though he reports that others regarded them as a class of the *argumenta*.⁷⁰ To class them under *argumentum*, however, is by no means the same (for a rhetorician of the Hellenistic or Imperial era) as to regard them as a form of the epicheireme and to describe them along syllogistic lines. Altogether our evidence suggests that hardly any later author followed Aristotle in his very interesting attempt to understand *signa*, *credibilia*, etc. (i. e. *τεκμήρια, εἰκότα, σημεῖα*) as imperfect and not fully cogent syllogisms.⁷¹ We have to remember that *τεκμήρια, σημεῖα, εἰκότα* had their place and function even before Aristotle in the legal and (more or less technical) rhetorical practice. They were simply "evidences." Traces of blood are "evidence"

⁶⁸ I, 44-49.

⁶⁹ Quintilian, V, 10-14.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, V, 9, 1; 10, 11. Cf. Philodemus, *Rhet.*, I, 248, 369 (Sudhaus).

⁷¹ See p. 40 *supra*. Cf. Kroll, *Philologus*, LXXXIX (1934), pp. 337, 340. Kroll rightly points out that the division of *σημεῖα* into such *ante factum, in facto, post factum*, which is frequently found in later writers, occurs as early as the *Rhet. ad Alex.* (ch. 13). Thus we get a glimpse of a tradition which continued in spite of Aristotle. Cf. further Volkmann, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 12), p. 155.

of a murder; the fact that someone has been seen on the spot is evidence that he has committed the murder. Early rhetoricians distinguished different types of such "evidence," using the words which they found in common use. It was left to Aristotle to force *τεκμήρια, σημεῖα, εἰκότα* into the strait-jacket of his syllogism; but, as in the later systems we find them discussed without any reference to the syllogistic epicheireme, we are obviously entitled to infer that Hellenistic authorities considered it wiser not to follow him in this point. We may say that the *signa*, etc. come to the fore again in their Pre-Aristotelian form even though in passing through the hands of rhetoricians they have naturally become somewhat more technical.

The distinction between *necessaria argumentatio* and *probabilis argumentatio*⁷² may also be traced back to Aristotle; yet we observe again that Aristotle explained the difference between them from the point of view of the syllogism, whereas later writers discuss them without reference to the syllogistic principle. For the rest, it goes without saying that the theory of the *refutatio* had to keep pace with that of the *argumentatio* and became in the same degree more elaborate and complicated.

Aristotle also bequeathed to the later rhetoricians a new conception of the *τόπος*. As we have seen, his new approach sprang from the idea that instead of providing a great number of ready-made arguments (one and all applying to quite definite and specific subjects or situations) the teacher of rhetoric ought to concentrate on general forms or types of arguments (see pp. 40-41, *supra*). To judge from the Roman authors, the question how general a way one should adopt in dealing with the arguments continued to occupy the rhetoricians, and remarks to the effect that it is unnecessary or impossible to provide ready-made arguments for every possible subject on which an orator may have to speak are found in Cicero and Quintilian.⁷³ We have again to note that in *De oratore* Cicero keeps very close to what he, with perfect right as it seems to me at least, considers Aristotle's idea. The *loci* or *sedes argumentorum* enumerated in II, 163-173 are of the Aristotelian type even though they are not

⁷² See e. g. Cicero, *De invent.*, I, 44. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* A 2, 1357 a 22-b 25.

⁷³ Cf. e. g. *De invent.*, II, 44 f.; *De orat.*, II, 117, 130; Quintilian, II, 4, 27; V, 10, 100.

materially identical with Aristotle's *tóποι*.⁷⁴ They are not connected with any definite subject-matter, and yet they are applicable to every subject. On the other hand, certain sections of *De inventione* contain *loci* of a more specific type.⁷⁵ We read there that arguments may be drawn from circumstances connected either with the person or with the fact under discussion and find a good deal of information about those circumstances which may serve as a basis for impressive arguments. Although it is true that Aristotle investigated the motives leading to crimes and the psychological conditions favoring their perpetration,⁷⁶ the discussion of "circumstances" in *De inventione* has little in common with his theory. The Greek word for circumstance is *περίστασις*, and there is evidence that this term played an important rôle in Hermagoras' system of the *status* (*στάσεις*).⁷⁷ For this reason (and others) scholars have assumed that the elaborate theory of the circumstances in the form in which we find it in Cicero's *De inventione* and in later *artes* is closely connected with that of the *status* and owes much to Hermagoras and to the Stoics who inspired him. It may be wise to leave the matter at that without indulging in further guesses about the inventor. Nor should I stress the fact that material of the same kind is found in *réxvai* of the fourth century B.C., notably in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* under *eikós*.⁷⁸

Quintilian has *loci* of the general as well as of the more

⁷⁴ See the references to Aristotle in *De orat.*, II, 152, 160. It is generally and probably rightly assumed that Cicero borrows the *loci* of the *De orat.* (and similarly those included in the *Topica* and the *Part. orat.*) from a contemporary Academic system which in turn shows Stoic influence. See M. Wallies, *De Fontibus Topic. Ciceronis* (Diss. Halle, 1878); W. Kroll, *Rhein. Mus.*, LVIII (1903), p. 590; P. Sternkopf, *De M. Tulli Ciceronis Part. Orat.* (Diss. Münst., 1914), pp. 20 f. From our point of view, however, the immediate source of Cicero's *loci* is less important than the fact that he reverts to Aristotle's method.

⁷⁵ *De invent.*, I, 34-43; II, 17-42 (the points of view mentioned in I, 41 fin.-42 are not very different from the *loci* of the *De orat.*). Cf. the shorter and somewhat different treatment of the material of the argumentation in *Ad Herennium*, II, 3-8. For the distinction between *persona* and *negotium* cf. Longinus, p. 182 (Spengel-Hammer) and Rufus, 27-29.


⁷⁶ *Rhet.* A 10-12.

⁷⁷ See especially Augustine, *De rhet.*, 7 f. Cf. Thiele, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-44; Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 56. Cf. also Volkmann, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁷⁸ Ch. 8.

specialized type.⁷⁹ Even in discussing the *πίστεις ἀτεχνοί* (witnesses, documents, etc.) he proceeds along rather general lines, although here if anywhere the traditional practice was to provide ready-made arguments, and even Aristotle had condescended to lay down in concrete terms arguments both for the strengthening and for the minimizing of witnesses, etc. We may wonder, however, whether Quintilian's teacher Domitius Afer, who wrote two books on this subject,⁸⁰ also confined himself to general points of view and excluded the customary clichés altogether. A remark like the following in Quintilian (V, 10, 20): *locos appello non ut vulgo nunc intelliguntur in luxuriem et adulterium et similia, sed sedes argumentorum* shows that the Pre-Aristotelian type of "commonplace" survived and that Aristotle killed this as little as the traditional conception of *σημεῖα, εἰκότα*, etc., or the practice of organizing the material under the "parts of the speech." The rhetoricians of the better type, however, appear to leave these commonplaces alone.

Among the rhetoricians of the Imperial era the Anonymus Seguerianus stands out as reproducing most closely the Aristotelian conception and division of the *πίστεις*:



Also, following Alexander Numenius, he defines the relation between the *τόπος* and the epicheireme in the true Aristotelian spirit: *τόπος . . . ἔστιν . . . ἀφορμὴ ἐπιχειρήματος η ἀφορμὴ πίστεως η ὅθεν ἀν τις ὁρμώμενος ἐπιχειρήματα εὑροι.* His system has rightly been used as evidence for a revival of the Aristotelian system in

⁷⁹ The first set of *loci* in Quintilian, V, 10 (23-52) refers to *persona* and *res*, but in V, 10, 53 he proceeds to an enumeration of less specified *loci*, refusing to connect them with the *status* (as other rhetoricians did; see e. g. Neocles in the Anonymus Seguerianus, 170; cf. Sternkopf's judicious discussion, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 f.). For the *πίστεις ἀτεχνοί* see Aristotle, *Rhet.* A 15, Quintilian, V, 1-7. Aristotle provides *τόποι* of a rather specific kind in his chapter on the *διαβολή* (Γ 15) in which he probably borrowed a great deal from Theodectes.

⁸⁰ See Quintilian, V, 7, 7. Cf. also Quintilian's remark in II, 4, 27.

earlier phases of the Imperial epoch,⁸¹ and this revival among the Greeks is in some way comparable to that on the Roman side for which Cicero is responsible. No other Greek rhetorician, however, appears to be affected by this revival in the same degree as the Anonymus.

Reverting to the *tóποι* or *loci*, we are justified in saying that they are an almost regular feature in the later *artes* where they appear in different forms; in some authors they are conceived as points of view of a general type useful for the argumentation irrespective of its subject. This appears to be the closest approximation to Aristotle's original conception. Yet other authors confine their *loci* to a more specified use either by connecting them with the "circumstances" or by dividing them, according to a scheme which seems to have been rather popular, into *loci ante rem* (that is *loci* to be used in discussing what happened before the fact, e. g. before the murder), *in re*, *circa rem*, *post rem*. Yet, even in this form they are still "types" of arguments, not ready-made clichés; in other words they are very different from the "commonplaces" of the rhetorical tradition before Aristotle.⁸² To maintain that it is due to Aristotle that no

⁸¹ Anonymus Seguerianus, 144 ff., 168 f., 172 ff. O. Angermann, *De Aristotele rhetorum auctore* (Diss. Leipzig, 1904), pp. 28-59, suggests that the Anonymus is indebted for the Aristotelian material in his *τέχνη* to Caecilius of Calacte, since the two authorities on whom he depends, Alexander Numenius and Neocles, may both have used Caecilius. Angermann comments on a number of "Aristotelian" passages in Quintilian which show a remarkable resemblance to the Aristotelian material in the Anonymus. His arguments for a common source of Quintilian, Alexander, and Neocles are, on the whole, convincing, though I cannot regard it as proved that this common source was Caecilius and that he was the rhetorician who returned to the genuine Aristotelian doctrine and passed it on to other rhetoricians of the Imperial time. Ofenloch's collection (*Caec. Calact. Fragmenta* [Leipzig, 1907]) is based on Angermann.

⁸² For the first type see Apsines, 10 and Anonymus Seguerianus, 169-181. Fortunatianus, II, 23, Julius Victor VI, 1-4, and Martianus Capella, 49 (contrast 21) have the fourfold division described in the text; but, while the *loci ante rem* are based on the *περιστάσεις*, those *circa rem* and *in re* are of a general logical complexion resembling those in Aristotle and the *De oratore*. For another combination of these types see Minucianus, 3 (p. 343, 24 Spengel-Hammer). For the *tóποι* in the mediaeval systems see Harry Caplan's very interesting discussion in *C. P.*, XXVIII (1933), p. 75. In this context attention may be drawn to some attempts to use Aristotle's categories as a basis for *inventio* (Quintilian, III, 6, 23; Longinus, pp. 179-181 [Spengel-Hammer]).

Hellenistic or Imperial *ars* (of which we know) consists merely of an enumeration of such commonplaces would be a gross overstatement of his influence; for the tendency to give rhetorical precepts a more general form is probably characteristic of the fourth century B. C., as the evidence of Theodectes and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* shows. We should also beware of underestimating the extent to which the *τόποι* were affected and their original idea modified by their close connection (in most of the later systems) with Hermagoras' *status*. And yet, in spite of these considerations, I suggest that whoever among the late writers of *artes* thinks in terms of "types" of arguments and not in terms of concrete, ready-made arguments is in some measure indebted to Aristotle and to his philosophical treatment of the rhetorical "proofs."

Propositions comparable to the "premises" put forward by Aristotle (see pp. 41 f. *supra*) occur in the sections on the political speech and the laudation, which are on the whole less affected by the innovations of Post-Aristotelian theorists.⁸³ The old values which had been allotted to the political speech and the laudation (*καλόν*, *συμφέρον*, *ἀγαθόν* = *honestas*, *utilia*, *bona*) continue to dominate them and we feel on familiar Aristotelian ground in reading general propositions referring to *honestas* or *utilitas*, for example, as well as enumerations of specific *honestas*, *utilia*, etc. It should be noted, however, that these propositions are no longer characterized as premises for rhetorical syllogisms and that propositions of the kind are also found in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Yet the propositions there are less general than Aristotle's, and it was Aristotle after all who had taught how to define the values as well as the "goods" classed under them. In the *Auctor ad Herennium* the sections dealing with the *laudatio* and the political speech include precepts concerning the arrangement and disposition of material in these types of speeches.⁸⁴

⁸³ See especially Cicero, *De invent.*, II, 157-178; *De orat.*, II, 342-349; *Ad Herennium*, III, 2-15; Quintilian, III, 7 f.

⁸⁴ III, 7-9 and 15. It may be noted that the chapters on the *laudatio* frequently include references to Peripatetic divisions of the "goods," especially to the famous tripartite division (goods of the mind, of the body, external goods; see e.g. *Ad Herennium*, III, 10; Cicero, *De orat.*, II, 342; *Part. orat.*, 38; Quintilian, III, 7, 12). For Stoic influence on Cicero, *De invent.*, II, 160 ff. see Kroll, *Philologus*, XCI (1936), pp. 197-205.

Evidently this is a concession to the alternative, "Isocratean," *τέχνη*.

Generally speaking, Post-Aristotelian theories of the rhetorical argumentation show a curious mixture of Aristotelian and un-Aristotelian features; and we have to admit that the latter have, on the whole, attained a dominating position. Even the most casual glance at the sections on *confirmatio* (or *argumentatio*) in the works collected in Halm's *Rhetores Latini Minores* would satisfy anyone that Hermagoras with his reorganization of the material under the *constitutiones* carried the day over alternative theories and tendencies.⁸⁵ His four basic *status* and the distinction between *λογικὰ* and *νομικὰ ζητήματα* provided the groundwork for almost all later *artes*. In addition, there is that considerable variety of arguments to be drawn from the place, the time, the motives, and other circumstances of the fact under discussion. Naturally Hermagoras' theory too suffered many alterations; it appears to have been the ambition of every rhetorician to make some new departure in this field, at the very least by selecting and arranging the traditional material differently from his predecessors. The result is that the *inventio* in most of the late *artes* reduces to the verge of despair anyone who attempts something in the nature of an historical analysis. I shall be satisfied if I have come near the truth at least with regard to the outlines of the development, and I am under no illusion about the ample chances of error in this field. The Isocratean school does not seem to have left a deep mark on this part of the system but it looks as though

⁸⁵ One naturally wonders whether Hermagoras' own system shows any signs of indebtedness to Aristotle. Unfortunately, the system has in spite of the careful studies of Thiele and W. Jäneke (*De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita* [Diss. Leipzig, 1904]) not yet been reconstructed with sufficient certainty. It is true that Quintilian was in a position to point to certain *semina* of Hermagoras' theory in Aristotle's work (III, 6, 24, 49, 60). *Rhet.* A 1, 1354 a 26-31, A 13, 1378 b 38 ff. are some of the passages which he may have had in mind, but those which come nearest to Hermagoras are found in the second part of book III (15, 1416 a 6-9; 16, 1416 b 20-22; 1416 b 39-1417 a 2) where Aristotle himself depends on the Isocratean tradition (see p. 46 *supra*). The value of these passages lies in the fact that they put us in mind of some practical facts which form a background also to Hermagoras' theory, but Quintilian's *fecit deinde velut propriam Hermagoras viam* (III, 1, 16) remains, after all, unassailable. See, however, for a different opinion Volkmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 31 f.; Navarre, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 7), p. 265.

some Pre-Aristotelian concepts have been carried along in the stream of the tradition and may occasionally even come to the surface, though on the whole they are buried under the various layers of later origin and it is not easy to recognize them.

3 (corresponding to section 3, page 42 *supra*). It may be a matter for wonder that Aristotle's theory of the three " proofs " (or, rather, means of carrying one's point) did not become a mainstay of the later systems; but our evidence for the Hellenistic centuries (which is more definite and explicit than usual⁸⁶) suggests that the inclusion of $\eta\thetaos$ and $\pi\acute{a}\thetaos$ —the speaker's character and the art of playing upon the feelings—was abandoned by the Hellenistic rhetoricians.⁸⁷ How soon after Aristotle this happened it is difficult to say, but one of the usual taunts of the philosophers against the rhetoricians in the late Hellenistic centuries seems to have been this very point—that the rhetoricians had given up the analysis *more Aristoteleo* of character and emotions. The Stoics, as is well known, generally disapproved of the arousing of emotions, and Hermagoras was influenced by them. In view of his enormous influence on the later rhetorical systems I should think that he was responsible (though not necessarily alone responsible) for the facts that *inventio* was reduced to a theory of the arguments and that the other two factors disappeared. Naturally, practical suggestions for the arousing of this and that definite emotion continued to find their place in the sections on proem and epilogue. To rescue the theory of $\pi\acute{a}\thetaos$ from such a dubious existence and, in a spirit of loyalty to Aristotle, to restore it to its old dignity were again left to Cicero. In *De inventione*⁸⁸ Cicero still follows the Hellenistic tradition in confining the arousing of emotions to proem and epilogue and refuses to recognize this as one of the principal functions of the orator. Yet in his maturer works we find him assigning to the orator the threefold task *probare*, *delectare*, and *permovere*;⁸⁹ and this new conviction, which must have grown out of his practical experience, is reflected in a

⁸⁶ See Cicero, *De orat.*, I, 87, 201; Philodemus, *Rhet.*, I, 370 (Sudhaus). Cf. also Quintilian (p. 179 *infra*).

⁸⁷ See for details *C. P.*, XXXIII (1938), p. 396.

⁸⁸ See *De invent.*, I, 22, 100 ff., 106 ff.

⁸⁹ E. g. *De orat.*, II, 114, 128, 310; *Orator*, 69; *Brutus*, 158; *De opt. gen. or.*, 3.

readmission of $\eta\theta\eta$ and $\pi\acute{a}\theta\eta$ to a position on a par with the rhetorical argument. $\eta\theta\oslash$, however, means to him something slightly different from what it had been to Aristotle; it now denotes the *leniores affectus*, a lesser degree of $\pi\acute{a}\theta\oslash$.⁹⁰

It is probably the result of Cicero's authority that Quintilian too makes an attempt to give the theory of *affectus* its due; but it is a rather unfortunate attempt, the execution being poor because of the dearth of material.⁹¹ He says in so many words that he found no more information in his (Hellenistic and early Imperial) sources, and he obviously did not see his way back to the original Aristotelian theory. In later times Martianus Capella on the Roman, and Minucianus on the Greek side return to Aristotle's tripartite system of $\pi\acute{a}\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, and certain other rhetoricians also take the $\pi\acute{a}\theta\eta$ into account.⁹² In fact Professor Hendrickson⁹³ has found a considerable body of evidence for a theory that assigned to the orator a twofold function (instead of the old threefold one) and divided rhetorical productions or prose in general into works designed to teach and convince and those of a more emotional complexion. This theory also goes back to the Peripatetic school and may in the last analysis have

⁹⁰ *De orat.*, II, 182-214. Cf. II, 115. See also *Orator*, 128-133. It must be admitted that Cicero's analysis of the emotions goes less deep and is less philosophic than Aristotle's. See for a fuller discussion of these points *C.P.*, XXXIII (1938), pp. 396-401. For Cicero's practical $\psi\nu\chi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\iota\alpha$ see *T.A.P.A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 542 ff. where I have discussed the reasons why Cicero was more attracted by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* than by the Hellenistic systems. For the new notion of $\eta\theta\oslash$ see L. Voit, *Δεινότης, Ein antiker Stilbegriff* (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 135-140. Cf. Quintilian, VI, 2, 8.

⁹¹ VI, 2. Cf. especially his remark VI, 2, 25.

⁹² Martianus Capella, 28, 29; Minucianus, 1. Julius Severianus discusses the *affectus* at length and from various points of view, drawing to a large extent on Cicero's practice (ch. 21 represents a curious attempt to utilize the *loci argumentorum* in building up an analogous theory for the *affectus*). Apsines (306-329 [Spengel-Hammer]) and the Anonymus Seguerianus (222-239) treat $\tau\alpha\pi\acute{a}\theta\eta$ in the context of the epilogue, and the latter has characteristically a reference (208) to "Aristotle in the *Θεοδεκτικαὶ τέχναι*"; see p. 46 *supra*. It is certainly not the genuine Aristotelian tradition. For a reference to Aristotle's tripartite division of the $\pi\acute{a}\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ see Dionysius Hal., *De Lys.*, 19 *init.* I cannot include in this paper a discussion of the place of $\eta\theta\oslash$ in the theory of style.

⁹³ *A.J.P.*, XXVI (1905), pp. 249-267.

grown out of an Aristotelian distinction between two types of style.⁹⁴

4 (corresponding to section 4, page 42 *supra*). With regard to the *tria genera causarum* (the forensic speech, the political speech, and the laudation) we have Quintilian's very valuable testimony: *nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelem secuti . . . hac partitione contenti fuerunt*.⁹⁵ The Aristotelian division was in fact adopted by the Stoics,⁹⁶ and we find it reproduced in the *Auctor ad Herennium*, Cicero, Quintilian, Fortunatianus, and Martianus Capella. On the Greek side, Alexander is particularly close to Aristotle's wording and idea; the rhetorician Menander characterizes his theory of the ἐπιδεικτικόν as covering a third of the whole field, and a glance at Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge* will satisfy us that the division persisted even among the Byzantines.⁹⁷ On the other hand, both Cicero and Quintilian indulge in some criticism, and the latter informs us that the division was opposed by the *maximus temporum nostrorum auctor*.⁹⁸ It was in fact an obvious disadvantage that a good part of the potential field of rhetoric remained outside the division, and remarks to this effect are found in Cicero's *De oratore* and Quintilian. Moreover, the term which Aristotle had used as the common denominator of eulogy and invective, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, lent itself to different interpretations, misunderstandings, and, on the basis of these misunderstandings, again to criticism; this has recently been interestingly shown by Mr. Hinks.⁹⁹ The alternative procedure, however, that we notice is an almost exclusive concentration on one of these three *genera*—the forensic. This tendency which was probably widespread in Hellenistic centuries is, as far as we can judge, typically represented by Hermagoras, whose new

⁹⁴ *Rhet.* Γ 12, 1413 b 3 ff. Cf. Theophrastus' much quoted fragment (Ammonius, *In Arist. de interpret.*, p. 65, 31 [Berlin ed.]).

⁹⁵ III, 4, 1; cf. *ibid.*, 12.

⁹⁶ Cf. Diogenes Laert., VII, 42.

⁹⁷ See Alexander in *Rhet. Graec.* (ed. Spengel-Hammer), III, 1; Menander, *ibid.*, 331. For the rest cf. Rabe's index *s. v.* δικανικός, ἐπιδεικτικός, πανηγυρικός, συμβουλευτικός.

⁹⁸ Cf. especially Cicero, *De orat.*, II, 43-51 and 68; Quintilian, III, 4, 2.

⁹⁹ D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," *Class. Quart.*, XXX (1936), pp. 170-176.

system (of the *status*) fits only the forensic branch while the other two are condemned to a rather obscure existence in a corner.¹⁰⁰ The effect of this development may be studied in *De inventione*, where the system of the *status*, though suitable only for the forensic kind, has yet in principle at least been made the basis for the whole section on the content of the speech (*inventio*). In the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* too the forensic branch receives preferential treatment, and some of the later rhetoricians forget the others altogether. Hermogenes ignored Aristotle's classification. His own *λόγος πολιτικός* embraces in effect the forensic and the deliberative—that is political—branch, and his division into *λόγος ἀπλῶς πολιτικός* and *λόγος ἀπλῶς πανηγυρικός* would cover the whole Aristotelian field if his *λόγος πανηγυρικός* were not something very different from Aristotle's *ἐπιδεικτικόν*. (To say that the deliberative branch "takes revenge" for the neglect to which it was commonly exposed, "by finding a new and disruptive place within the theory of *status* itself,"¹⁰¹ is not quite fair to Hermogenes who is constantly thinking of deliberative—political—speeches and tries to fit them into all his *status*.)

5 (corresponding to section 5, page 43 *supra*). The history of the Aristotelian (or Theophrastean) "virtues" of style in later rhetorical theory has been admirably written by Professor Stroux.¹⁰² The fourth book of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* shows how completely the Theophrastean scheme had been destroyed, and in what a chaotic condition the theory of style found itself before Cicero in *De oratore* decided to go back to the *auctores et inventores harum sane minutarum rerum*, that is to revive the old Peripatetic doctrine. In the third book of *De oratore* a theory of rhetorical diction (*elocutio*) is put forward which in its outlines and organization corresponds exactly to Theophrastus' scheme (see *supra*, p. 44).¹⁰³ It is no exaggeration to maintain

¹⁰⁰ Namely under the *status* called *qualitas* (*ποιότης*). Cf. Quintilian, III, 6, 56; Thiele, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 f., 78 (see also p. 182 concerning Athenaeus); Kroll, *R.E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 53.

¹⁰¹ Hinks, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

¹⁰² See p. 36 *supra*.

¹⁰³ See especially III, 148, 187. *Elocutio* is discussed in III, 37-212 (though the "excursuses" containing lofty philosophical speculations are, of course, foreign to the rhetorical theory and have to be considered as Cicero's own addition). See for the disposition of this part of the work III, 37. Cf. Stroux, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 6), pp. 11-28, 54-56.

that but for this revival modern scholars would not have been able to reconstruct the original system. And yet, if Cicero when he wrote *De inventione* had carried out his intention of reproducing the entire Hellenistic system, the section on *elocutio* would in all probability show the same close resemblance to that in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as does the part which he actually worked out. As he stopped before arriving at *elocutio* his development from "Asianism" to "classicism" can be traced only in his stylistic practice, and it is only to the latter phase that we have a corresponding "classical" theory in *De oratore*. In *Orator*, Cicero is preoccupied with the three "characters"; yet in that work too the Peripatetic basis is unmistakable.¹⁰⁴

Quintilian, who devotes three and a half books to *elocutio*,¹⁰⁵ follows Cicero in arranging the material under the four "virtues" and Fortunatianus, Julius Victor, Martianus Capella, and Cassiodorus proceed in principle on the same lines. In the field of diction, however, a huge amount of new material had accumulated since Theophrastus' time. Innumerable new "figures," the whole array of *τρόποι*, and many other recent pieces of theory were claiming a place in this phase of the system, so that we need not wonder that, while the general outlines of the Peripatetic scheme are preserved intact in writers like Quintilian and the others just mentioned, the content of a section like the *ornatae continuae orationis* (i. e. *κόσμος* in the *σύνθετις*) differs considerably from what Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other Peripatetic writers would have discussed under this heading. In fact, as far as the material (as distinct from its organization) is concerned, we find a closer reproduction of the old Peripatetic doctrine in "Demetrius," *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*, although this author, unlike Quintilian, has broken up the Peripatetic structure.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ It is apparent especially in the inclusion of *πάθος* and *ἡθος* (128), the reference to the four "virtues of style" as a standard of which the Atticists fall short (79), the use made of *τὸ πρέπον* in defining, among other things, the proper sphere of each character (70 ff.), and the reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus as authorities on period and rhythm (172, 228).

¹⁰⁵ VIII-XI, 1. See for Quintilian and the *virtutes dicendi* in later Roman rhetoricians Stroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-64. Cf. Fortunatianus, III, 8; Martianus Capella, 31 (Julius Victor, 20).

¹⁰⁶ See my paper in *Hermes*, LXVI (1931), pp. 241-267. The features of the *σύνθετις* which the Peripatetic source of "Demetrius" had under

On the Greek side no revival of the old Peripatetic scheme seems to have taken place.¹⁰⁷ On the contrary, Stroux has ingeniously shown that writers like Dionysius tend to make the *ornatus* supreme and to give it a monopoly of *elocutio*,¹⁰⁸ thus abandoning the fundamental idea of the Peripatetic school for which *ornatus* (*κόσμος*) ranked with the three other "virtues": correct language, clarity, and appropriateness to subject matter. Since this is the theory which the Romans beginning with Cicero revive, we note an important divergence between them and their Greek colleagues, who think of style primarily as an "ornament" and tend to ignore the instructive and informative function of language (guaranteed by *σαφήνεια*)¹⁰⁸ as well as the requirement of a proper relation between style and subject matter, etc. (*τὸ πρέπον*).

The so-called Atticistic movement is to a large extent controlled by the *κριτικοί* who either believe in a multitude of stylistic "ideas" to be used in the appraisal and emulation of the great models or put the main emphasis on the three (or, eventually, more) stylistic "characters." The origin of this stock-in-trade of the later systems does not concern us here. It suffices for our purpose to note that the Peripatetic school is no longer considered responsible for its introduction and that the essential difference between this approach to style and that along the line of "virtues" has come to be recognized.¹⁰⁹ It lies, above everything else, in the fact that, while the Peripatetic believers in virtues theorize on style in a general way and provide precepts applicable to every speech (or even every piece of prose), the writers on *χαρακτῆρες* divide the whole literature of the past into three or four different types and proceed to describe the peculiarities of each of these. In other words, the theorists of the former type recognize only a distinction between good style and bad style, whereas those of the latter know and approve of four different styles and disapprove of another four.

κεκοσμημένον appear to have been rhythm, length of *κῶλα*, *περιαγωγὴ*, *εὐφωνία*, structure of the period, order and arrangement of the words, *σύνδεσμοι*, hiatus.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Stroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 19, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.*, Γ 2, 1404 b 2.

¹⁰⁹ See again Stroux, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 88-104 and Hendrickson's papers quoted *supra*, notes 2 and 6. For a more conservative view cf. Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 35; Radermacher, *Gnomon*, XV (1939), p. 101. For the history of the problem see Stroux' first chapter.

I am far from minimizing this important difference, and yet it is equally important to understand that both the writers dealing with stylistic "ideas" and those discussing the "characters" draw to a very large extent on material provided for the "virtues" and, in fact, on the virtues themselves.¹¹⁰ Thus they too are indebted to the Peripatetics. Dionysius' "ideas" are, from the historical point of view, a rather variegated affair, and yet the Peripatetic stock is clearly discernible (more so, as it seems to me at least, than in Hermogenes' *περὶ ἴδεων*). It is true that, besides *τὸ σαφές*, *τὸ πρέπον*, etc., we also find the Isocratean *ἡδύ*, *πιθανόν*, *ἐναργές*, but we shall see presently that later Peripatetics had found a way of combining these with the original Aristotelian "virtues," and we should bear in mind that Peripatetic writers like Demetrius of Phaleron had been liberal enough to theorize e. g. on *χάρις*. It has also been pointed out that Dionysius in discriminating between good and bad style makes frequent use of the Peripatetic principle of the "mean" (*μεσότης*) between two extremes, which helps him also in establishing the supremacy of his *εὐκρατὸς ἀρμονία*, the middle style.¹¹¹ As regards the writers on *χαρακτῆρες*, the Peripatetic basis of Pseudo-Longinus and "Demetrius," *περὶ ἐρμηνείας* is obvious enough. Three of the "sources of sublimity" (*πηγαὶ τοῦ ὑψους*) in "Longinus" are identical with the sub-headings of Theophrastus' *κόσμος*, namely the right choice of words (*ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων*), the dignified composition of words (*σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων*), and the "figures" (*σχήματα*).¹¹² "Demetrius" makes an even more extensive use of Peripatetic material. In discussing the *ἰσχνὸς χαρακτήρ* (the *tenue genus dicendi*) he declares that in this character *σαφῆ δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν* and proceeds to expound such precepts as the Peripatetics from Aristotle onwards provided for clarity, one of their "virtues" (*σαφήνεια*): use the common words, avoid ambiguities, leave the words in their natural order, use plenty of particles, etc.¹¹³ Another Peripatetic virtue, *ornatus*, provides him with

¹¹⁰ Cf. again Stroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-88 (for the material in Dionysius see especially pp. 73 f., 77 f.), 104-126. I am confining myself in the following pages to a few significant illustrations of the process.

¹¹¹ See S. F. Bonner's recent article (*C. P.*, XXXIII [1938], pp. 257-266) in which the author proceeds successfully on lines indicated by Hendrickson in *A. J. P.*, XXV (1904), pp. 125-146.

¹¹² See *De Subl.*, 8 init., 16-29, 30-38, 39-43. Cf. Hans Stefan Schultz, *Der Aufbau der Schrift περὶ ὕψους* (Diss. Berlin, 1936), pp. 30 ff., 42, 44.

¹¹³ "Demetrius," 191 f., 199 ff. Cf. Cicero, *De orat.*, III, 48 f.

material on metaphors, images, new words, compound words, allegories, etc., which he uses in his description of the sublime or magnificent character. He also draws on this material, though in a somewhat different manner, in his sections on the two remaining "characters."¹¹⁴ Again, in theorizing on the "composition of words" in the various characters and in selecting the figures suitable for each of them he proceeds for the most part by dividing up between them the Peripatetic material for *σύνθετος ὀνομάτων* and *σχήματα*.

Instead of pursuing this subject further in detail, let us note that "Demetrius," who borrows and hands on so much Peripatetic material, shows very clearly that this material had suffered—obviously at the hands of the Peripatetics themselves—important modifications, especially through the addition to the old stock of some new categories which had previously been sponsored by the Isocrateans (we here notice again the *conflatio* of the two traditions). Theophrastus is known to have found room in his system of style for *τὸ ιδύ* and *τὸ μεγαλωπρεπές*, two Isocratean requirements for the narration which Aristotle himself had rejected as unnecessary. From "Demetrius" we infer that *τὸ πιθανόν* and *τὸ ἐναργές*,¹¹⁵ two other Isocratean "virtues" of the narration, were also admitted by the Peripatetics (after Aristotle's time) and even elevated to the position of a quality of style in general, whereas the Isocrateans had confined these to the narration, one of their four "parts of the speech." Among the more specialized subjects on which the Isocratean school had theorized and which now came to be absorbed in the Peripatetic system hiatus is probably the most important. Aristotle himself, though dealing at length with the period and its rhythm, had refrained from making any reference to hiatus. He probably knew that the Isocrateans prided themselves on avoiding collisions of vowels but considered it beneath his dignity to pay attention to this newfangled subtlety. His successors, however, did not share his prejudice.

Yet, although the later Peripatetics compromised with the

¹¹⁴ Cf. for a fuller treatment my paper in *Hermes*, LXVI (1931), pp. 244-249, 251, 253. The Peripatetic influence in this work is recognized also (at least in principle) by Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge, 1902), pp. 50-52 and *passim* in the notes, and by Radermacher on p. 12 of his edition (Leipzig, 1901).

¹¹⁵ "Demetrius," 208-222.

rival school, they did not normally surrender vital and axiomatic features of their master's system. This may be gathered from the following two passages in "Demetrius" which are probably typical of the Peripatetic attitude to Isocratean propositions.¹¹⁶

"There are people who hold that we ought to talk about little things in a grand fashion (*τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλως λέγειν*; this has been taken as a reference to Isocrates and is in fact more likely to have been aimed at him than at Gorgias) and they regard this as proof of surpassing power. . . . Yet fitness must be observed whatever the subject be or, in other words, the style must be appropriate." This "fitness" is *τὸ πρέπον*, one of the Aristotelian "virtues" which is here played off against an Isocratean principle. Instead of *τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλως λέγειν* the Peripatetics formulate a new principle, with the help of Aristotle's *πρέπον*, namely *τὰ μικρὰ μικρῶς λέγειν, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα μεγάλως*.

The following passage refers to the question of hiatus: "With regard to hiatus different opinions have been held by different people. Isocrates and his followers avoided hiatus while others have admitted it whenever it chanced to occur and between all vowels (reading *πάντα πᾶσιν* instead of *παντάπασιν*). One ought, however, neither to make the composition noisy as it will be if the vowels are allowed inartistically to collide just as they fall together . . . nor shun the direct contact of such letters altogether." This is a good Peripatetic middle course for which several reasons are given, especially that common parlance (*ἡ συνήθεια*) does not hesitate to bring these letters into contact, in words like *χιών*, and that much music and euphony would be lost if hiatus were shunned everywhere.

We referred above (pp. 44 ff.) to certain other contributions and new departures made either by Aristotle himself or by his school and may now add a few brief remarks concerning their fate in later authors. Quintilian¹¹⁷ records that the division of proofs into *ἐντεχνοί* and *ἀτεχνοί* was accepted by almost all writers on rhetoric (*illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit*). This is borne out by the extant systems, especially by those constructed on the lines of the quinquepartite scheme.¹¹⁸ A divergent attitude is taken by Cicero in *De inven-*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 120, 68-71.

¹¹⁷ V, 1, 1.

¹¹⁸ See, besides Cicero and Quintilian, Julius Victor, VI, 5, 6; Martianus Capella, 27, 43; Anonymus Seguerianus, 145 f.; Minucianus, 1.

tione where he does not recognize a distinction between these two kinds of proofs and polemizes against people holding that *quaestiones*, *testimonia*, etc. *artificio non indigere*.¹¹⁹ Some rhetoricians, one may assume from this, considered that *ἀτεχνα* should find either no place at all or at least no technical treatment in the *τέχνη*. Cicero's own view (or, more probably, that of a Hellenistic rhetorician whom he follows) is that these proofs are a phase of one particular *status*, namely *coniectura*. Yet, in *De oratore* he has changed his mind and returns to the orthodox Aristotelian distinction between *ἐντεχνα* and *ἀτεχνα*,¹²⁰ including in the latter category even the *leges*. This is noteworthy since, as a rule, later rhetoricians diverged from Aristotle in excluding this item. Nor is it difficult to account for this; the devices which Aristotle in his discussion of the *ἀτεχνοι πίστεις* had provided for the interpretation of the law, the appeal to the lawgiver's intention as against the letter of the law, the defense of the letter against the supposed intention of the lawgiver, etc., have in the meantime received a place in a different part of the system. Hermagoras used material very similar to Aristotle's to build up his *νομικὰ στάσεις*;¹²¹ and, as the later rhetoricians adopted his system of *στάσεις*, it was logical for them no longer to include the *νόμος* with the rest of the *ἀτεχνοι πίστεις*.

As for the sentence period, my impression is that hardly any later rhetorician fully grasped the idea behind Aristotle's definition. The general tendency is to treat this subject more "empirically" and less philosophically. Instead of emphasizing (as Aristotle had done) that the period has a beginning and an end "in itself" and that it is the function of the rhythm to mark these, later writers stress the fact that the period consists of *κῶλα* and *κόμματα*, a point which Aristotle as we have seen did not regard as at all essential.¹²² Cicero in *Orator* (where

¹¹⁹ *De invent.*, II, 47; cf. Quintilian, V, 1, 2.

¹²⁰ *De orat.*, II, 116-119. Cf. *Part. orat.*, 6, 48, 117 (in 117 a particular *ἀτεχνον*, *testes*, is discussed under the heading *coniectura*, which is in keeping with Cicero's decision in *De invent.*, II, 47).

¹²¹ See Thiele, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-84 and cf. Quintilian, III, 6, 61. It is possible, as Thiele points out, that Hermagoras' own term was *νομικὰ ξητήματα* (not *στάσεις*). A detailed comparison of Hermagoras' theory and Aristotle, *Rhet.* A 15, 1375 a 25-b 25 would seem to be a desideratum.

¹²² "Demetrius," 10 is a typical passage. Cf. also Aristides, II, 507, 6 (Spengel); Anonymus Seguerianus, 242; Quintilian, IX, 4, 122 ff.,

he quotes Aristotle in support of his plea for a rhythmical structure of the oration) comes nearer than anyone else perhaps to the original Aristotelian idea.¹²³

The sections of "Demetrius" on $\chiάρις$ and $\tauò γελοῖον$ are, like almost everything else in his treatise, derived from a Peripatetic source; and Cicero's discussion of the rhetorical joke in *De oratore* II is based on the Peripatetic distinction between the laughable in the subject-matter and the laughable in verbal expression and certainly owes many of the more specific points also to Peripatetic theory. This has been shown by a comparison with the *Tractatus Coislinianus* the results of which seem valid, even though one might feel that Cicero's own contributions have been somewhat underrated. Quintilian in turn depends on Cicero. Since the Peripatetics, as far as we know, treated this subject in monographs, it was left to later authors (especially the Romans) to locate it in the system. Cicero as well as Quintilian decided to place it close to his propositions about the arousing of emotions, but Kroll rightly says that the place was never definitively fixed.¹²⁴

We know so little of the Peripatetic theories concerning oratorical delivery that it is very difficult to define the extent to which later authors reproduce them. According to Kroll, Cicero followed Theophrastus closely both in *De oratore* and *Orator*,¹²⁵ this would mean that not only the precepts referring to the orator's voice (which Theophrastus certainly discussed) but also those covering his *gestus* and the movements of his body go back

especially 125. See also Martianus Capella, 39. Cf. Zehetmeier, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 36), *passim*, especially pp. 423 ff., 434.

¹²³ *Orator*, 228. Yet cf. 221.

¹²⁴ E. Arndt (*op. cit.*, *supra*, note 37) deals with Cicero, *De orat.*, II, 217-289 (pp. 25-40) and Quintilian, VI, 3 (pp. 41-62). See also Roger Pack, *C.P.*, XXXIII (1938), pp. 405-410, who proceeds more cautiously. Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 38 f., emphasizes that in the *Orator*, unlike the *De oratore*, Cicero connects the *ridiculum* with the *genus tenue* (see the notes in his commentary on *Orator*, 87-89); Kroll's identification of *facetiae* and *dicacitas* with $\chiάρις$ and $\gammaέλως$ is not tenable and has been refuted by Miss Grant, *op. cit.* (note 37 *supra*), p. 103. See also *Ad Herennium*, I, 10 which has something in common with Cicero (Arndt, *op. cit.*, p. 38).

¹²⁵ *De orat.*, III, 213-225 (much that we read here must have originated with Cicero himself), *Orator*, 55-60. Cf. Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 36; Stroux, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

to Theophrastus. It is not easy to substantiate this suggestion. The best argument (which, however, Kroll would hardly use) is that it is generally Cicero's tendency, especially in *De oratore*, to revert to the Peripatetic authorities. And we have seen that the Peripatetics were responsible for the inclusion of *ὑπόκρισις* (*actio*) in the quinquepartite system.

The quinquepartite system is certainly the most comprehensive put forward in the history of ancient rhetoric, but even in characterizing it thus we are far from doing full justice to its importance. It is safe to say that through the quinquepartite system and through the tripartite scheme of "proofs" (arguments, emotions, speaker's character) Aristotle and his school provided the rhetoricians with a principle of organization based on the nature and functions of a public speech. This is the truly philosophical approach to rhetoric; and, though the Peripatetics did not actually kill the rather mechanical alternative system, they at least succeeded in breaking its monopoly. Next to this contribution, the theory of argumentation and the theory of style are the two major fields where Aristotle's methods and ideas have left their mark. Oratorical delivery is a somewhat less important subject; and the analysis of the emotions, though revived from time to time, never secured a definite and undisputed place in the system. While the history of the most important rival tradition, the Isocratean, still remains to be written, we have at least been able to observe how it weakened and to some extent undermined the Peripatetic position in the two most important sections of the rhetorical system, *inventio* and *elocutio*. To this extent Cicero's *unum quoddam genus est conflatum a posterioribus* is certainly borne out.¹²⁶ In the field of *inventio* an even more dangerous rival arose in the person of Hermagoras, and it is not too much to say that with the subtle, scholastic distinctions and the elaborate casuistry of his *status* he carried the day over Aristotle. Certain Aristotelian features survived, however, indicating that even Hermagoras' triumph was not complete and that on the whole the result was (here as well as in the fields of conflict between Aristotle and Isocrates) a compromise.

If it is asked (and I do not see why this should not be a perfectly legitimate question) who did most to keep alive or revive Aristotelian ideas and concepts, the answer can hardly be

¹²⁶ *De invent.*, II, 8. See *supra* p. 49 and p. 185.

doubtful. I should not stress the fact that the quinquepartite system underlies *De oratore* (for this system was scarcely in danger of being eclipsed) but rather draw attention to the inclusion in this work of $\eta\thetaos$ and $\pi\acute{a}\thetaos$, the revival of Aristotle's conception of the *loci argumentorum*, the return to the four "virtues" of the diction, and the insistence on the old boundary between *inventio* and *dispositio*. And we may add, as a point of a less technical nature, that Cicero regards a wide range of knowledge and philosophical speculation as prior conditions for successful oratory.¹²⁷ These facts lend substance to his claim that in *De oratore* he renewed the *ratio Aristotelia* (along with the *ratio Isocratea*),¹²⁸ and I cannot help wondering why the tendency among scholars has been either to ignore or to minimize the importance of this testimony.

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

¹²⁷ In stressing the need of philosophical penetration Cicero agrees with Plato's *Phaedrus*, whereas the emphasis put on extensive knowledge has parallels in Aristotle (see especially *Rhet. A* 4; *B* 22). Cf. Hans Schulte, *Orator, Untersuchungen über das Ciceronische Bildungsideal* (Frankfurt, 1935) and my review of this book in *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), p. 106.

¹²⁸ *Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 23. See for literature *C. P.*, XXXIII (1938), p. 398 (add Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Rhetorik," 47-50).

BITHYNICA.

In his "Contributions à un lexique épigraphique" (*Études épigraphiques et philologiques*, pp. 219 ff.; cf. *Rev. Phil.*, X [1936], pp. 113 ff., 117) Professor L. Robert has called attention to certain words for "tomb" (*έντομίς*, *λατόμι(ο)ν*, *μάκρα*, *στιβάς*, *πυρία*) which occur only in restricted areas and may therefore serve as useful criteria for the assignment of an inscription to its provenance where this is otherwise unknown. Here I add a note on a technical term occurring in a number of epitaphs, which, though not confined to the province of Bithynia, seems to have been used there with especial frequency.

Άνεξοδίαστος is not found in Greek literature. Its first appearance was in a tomb-inscription (*C. I. G.*, 2050 = *I. G. Rom.*, I, 735) from Philippopolis in Thrace, which ends thus: *κατεσκεύασε τὴν σορὸν σὺν τῷ γρά[δ]ῳ ἀνεξοδίαστον· ὃς ἀν δὲ πωλήσι, δώσι τῷ φίσκῳ δημάρια -*. The concluding sentence clearly indicates its meaning, "not liable to be sold." From Boutovo in Bulgaria comes a recently discovered bilingual text published by D. Dzontchev (*Bull. Inst. Arch. Bulg.*, VIII, p. 458): *'Αγαθόδωρος Διοφάνου νεικεύς ζῶν καὶ φρονῶν ἔαντῷ ἐποίησεν ἀνεξοδίαστον.* Of the third word the editor says nothing by way of comment, but I have no hesitation in interpreting it as *Νεικεύς*, which occurs rarely (*I. G.*, III, 2840; VII, 1767) side by side with the commoner forms *Νικαιεύς*, *Νεικαιεύς*, *N(ε)ικαιεύς*, as the ethnic of the Bithynian city of Nicaea (for other forms see W. Ruge in *Pauly-Wissowa*, XVII, col. 227). The same word was restored by A. Wilhelm (*Arch.-epigr. Mitt.*, XX, p. 86) in an inscription of Apamea on the Maeander (Dikici) first copied by W. M. Ramsay (*Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, p. 475, No. 332) and recently re-edited by W. H. Buckler and W. M. Calder (*M. A. M. A.*, VI, 218) who read: *ἐπὶ [τῷ] εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀνεξοδίαστον· ὃς δ' ἀν σκύλῃ δώσει κτλ.* One probable example is afforded by Smyrna (LeBas-Waddington, 1527 = *I. G. Rom.*, IV, 1475), where Wagener's copy gives *ἴσται δὲ ἀπρατον καὶ ἀνεισοδίαστον· ὃ δὲ πωλήσας δώσει τῷ φίσκῳ κτλ.*, but Waddington notes, "il est très-possible que sur la pierre il y ait ἀνεξοδίαστον, 'inalienable.' " I doubt whether the stone bore *ἀνεξ-* --; I am inclined rather to believe that the unfamiliarity of the word, which occurs nowhere else in Smyrna

or its neighbourhood, was responsible for the error of the engraver and also for the addition of the word ἄπρατον, probably more generally intelligible.¹

So far we have dealt with appearances of the term outside Bithynia, though we have seen that in one case the inscription was erected by a citizen of Nicaea, one of the principal cities of that province. Wilhelm (*loc. cit.*) cited (1) *Ath. Mitt.*, XVII, p. 81 (a re-edition by B. Graef of an epigram from the district of Nicomedia [Ismid], first published by J. H. Mordtmann in *Ath. Mitt.*, IV, pp. 18 ff.), the prose introduction to which ends thus: κατεσκένασεν ἐαντῷ ἀνεξοδίαστον σὺν ταῖς οἰκίαις καθὼς περιεληπται, (2) *Ath. Mitt.*, XVIII, pp. 27 ff., a grave-inscription of Badjikeui, between Nicomedia and Nicaea, also published by Graef,² which runs: τὸ μνημεῖον κατεσκένασεν καθὼς περιοικοδόμηται σὺν ταῖς περικειμέναις οἰκίαις πάσαις ἀνεξοδίαστον: near this were discovered two further inscriptions, one containing only the word ἀνεξοδίαστον, the other the formula [τὸ μνημεῖον κατ]εσκένασεν σὺν τῇ σκάφ[ῃ] ἀνεξοδίαστον; also (3) a grave-inscription of Karaviran, edited by W. von Diest and M. Anton, *Neue Forschungen im nordwestlichen Kleinasiens* (Gotha, 1895), p. 13: Νείκων Νείκωνος ἐαντῷ καὶ τῇ ἐαντοῦ γννακὶ Σίᾳ ζῶν φρονῶν κατεσκένασεν ἀνεξοδίαστον (cf. *op. cit.*, p. 10). This last text was given as unpublished by A. Körte, *Ath. Mitt.*, XXIV, p. 447, No. 46, who represents correctly the arrangement of the lines and reads Εἴᾳ³ instead of Σίᾳ. All the examples cited by Wilhelm, then, come from Bithynia, and it is in that region that the term is most frequently found. Moreover, it is often emphasized by being placed last and occupying a line by itself. Such is the case with the Boutovo stone and with three of the other examples already quoted, as well as with a grave-stele of Nicaea (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 392, No. 54) and a rock-cut inscription over a niche in the

¹ Can the composer of the inscription, or its engraver, have regarded ἀνεισοδίαστον as a variant for ἀνεισόδον (Plut., *Dio*, 7 αὐλὴν ἄβατον καὶ ἀνεισόδον; *Pyrrh.*, 29 ἀνεισόδον πόλιν), intended to deny the right of entry to unauthorised persons?

² Graef failed to notice that a part of this inscription had previously been published by G. Perrot, *Exploration archéologique de la Galatie* (Paris, 1862), p. 67, No. 47. Where the two versions differ, that of Graef is preferable.

³ For the name Εἴᾳ see *M. A. M. A.*, V, 90, with the comment of C. W. M. Cox and A. Cameron.

Goel-bazar district (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 400, No. 73) published by G. Mendel, while in three other Bithynian texts copied by the same scholar (*ibid.*, p. 396, No. 66; p. 405, No. 83; XXVII, p. 318), found at Ak-hissar, at Goel-bazar, and in the plain of Boli respectively, the word occurs in the middle of the inscription.

In two further texts from Nicaea the same word recurs, though it has not been recognized by the editors. To their detailed account of the ancient walls of Nicaea (*Die Stadtmauer von Iznik [Nicaea]*: Istanbuler Forschungen, IX [Berlin, 1938]) A. M. Schneider and W. Karnapp append a publication of the forty-one inscriptions belonging to the city-wall, in the sense that they were either originally engraved on it or subsequently built into it. This rests mainly upon the copies made by K. O. Dalman, whose early death in November, 1932, no doubt accounts for the imperfect form in which the texts, many of them previously unpublished, are here presented. In No. 2 (pp. 43 f.) we have a grave-altar built into the inner side of the Yenishehir Kapi: it has been mutilated and its present position makes it difficult to read even with the aid of field-glasses. The editors give a facsimile and the following text, but no comment.

Χαιρέας Διοσ....
 . . ας ζῶν ἔαυτῷ....
 τ.. αὐτο.....
 .ω αὐτῷ.. ο....
 5 σὸν ταῖς εἴκοσι....
 εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀνέξοδ[ον]..
 καταλύ[σ]η. ω...ο.
 . εἰς τ[ὸ]ν φίσκον [

Clearly a considerable portion of the inscription has perished, and I shall not attempt a complete restoration; but a few points call for remark. In line 1 the last letter must be rejected, for the facsimile shows at the end of the line ΔΙΟC, and the form of sigma used throughout the inscription is Σ. The final letter must therefore be Θ, Ο, or Φ, and in the present context Φ alone is admissible; the name is therefore probably Διοφ[άνου(ς)] or Διοφ[άντου]. A Διόφαντος Ἀριστομήδον is commemorated in a Bithynian epitaph (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 424, No. 138, previously, but faultily, published in *Sitzb. München*, 1863, p. 209, No. 8), and in the Boutovo inscription quoted above Διοφάνης is the name of a Nicaean citizen. In line 5 nothing appears in the facsimile

between *ταῖς* and *κοσι*, but the editors seemingly saw traces compatible with *ει*. It would be possible to write *εἰκόσι*, dative plural of *εἰκών*, as in an inscription of Hammalar in Bithynia (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, pp. 415 f., No. 112; cf. L. Robert, *B. C. H.*, LII, pp. 412 f. and *Études anatoliennes*, p. 242) : ἐτείμησεν . . . τελαμῶνι καὶ εἰκόσιν καὶ προεδρίᾳ κτλ. Here, however, *εἴκοσι*, "twenty," seems more probable and calls to mind a phrase found in a similar monument from the plain of Boli, ὄντος τοῦ [μνημείου] ἀνέξοδάστον σὸν ἀκαίναις δέκα ταῖς περὶ αὐτό (B. C. H., XXVII, p. 318), indicating the area around the actual tomb which was included in the sale-prohibition. In several of the inscriptions quoted above such extensions of the force of the prohibition are found, introduced, as here, by *σύν*.

In line 6 we cannot accept ἀνέξοδ[ον], a word whose primary meaning is "with no outlet, impassable,"⁴ since the meaning is unsuitable and the word does not occur elsewhere in inscriptions of this class, nor yet ἀνέξόδ[ευτον], found only in an epigram of Eumenia beginning ἀνέξόδευτοι δ' εἰσ[iv] ἐς φάσος τρίβοι, most recently published in *S. E. G.*, VI, 210, where references to previous editions will be found. In the light of what has already been said, the restoration ἀνέξοδ[ίαστον] becomes imperative.

The inscription closes with the usual threat of a penalty in the event of the violation or alienation of the tomb. This normally opens with *ἐὰν* (or *ει*) *δέ τις* and proceeds *δώσ(ε)ι προστ(ε)ίμον* to such-and-such a recipient or recipients (indicated either by *eis* with the accusative or by the simple dative: see the examples collected in *I. G. Rom.*, III, 11) a specified sum. I therefore suggest for lines 5-8 the following restoration:

5 σὺν ταῖς εἴκοσι [ἀκαίναις ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸ]
εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀνέξοδ[ίαστον]. ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτὸ]
καταλύ[σ]η, [δ]ῶ[σ]ε[ι] πρ[ο]στ[ε]ίμον εἰς τὴν πόλιν *.]
κ(αὶ) εἰς τ[ὸ]ν φίσκο[ν] *.].

⁴ Liddell and Scott cite for this sense Theocritus, XII, 19: ἀνέξοδον εἰς Ἀχέροντα (the Scholiast explains ἀνέξοδον: παρόσον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς φῶς τοὺς ἐν "Αἰδον"); Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.*, III, 59: δυσχωρίαις ἐγκυρήσαντες ἀνέξοδοις; and Rhianus, *Anth. Pal.*, XII, 93: οἱ παιδες λαβύρινθος ἀνέξοδος.

⁵ If *βωμόν* rather than *μνημείον* figures in the early part of the inscription, we must restore *αὐτόν* in lines 5 and 6 in place of *αὐτό*. Possibly we should write *τῇ πόλει* in line 7, as the dative and the accusative with *eis* are sometimes found side by side (e.g. in *I. G. Rom.*, III, 11b).

A double fine, payable to the city, in this case Nicaea, and to the Imperial *fiscus* (*φίσκος* or *ταμ(ι)εῖον*), is frequently imposed (e. g. in *I. G. Rom.*, III, 11, 11a, b, c, d, 26, 47, the last from Nicaea). If we suppose that the word *δημάρια* was represented, as is normal, by the symbol * and that the sum was indicated by a single numeral, such as , α or , β , the above restoration gives 33 letters in line 5, 34 in line 6, and 36 in line 7. The facsimile shows that the letters in lines 6 and 7 were somewhat more crowded than in line 5.

Lines 1-4, in which the letters were larger and more widely spaced, may have had something of this form:

Χαιρέας Διοφ[άνον κατασκενά]	—	24
[σ]ας ξῶν ἔαντῷ [καὶ -----]		
τ[ῆ] ἔαντο[ῦ] σ[υ]μ[βίω καὶ e. g. Διοφάνει τῷ]	27	
[υ]ιῷ αὐτῷ τῷ [μνημείον ἀνέστησεν].	27	

The verb *κατασκενάζω* is extremely common in inscriptions of this class, followed usually by *τῷ μνημεῖον* or, occasionally, by *τὸν βωμόν*. Frequently the verb *ἔθηκε*, *ἔστησε*, or *ἀνέστησε* is used to indicate the erection of the monument, which often commemorates not only the builder but also his wife and children, e. g. Διογένης Ἀττάλου ἀνέσ[τησε]ν αἰαντῷ καὶ Ἀμύᾳ τῇ ἔαντο[ῦ] συμβίῳ καὶ Ἀτταλίωνι τῷ ἔαντοῦ νιῷ (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 397, No. 69).

A second Nicaean text, first published by Schneider and Karnapp (*op. cit.*, p. 48, No. 22), engraved on a block built into the inner side of the curtain between towers 54 and 55, is thus presented without comment:

πον Σεονήρου χειλι[άρχον]ολλινα
κατασκενάσαντος ἐκ τῶν ιδ[ίων ἐπὶ τ]οῦ ἄσκ[υλτον εἶναι
ἀνεξοδία

No photograph or facsimile is given and we are not told whether it is possible to determine accurately the gap between the two legible portions of the text. It seems that here we have a further example of the practice of isolating the word *ἀνεξοδίαστον* (for so we shall unhesitatingly restore line 3) at the end of the inscription. Line 2 is unsatisfactory as restored by the editors. It is true that *σκύλλω* is frequently used in Bithynian and other epitaphs of tomb-violation (e. g. *B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 389, No. 45,

I. G. Rom., III, 47 and 59, all from Nicaea; see W. M. Ramsay's commentary in *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, p. 734), and that in a Nicaean tomb-inscription we find the phrase ἐπὶ τῷ μετὰ τὸ κατατεθῆναι ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι αὐτὸς ἀσκυλτον (*B. C. H.*, XXIV, p. 389). But whereas ἐπὶ τῷ, as in the clause just quoted, or ἐπὶ τῷ, as in Perrot, *op. cit.*, p. 11, No. 7, or *eis τῷ*, as in the inscription of Nicaea discussed above, is legitimate, ἐπὶ τοῦ indicating condition or purpose is wholly inadmissible. Moreover, *κατασκευάσαντος* almost certainly precedes rather than follows the name to which it refers, and anyone who has studied the Bithynian inscriptions will have noticed how frequent in that region are names connected with the god 'Ασκληπίος, — 'Ασκληπᾶς, 'Ασκληπιάδης, 'Ασκληπιώδοτος, 'Ασκληπιώδωρος, and 'Ασκληπιοδοτανός. If the gap is approximately that indicated by the editors, we may perhaps restore *κατασκευάσαντος* ἐκ τῶν ιδ[ίων e. g. Ιουλί]ον 'Ασκ[ληπι---] or ἐκ τῶν ιδ[ίων e. g. Δίου τοῦ]ον 'Ασκ[ληπι---].

After the word χειλι[άρχον (or perhaps χειλι[άρχον or χειλι[άρχῳ, for it is uncertain whether this word agrees with the preceding name) we expect some mention of the legion in which the χιλίαρχος, or *tribunus militum*, served; this can hardly be other than the *legio XV Apollinaris*, a creation of Augustus, the history of which has been traced by Ritterling in Pauly-Wissowa, XII, cols. 1747 ff. He gives a list (*op. cit.*, col. 1754) of the members of the legion of whom traces are found in Asia Minor,⁶ and also (cols. 1755 f.) of all its known *tribuni*, to whose number may now be added T. Oppius Afer Pollius Tertullus, if an Ephesian inscription of about A. D. 160 is rightly restored: T. *Οππιον *Αφρον Πόλλιον Τέρτυλλο[ν τριβ(ούνον) λεγάνως ιε' Απολειναρίας (*S. E. G.*, IV, 519, 4). One of them bears the cognomen Severus, namely M'. Acilius M'. f. Gal(eria) Glabrio Cn. Cornelius Severus, consul in A. D. 152, whose career is recorded in *C. I. L.*, XIV, 4237 = Dessau, 1072 (cf. *P. I. R.*², I, pp. 11 ff., No. 73; W. Hüttl, *Antoninus Pius*, II, pp. 26 f.); but the name Severus is common and I do not propose to identify him with the Severus of our Nicaean record. This, however, must clearly be restored

⁶ A Nicaean inscription commemorating a man, whose name is lost, as χειλίαρχον λεγ. ιε' (*C. I. G.*, 3751; *Sitzb. München*, 1863, p. 238) must be corrected to read λεγ. ιγ' (*I. G. Rom.*, III, 41). Another soldier of *legio XV* is the "Αρδίς? [σ]τρατιώτης λεγ. ει' Απολειναρίας, who erected a votive stele in Thrace ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς στρατείας (*S. E. G.*, III, 525).

$\chiειλι[αρχ.. λεγιῶνος οέ 'Απ]ολλινα(ρίας)$ unless, indeed, ολλινα represents the end not of the line as originally engraved, but of the legible portion of it, in which case we shall write 'Απ]ολλινα[ρίας].

'Ανεξοδίαστος is, as we have seen, almost, though not absolutely, confined to Bithynia; but I have not found there the word which is used widely elsewhere for "inalienable," ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτος. This occurs, e.g., at Smyrna (*C. I. G.*, 3203, 8 = *I. G. Rom.*, IV, 1429, 8, as restored by L. Robert, *R. E. G.*, XLII, pp. 428 f.), Pergamum (*Inschr. v. Perg.*, 590), Teira in Lydia (*I. G. Rom.*, IV, 1666, 20), and Apollonia in Pisidia (*S. I. G.*³, 1232, 9),* in Phrygia Galatica (*J. R. S.*, XII, p. 182),* on the Phrygian-Pisidian border (*A. J. A.*, XXXVI, p. 453),* in two Egyptian inscriptions found at Alexandria and at Medinet el-Fayum respectively (*Sammelbuch*, 364, 7687 = *S. E. G.*, VIII, 533,* and in several papyri (see references in F. Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, I, p. 117). The asterisked inscriptions are engraved on tombstones, and in the two Egyptian examples, and in these alone, we find the combination ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτος (*καὶ*) ἀκαταχρημάτιστος. In Liddell and Scott the term ἀναπαλλοτρίωτος also is registered, but this must be deleted, for the sole reference given is *T. A. M.*, II, 261b, 15, from Xanthus in Lycia, where Kalinka has adopted without question the restoration ἀ[να]παλλο]τριώτος⁷ from H. A. Ormerod's publication of the inscription, now preserved in the Liverpool Museum, in *Liverpool Annals*, VI, p. 104: as this word is otherwise unknown, while ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτος is abundantly attested, we must certainly prefer the latter to the former restoration. But while the adjective ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτος alone is used, the verbs ἀπαλλοτριώ and ἔξαλλοτριώ occur, it would seem, without any distinction of meaning.⁸ In LeBas-Waddington, 1639 (Aphrodisias), both are found in the same document, and in

⁷ Quoted by L. Robert, *Rev. Phil.*, X (1936), p. 134, note 3.

⁸ See L. Robert, *Rev. Phil.*, X (1936), p. 135, who in a Thasian decree (*B. C. H.*, XLV, p. 157, No. 9, line 10) restores περι[ιδ]εῖν ἀπ[αλλοτριωθέντας] (though in footnote 1 he gives ἀπαλλοτριωμένους) and adds two further examples, from Lycia and Pamphylia, to Laum's treatment of this group of words in the records of Greek societies (*Stiftungen in der griech. und röm. Antike*, I, pp. 185 f.). He misquotes *S. I. G.*³, 363, 13 (Ephesus) as περιδεῖν τὸ φρούριον ἀπαλλοτριωθέν, instead of π. ἀλλοτριωθέν τὸ φ. For ἀπ- and ἔξαλλοτριώ in papyri see Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, I, pp. 153, 508. On the Greek mainland I have noted one case, *I. G.*, V (2), 344, 12 (Arcadian Orchomenus), of the use of ἀπαλλοτριώσαι.

Inschr. v. Perg., 590, ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτον is almost immediately followed by ἀπαλλοτριώθη. Similarly the nouns ἀπαλλοτρίωσις (*C. I. G.*, 3281) and ἐξαλλοτρίωσις (Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, I, p. 508) are used alike to denote "alienation." In Bithynia, as has been said, the adjective ἀνεξαλλοτρίωτος does not occur, but of the cognate verb we have one example, hitherto unrecognized. Schneider and Karnapp publish (*op. cit.*, p. 48, No. 26) a greatly improved version of a Nicaean tomb-inscription first copied by C. Cichorius (*Ath. Mitt.*, XIV, p. 241). In line 5, where Cichorius did not succeed in deciphering a single letter, they give η.....οτριως ἀπ[....]. In view of the context (line 3 begins ἐπὶ τῷ μετὰ τό, line 4 ἔτερον ἐξεῖναι) we may confidently restore ἡ [ἐξ (or ἀπ-)αλλ]οτριῶσαι, followed perhaps by a τ--, on the analogy of such a phrase as *S. E. G.*, VI, 673, 9 f. (Lyrboton Come, in Pamphylia): μηδενὸς ἔχοντος ἐξουσίαν τὰ προγεγραμμένα] ἡ καὶ μέρο[s] τι αὐτῶν πωλῆσαι ἡ ἐξαλλοτριῶσαι, or *C. I. G.*, 3400 = *A. G. I. Brit. Mus.*, 1028 (Smyrna): μηδενὸς ἔχοντος ἐξουσίαν μ[η]τε πωλῆσαι μήτε ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι, or again *Sardis*, VII (1), 154: [ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ π]ωλῆσαιν ἡ ἐξαλλοτριῶσαι].⁹

MARCUS N. TOD.

ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

⁹ Schneider and Karnapp (*op. cit.*, pp. 44 f., No. 10) publish an order of Hadrian, which deserves further study; one small point may here be noted. In line 4 they write [όσαι ἀν] εὑρεθῶσιν πεφυ[κέν]αι, but in the light of line 8, ὅς δ' ἀν εὑρεθῇ παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῶν, we should rather restore πεφυ[κύι]αι.

ON ETRUSCAN AND LATIN MONTH-NAMES.

E. Benveniste has succeeded in tracing back the most obscure of the Latin month-names, *Aprilis*, to its non-Latin origin.¹ After rejecting for good reasons the Indo-European etymologies of the word, he recognizes its Etruscan character and ties it up with the proper names Lat. *Aprius Apronius*, Etr. *apruntial*, the combination of which leads to an Etr. **apru*. **apru*, for its part, may be identified with the Greek short-name 'Αφρώ "Αφροδίτα," a form which the Etruscans would have taken over, like so many other mythical elements, from central Greece. Under such circumstances it is perhaps not a mere accident if in Thessalic calendars a month **Aphrios* appears, which corresponds to late March and early April.²

To give further support to Benveniste's reconstruction, E. Fiesel has recalled another case.³ *Ampiles* or *Amphiles*, the Etruscan name of May recorded by mediaeval glosses, not only rhymes with the name of the month which precedes it immediately, Lat.-Etr. *Aprilis*, and shares with it the well known Etruscan -l-suffix, but it can also be shown that its structure is essentially analogous to that of *Aprilis*. *Amp(h)ius* 'Αμπεῖλος *Amp(h)iles* perfectly corresponds with *Aprius Aprilius Aprilis*; and, if 'Αφρώ **apru* was the eponymous deity of both proper names and month-names in the first series (for this is the way the correspondences must be interpreted), E. Fiesel's assumption that the second might contain the name of *Αμφι(ο)s, Greek short forms of 'Αμφιάραος—as *amphiare*, etc., one of the favorite Etruscan heroes—, does not appear too hazardous.

That mediaeval tradition to which attention was drawn anew by the interpretation of *Amp(h)iles* is well worth a study from a linguistical point of view. As far as the philological evidence is concerned, it suffices to refer to Mountford's and Goetz's statements.⁴ The *Liber Glossarum*, represented by LPTV and by

¹ *B. S. L.*, XXXII (1931), pp. 68-74.

² Cortsen, *Glotta*, XXVI (1938), p. 273. Perhaps Varro's remark, *Sat.*, 1, 28, is also of importance: "quidam putant cum aspiratione quasi Aphrilem" (recalled by Cortsen, *Glotta*, XXVII [1939], p. 277); alternation of aspirated and non-aspirated stops is a characteristic feature of Etruscan loanwords.

³ *Studi Etruschi*, VII (1933), pp. 295 ff.

⁴ *J. H. S.*, XLIII (1923), pp. 102 ff.; *R.-E.*, VII, cols. 1454 f. Further-

two secondary witnesses, Papias and the Leyden Codex viii 67 D, offers us the following set of month-names:

Velcitanus (PTV Leyd *Veleitanus* L *Velitanus* Pap) "Martius"
Cabreas (LPTV) "Aprilis"

Ampiles (LPTV Leyd *Amphiles* Pap) "Maius"

Aclus (LP Pap) "Iunius"

Traneus (LP Leyd Pap) "Iulius"

Ermius (LP Pap) "Augustus"

Celius (LP *Caelius* TV Pap) "September"

Xosfer (LPTV *Xoffer* Leyd *Xofer* Pap) "October."

This list may be regarded as trustworthy. The monuments, to be sure, do not expressly confirm it—at least until it shall really have been proved that *hermeri hermu hr̄mier* on the sarcophagus of Pulena,⁵ or *acale* and *celi* in the Agram Mummy⁶ refer to month-dates, and mean "August," "June," and "September" respectively. As to the fact, moreover, that Lat. *Aprilis* would lead to an Etruscan form different from *Cabreas*, one will agree with E. Fiesel in explaining this dualism by the well-known decentralization of Etruscan public life:⁷ local divergences may *a priori* be expected in Etruscan month-nomenclature to no less an extent than e. g. in that of Latium or of Greece. I hope to show that seven of the eight items can be interpreted, with the

more, Lindsay, *Gl. L.*, I, s. vv.; *C. Gl. L.*, VI, 692, and s. vv.; Bröcker, *Philologus*, II (1847), pp. 248 ff., 256 ff.; Mommsen, *Rh. M.*, XVI (1861), pp. 145 ff.

⁵ C. I. E., 5430 Tarquinii. See Herbig, *Die etruskische Leinwandrolle*, p. 25.

⁶ VI, 14; XI, 1; VIII, 3. More recently Goldmann, *Neue Beitr.*, pp. 213 ff.; Runes, *Der etrusk. Text der Agramer Mumienbinde*, pp. 38 f.; Olzscha, *Interpretation der Agramer Mumienbinde*, p. 196.

⁷ *Studi Etruschi*, VII (1935), p. 295, n. 4. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion*, pp. 162 f., has shown how Lat. *Iunius*, too, owes its peculiar formation to Etruscan. In Aricia, Larentum, Lavinia, etc., i. e. in an area more remote from Etruria, the month is called by the genuine derivative *Iunonius*; see Ovid, *Fast.*, VI, 60 ff. On the other hand, *Iuno* had become Etr. *uni*, and a family *un-* is named after her (unless the process was inverse; see note 18 *infra*; Fiesel, *Das grammatische Geschlecht*, pp. 23 f.; Nehring, *Studi Etruschi*, XII [1938], pp. 157 f.). It is probable, if not certain, that not only the *gens Iunia*, but the *mensis Iunius* are a Latin rendering of an Etruscan original. If so, *Aclus* and *Iunius* must also be considered as epichoric variants. The whole question is complicated by the morphological obscurity of Lat. *Iuno* itself. See Fiesel, *Roscher's Myth. Lex.*, VI, cols. 33 f.

means provided by our knowledge of Etruscan, in a simple and consistent manner. E. Fiesel, who seems to have been of the same opinion, has unfortunately been unable to carry out her purpose of giving the proofs—only the fine article on *Xosfer* referred to below has appeared; and although I can find among the numerous manuscript materials left by her only a short and incomplete, if precious, note on the subject, I hope and believe that she would have consented to the following attempt at a demonstration.⁸

Velcitanus “Martius”: gentile name *velxite velcite* (enlargement of *velxe*, Lat. *Volca*), W. Schulze, *Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen* (*Abh. Gesell. Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, V, No. 5), pp. 99, 586.⁹ *velxe* : *Velcitanus* = Etr. *carpe* “Carpus” (?) : *Carpitanus*, *ibid.*, p. 146; *velxite* : *Velcitanus* ~ Etr. *caprti* : *Capretanus*, *ibid.*, p. 145; cf. also *Calptana Calpetanus* with other forms with *calp-*, *ibid.*, p. 138, and pp. 96, 147, 347.

Cabreas “Aprilis” can be connected with numerous Etr. proper names: *caprti caprinal*, Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 145; *capru*, *ibid.*, p. 234; *capras caprasial*, *ibid.*, p. 353; Lat. *Capertius* *Caprius Caprilius Caprelius Caprasius Capronius Caprutius*, etc., *ll. citt.* The name-stem as such was most familiar to the Etruscans, though the root from which it had risen may be of non-Etruscan or non-Italic “mediterranean” provenience.¹⁰ We are, therefore, entitled to maintain the references given above. To be sure, the ending in *-eas* is strange, and I cannot quote analogous latinized Etr. forms. It should be noticed that the form is given only by LPTV.

Amp(h)iles “Maius,” see *supra*.

Aclus “Iunius”: Etr. proper name *axle* = Lat. *Aclius*, Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 111; enlarged forms Etr. *aclani aclina acline aclnal*, etc., Lat. *Aclenius Acclenus Achillenius* (with aspiration characteristic of Etr. influence). An *Aclus* might represent a praenomen as well as a gentile name.¹¹ May the latter be tied up

⁸ *Studi Etruschi*, VII (1933), p. 29; X (1936), p. 324. The manuscripts now belong to the Yale University Library.

⁹ Where “*CIE* 606 und 608” must be read.

¹⁰ Fiesel, *Studi Etruschi*, VII (1933), p. 295, n. 4.

¹¹ Fiesel (*mscr.*): *-l-* not being suffixal, and the preceding vowel being short, there is no chance of establishing a parallelism between *Aprile*- *Ampile*- *Acile*.

with *axle axile axele axale axule*, Etr. form of Ἀχιλλεύς, Fiesel, *Namen des griechischen Mythos*, pp. 86 f.?

Traneus "Iulius" has no correspondence in the known Etr. material. See note 30 *infra*, and Fiesel, *Studi Etruschi*, X (1936), p. 324, n. 6.

Ermius "Augustus": coincides with *Ermius*, gentile name formation from Etr. *herme*, Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Herbig, *Die etruskische Leinwandrolle*, p. 25, thinks of a connection with 'Ερμῆς.¹²

Celius "September," better documented than *Caelius*, hence more likely to be related with Etr. *cele* (Lat. *Gellius*, cf. *C. I. E.*, 1977, 1986) than with Etr. *cæle* "Caeles," Lat. gentile form *Caelius*, etc.; Schulze, *op. cit.*, pp. 134, 357, 592. A name of a god *cel* seems to be read in the Liver of Piacenza: Olzscha, *Interpretation der Agramer Mumienbinde*, pp. 178 f., 196.

As to *Xosfer* "October," see *infra*.

To these items *Aprilis* and, perhaps, *Iunius*¹³ must be added.

From this evidence it results that nearly all of the month-names can be tied up with Etr. proper names and that they can even be equated with certain gentile varieties of the latter. *Ermius*, *Celius* (and *Iunius*) are attested in such function; the suffix *-ius*, though of Italic origin, was extremely common in Etruscan, and it is by no means due to the latinized forms in which the month-names have been recorded. *Aclus*, only apparently lacking a suffix, might represent a gentile name as well as Plautus' nomen *Maccus*¹⁴ and the like. *Velcitanus Amp(h)iles Aprilis* show more amplified suffixal groups, in perfect conformity with the onomasticon.

What does this striking coincidence mean? The analogy of Lat. *Iulus*, as *Quintilis* was renamed in the year 44 B. C. after the greatest son of the *gens Iulia*, does not of course apply to our

¹² Mountford, *J. H. S.*, XLIII (1923), p. 108, conjectures that *Ermius* has invaded the Etruscan month-list by some mistake, and is identical with 'Ερμαῖος, which may have belonged to a list of Greek months in the glosses. One would, however, expect to find something like **Ermæus*; moreover, the distance between the seasons concerned is too great (Fiesel, *mscr.*). For the same reason a possible historical relation between "Etr." *Ermius* and 'Ερμαῖος (like that of "Etr." *Aprilis* and 'Αφριός assumed by Cortsen; see p. 199 *supra*) seems to be excluded.

¹³ See note 7 *supra*.

¹⁴ See W. Schulze, *op. cit.*, pp. 297 f.

case. But that fact was possible only because the Roman, like other Italic calendars, contained a set of months, *Martius Maius Iunius*, which were homonymous to gentile names. Both families (or their founders) and months had their denominations from the god or his sacred days; both family names and month names are nothing but adjectival derivatives.¹⁵ This applies as well to Latin as to Etruscan: *Aprilis Amp(h)iles* stand in the same relation with the related name-forms as *Martius* or *Maius* with the corresponding nomina; and it is impossible to decide whether *Iunius* has assumed its double meaning on Etruscan or on Roman soil. It will be not by mere chance, therefore, that, in addition to the two Etruscan months mentioned just now, three more show traces of divine or mythical provenience: however uncertain the single connections of *Aclus Ermius Celius* with *Aχle* = Ἀχιλλεύς 'Ερμῆς *cel* may be—the last would be fairly well secured if the reading of the Liver is really sound—, one will admit that they support each other by their typical likeness. Achilleus *aχle*, it should be observed, was known (and worshipped?) in Etruria at a very early stage,¹⁶ like Amphiaraus mentioned above. As to Hermes, his cult in Etruria is known to us only under the name of *turms*, *turm̄s*; but, as G. Herbig pointed out, this does not necessarily exclude the use of the Greek name, which, it is probable, will be seen in the quoted forms of the Pulena inscription.¹⁷

The large majority of gentile names, however, cannot be traced back beyond a praenomen, from the patronymical use of which it had arisen. Thus, the cases of *Cabreas* and *Velcitanus* remain functionally obscure despite the formal correspondence given above. Of course, *Cabreas* might also contain a lost god-name, although this is impossible to prove. At any rate, however, *Velcitanus* requires a different sort of interpretation. Alongside the theophoric proper names, and to be kept well distinct from them, the inverse phenomenon exists: the “gentile deities,” originally worshipped by certain families and named after them. The cult of those deities must have been of enormous importance in Etruria, for even its Roman reflections are still

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 469 ff.

¹⁶ The form of Lat. *Achilles* may suggest that it was taken over by the Romans from Etruscan rather than directly from Greek.

¹⁷ *Die etruskische Leinwandrolle*, p. 25.

very remarkable.¹⁸ As the classical examples, *Volcanus* (: Etr. gens *velxa*, Lat. *Volca*) and *Saturnus* (: Etr. *saθre*), show, a derivative suffix in *-n-* is, among others, common in their formation. Now, *Velcitanus* might well have been to the **velxita*¹⁹ family what *Volcanus* was to the *Volca*. A slight difficulty remains in so far as one would expect something like **Velcitanus* in the name of the month; and it is hard to tell whether the apparent identity of eponymous god-name and secondary month-name is due again to the late Etruscan change of *ie* into *e*, or to the still felt adjectival character of such a god-name; in the latter case the month-name would have been connected still more closely with the family name.²⁰

In the preceding pages no account has been made of *Xosfer*, the form for "October" given by the most reliable manuscripts of our glosses. It needs a separate discussion.

Here again E. Fiesel has devoted a shrewd article to the problem.²¹ Following Mountford's suggestion of reading the first letter of the strange-looking item as a Greek Chi as elsewhere in the glosses²²—there is, indeed, no *cs-* or *χs-* at the beginning of Etruscan words—, she writes also *e* instead of the second letter, *o*, which does not occur in Etruscan texts either. Thus, an Etr.-Lat. **Chesfer*, Etr. *c/χesp/fre* is reached and tied up with Etr. *cezp-* "a cardinal number from 7 to 9." Furthermore, the value of "8" for *cezp-*, conjectured long ago by Pauli, is established by the equation of **Chesfer* and Lat. *October*.

This hypothesis would have important consequences. Above all, the hitherto unexplained formation of the Latin month-names *September October November December*²³ seems at once

¹⁸ See Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion*, pp. 114 ff., 144 ff. (as to *Angerona*, however, see Fiesel, *Language*, XI, pp. 126 ff.); Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 165. Even Etr. *uni* "Juno" (see note 7 *supra*) was a gentle goddess according to Fiesel, *Das grammatische Geschlecht*, p. 23.

¹⁹ *velxite* : **velxita* e. g. = *velxe* : *Volca*; cf. the pattern of name-forms given *supra*, p. 201. The existence of **velxita* is suggested by analogy.

²⁰ See Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 297. As to the adjectival use of names (*via Appia*; *pax Augusta*, *mensis Augustus*) in Latin, see Schulze's important remarks, *op. cit.*, pp. 510 ff.

²¹ *Studi Etruschi*, X (1936), pp. 324 ff.

²² *J. H. S.*, XLIII (1923), p. 109.

²³ See Walde-Hofmann, *L. E. W.*, s. v. *December*; Benveniste, *B. S. L.*,

proved to be due to that same Etruscan influence, which, to a larger or smaller extent, was at work in the cases *Aprilis Iunius Quintilis Sextilis*, or which had brought to Rome other calendar terms like, perhaps, *idus*.²⁴ We shall have to conclude that Etr. *cez̄p-re, in being partly translated into Latin, was analyzed *cez̄-pre, and the "false suffix" taken over. This would be the less surprising, as those Etruscan numerals next to *cez̄p-, viz. *semφ-* and *nurφ-*²⁵ (their distribution among the values 7 9 10—hardly higher—is not certain) display the same final labial, rare in Etruscan; and, if we might assume that *September November December*, at least in part,²⁶ are not merely formed in Latin after the analogy of *October* but go back to corresponding Etruscan words, we should obtain a set of successive Etruscan names ending in -p-re. Moreover, it should be noticed that the forms before the suffix in those four Latin month-names may morphologically be cardinal numbers at least as well as the ordinal ones we expect. So it is quite possible that Etr. -re was the carrier of the ordinal function.

In consideration of these data the objection counts little that we do not know an Etruscan ordinal (or similar) suffix -re; for we do not know any other suffix with that function. There is even less weight in another objection, viz. that *Xosfer* thus would have a structure differing from the preceding Etruscan month-names. Why should the formative principle not have changed in passing from *Celius* to *Xosfer* just as in passing from *Iunius* to *Quintilis* in Latin?²⁷

It would be hard to renounce, despite all this, E. Fiesel's XXXII (1931), p. 73. That these words are in the i-declension would be due to the analogy of the preceding *Quintilis Sextilis*. The alternation of *p* (Lat. *p, b*), *φ*, and *f* (as well as that between *z* and *s*) is known in Etruscan; so *Xosfer* does not prove anything in favor of "Oscan" OCTUFRI, reconstructed from modern Neapolitan by Rohlfs, Z. R. Ph., XLIV, p. 156. This form is certainly nothing else but a secondary dialectization of Lat. *Octobri-*; if it were really Oscan, it would have changed *-kt-* to *-(h)t-*; cf. *Uhtavis*, Buck, pp. 20; 58.

²⁴ See Benveniste, *loc. cit.*; Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. ét.*, s. v.

²⁵ Not *nurb-*; *nuryphi* is now read in C.I.E., 5526. See, moreover, Slotty, *Archiv orientální*, IX, pp. 397 f.

²⁶ Unless, besides *Celius*, another name was in use in other places; see p. 200 *supra*.

²⁷ See Schulze, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 f.; Benveniste, B. S. L., XXXII (1931), pp. 69 f.

sagacious and consistent construction.²⁸ Nevertheless, I strongly doubt that it will be possible to maintain it. Let us go back again to the sources and consider how **cespre* was reconstructed. However justified the correction (more exactly: corrected reading) of *X = Ch* may have been, the same cannot be said of the treatment of the following vowel. It is true that *o* is not found in genuine Etruscan scripts—the Etruscan phoneme which was next to it was written by *u*. But it is precisely for this reason that *o*, wherever it occurs in texts written in the Latin alphabet or in latinized Etruscan forms (and spellings of this kind are quite common), represents Etr. *u*.²⁹ To write *Chesfer* for *Xosfer* is, therefore, not to heal an evident corruption by a plausible emendation, as E. Fiesel thought, but to make a mere conjecture to which we are hardly entitled.³⁰ The Etruscan name we must reconstruct can be nothing else than **c/xusp/fre*.

Now, the inscriptions provide us with a group of proper names: *cvspi cuspi Cuspedius Cuspidius cusperiena*, Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 162. In consideration of the other months and their relation to proper names, there can be no doubt that *cuspre* must be listed here. It fills the gap existing morphologically between *cuspi* “di. Cuspis” (W. Schulze, *loc. cit.*) and *cusperiena* and is formally identical with other gentile names in *-r(i)e*, latinized *-er*.³¹ As to its function and meaning, we may see in *cuspre*, too, the gentile deity of the *cuspi* family, and in *cuspr(i)e Xosfer* the month sacred to that deity.

Thus, the mediaeval tradition of Etruscan month-names deserves more credence than it is usually given. It is highly probable that the Etruscans named their months after gods; and it is a lucky accident that just that part of the Etruscan language with which we are most familiar, the proper names, contains enough related elements to let us know or guess the significance of those denominations, and the principles of their formation.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

H. M. HOENIGSWALD.

²⁸ Would it, perhaps, account also for another Etruscan survival, the *equos October* (cf. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion*, p. 147)?

²⁹ See Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

³⁰ It would be likewise impossible to alter *Traneus* “Iulius” into **Turanius Toranius*, to tie it up with the proper name *Toranius Thoranius*, Schulze, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 373, and to see in either form a derivative from Etr. *turan* “Venus.”

³¹ See Schulze, *op. cit.*, pp. 296 f.

THE WALL OF THEODOSIUS AT ANTIOCH.

The study which has been devoted to the elucidation and evaluation of the sixth-century Chronicle of John Malalas has been concerned primarily with his account of the period from Augustus to Diocletian.¹ The peculiarities which have been discovered in this part of his work, and the principles on which they are to be investigated, apply equally to the latter part of his book. The present paper deals with a question of mistaken identities which is exceptionally instructive because confusions of rulers of the same name and of officials of the same name appear in this case to have been brought about by unusual circumstances, and to have caused an extraordinary displacement of events from their proper chronological context.

It is not surprising to find that Malalas confused Theodosius the Elder and Theodosius the Younger. He sometimes confused earlier emperors whose names were similar or identical,² and the sameness of the names of the Theodosii and their close chronological connection would readily expose them and the events of their reigns to misunderstanding. There is one immediate indication of a confusion of the emperors in Malalas' statement³ that Valentinian III died before Theodosius II: actually Valentinian survived Theodosius by nearly five years. Evidently Malalas was thinking of Valentinian II and Theodosius I, Theodosius in this case having really lived nearly three years longer than Valentinian. Again, the chronicler relates⁴ that Alarich was killed in battle with Attila during the reign of Theodosius II, whereas actually Alarich died long before Attila's invasion: possibly Malalas confused Attila with the usurper Attalus.⁵

¹ See the bibliography cited in the present writer's articles "Malalas on the History of Antioch under Severus and Caracalla," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII (1937), pp. 141-156, and "Imperial Building Records in Malalas," *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXVIII (1938), pp. 1-15, 299-311. A valuable summary of the nature of the problems involved is given by F. Schehl in his review of A. Schenk von Stauffenberg's edition of Books IX-XII of Malalas, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXVIII (1938), pp. 157-169.

² See W. Ensslin, *Phil. Woch.*, LIII (1933), cols. 785-787; Schehl, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167; Downey, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXVIII (1938), p. 15.

³ P. 360, line 20, Bonn ed.

⁴ P. 358, 21.

⁵ It seems possible that there is also a confusion of the two Theodosii

Transposition to one reign of events which happened in another would seem to require no explanation other than confusion of the names. But it is an entirely different matter if, as seems to be the case in the instance to be examined here, one event was transferred from one reign to the other, while at the same time another event was displaced in the opposite direction, both shifts apparently arising from the same cause or from related causes.

The problem in Malalas' accounts of the relations of the two Theodosii to Antioch which has attracted most attention is the question presented by his description of the extension of the wall of the city under Theodosius I. The subject has been investigated by several students, but there is still evidence which has been overlooked. Malalas states⁶ that Theodosius I appointed to the praetorian prefecture a man called Antiochus Chuzon, "the Great," of Antioch and that Antiochus brought to the emperor's attention the growth of Antioch, which had increased in area until there were buildings for a considerable distance beyond the walls. Accordingly Theodosius had a part of the wall extended, and Malalas describes its new course in detail. Again, the chronicler relates,⁷ in his account of the reign of Theodosius II, that the emperor appointed to the prefecture Antiochus Chuzon, grandson of Antiochus Chuzon the Great, and that the younger Antiochus provided an addition to the funds which provided for the spectacles of the hippodrome, the local Olympic games of Antioch, and the festival of the Maiuma.⁸

There is no other evidence that a person named Antiochus was

in Malalas' reference to the gilding of the Porta Aurea at Constantinople. In his account of the work of Theodosius II at Antioch he says (p. 360, 15) that that emperor also "gilded the two bronze leaves of the Daphnetic Gate (at Antioch) in the same manner that he gilded the gate at Constantinople which is still called the Golden Gate." There has been a considerable debate, on the basis of this and other evidence, as to whether the gate at Constantinople is the work of Theodosius I or Theodosius II (see the bibliography given by A. M. Schneider, *Byzanz: Vorarbeiten zur Topographie u. Archäologie der Stadt* [Berlin, 1936], p. 81, also E. Mamboury, "Les fouilles byzantines à Istanbul," *Byzantion*, XI [1936], pp. 261-262).

⁶ P. 346, 5.

⁷ P. 362, 18.

⁸ Chuzon is a *signum* or nickname; see G. R. Sievers, *Das Leben des Libanius* (Berlin, 1868), p. 236.

praetorian prefect under Theodosius I, while an Antiochus is known from several sources to have held the office under Theodosius II, in 430 and 431.⁹ Scholars consequently concluded that Malalas confused the elder Antiochus with the man of the same name who was prefect under Theodosius II.¹⁰ The chronicler's sources and methods, of course, made such a confusion quite possible.

There is, however, further evidence in this connection which has not been used by the scholars who discussed the two supposed prefects named Antiochus. This is given by Evagrius, whose testimony places the problem in a different light. He states¹¹ that the wall of Antioch was extended by Theodosius the Younger, and adds that "some say that Theodosius the Elder extended the wall." This last phrase must refer to an account such as Malalas'; Evagrius used Malalas, sometimes quoting him, but occasionally taking material from him without mentioning his source.¹² Evagrius does not mention an Antiochus Chuzon, but says that the work was done at the request of the Empress Eudocia, following her visit to Antioch.¹³

Various opinions have been expressed with regard to the extension of the wall.¹⁴ There is, however, evidence which again has

⁹ See O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser u. Päpste* (Stuttgart, 1919), entries for 31 Dec. 430 and 23 Mar. 431; B. Borghesi, *Œuvres complètes*, X (Paris, 1897), p. 319.

¹⁰ Borghesi, *op. cit.*, p. 332, cf. pp. 254-256; Sievers, *op. cit.*, p. 264; R. Förster, "Antiochia," *Jahrbuch d. k. deutschen Archäol. Inst.*, XII (1897), p. 127.

¹¹ *Ecclesiastical Hist.*, I, 20.

¹² See E. Patzig, *Unerkannt u. unbekannt gebliebene Malalas-Fragmente* (Prog., Leipzig, 1891), pp. 17-20; C. E. Gleye, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, III (1894), pp. 625-630; E. Chernousov, *ibid.*, XXVII (1927), p. 30, n. 2; also G. Downey, *P. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), p. xxxiv.

¹³ On Eudocia's visit, see E. Stein, *Gesch. d. spätrom. Reiches*, I (Vienna, 1928), p. 444. Other evidence might suggest that Malalas is in error, for the chronicler mentions that the Daphnetic Gate at Antioch was gilded under Theodosius II (p. 360, 15; see also *supra*), and one might naturally think that this work was connected with the extension of the wall, for the gate was in the southern wall of the city (the wall which was, according to Evagrius, extended), and it might be thought natural that an operation of this kind would be carried out at the same time that the wall was enlarged. This evidence is not conclusive, however, for the gilding might still have been done long after the wall was extended.

¹⁴ C. O. Müller, *Antiquitates Antiochenae* (Göttingen, 1839), pp. 113-

not been taken into account by the students who have examined the question. This is provided by the evident confusion of the two Theodosii which appears in Malalas' statement¹⁵ that Theodosius II appointed to the praetorian prefecture Rufinus, "the emperor's relative," and that Rufinus was finally executed "because he planned revolt."¹⁶ No Rufinus is known to have been praetorian prefect under Theodosius II, but the way in which the chronicler describes this official makes it certain that he means Flavius Rufinus, who became praetorian prefect in 392 and after the death of Theodosius I in January, 395, schemed to make himself the colleague of Arcadius.¹⁷ Malalas' description of his Rufinus as a "relative" of Theodosius II is plainly a reference to the prefect's attempt to have Arcadius marry his daughter (a plan which was thwarted by Eutropius), and the motive which the chronicler gives for his execution represents the hostile interpretation of the events which led to the assassination of Rufinus in November, 395.

If it stood alone, such a passage as this in Malalas would not necessarily mean anything more than that the chronicler found a reference to the career and death of Rufinus in a description of the reign of an emperor named Theodosius, and mistakenly assigned the incidents to the time of the younger emperor. But the context suggests that behind the mistake there may lie more

114, knows the evidence of Evagrius but rejects it without stating any reason and follows Malalas. Förster, *loc. cit.*, does not attempt to decide between Malalas and Evagrius, but observes that two points are in favor of Evagrius, though neither is decisive: first, Evagrius knows the conflicting tradition but rejects it; second, the gilding of the Daphnetic Gate, which must, in Förster's opinion, have been executed in connection with the extension of the walls, is assigned by Malalas to Theodosius II (see, however, the preceding note). V. Schultze, *Antiocheia* (Gütersloh, 1930), p. 101, solves the difficulty easily by supposing that Theodosius II completed work begun under Theodosius I. Neither Müller nor Schultze discussed the question of Antiochus Chuzon in this connection; Förster's opinion has been noted above. E. S. Bouchier, *A Short History of Antioch* (Oxford, 1921), p. 170, follows Malalas; he mentions Evagrius' account of Eudocia's visit (p. 177) but ignores his statement concerning the wall.

¹⁵ P. 362, 18.

¹⁶ On Malalas' use of *tyrannis* in this passage see Ensslin, *op. cit.*, cols. 777-778.

¹⁷ On the career of Rufinus, see J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (2nd ed., London, 1923), I, pp. 107-113, and Stein, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 351-352.

than this. Rufinus is said by Malalas¹⁸ to have been the successor of the prefect Antiochus Chuzon, the grandson of Antiochus Chuzon the Great. There was of course an Antiochus who was prefect under Theodosius II. But Malalas also says that there was a prefect named Antiochus Chuzon under Theodosius I, and no prefect of this name is attested for this period. It looks then as though Malalas' account of two prefects named Antiochus might be a doublet and as though the mistaken assignment of a prefect Rufinus to the reign of Theodosius II, when there was a prefect of this name only under Theodosius I, might be connected with the origin of this doublet. One might be tempted to suppose, for example, that, if Rufinus is anachronistically associated with the younger Antiochus, this might have come about because he had been in some way associated (or might have been thought to be associated) with an elder Antiochus. Thus the transfer of Rufinus from the reign of one Theodosius to the other could have been motivated or facilitated by Malalas' knowledge of (and confusion of) two persons named Antiochus Chuzon.

If the problem is examined further, the possible reason for the displacement of Rufinus may throw further light on the accounts of the two Antiochi. Antiochus the Younger, with whom Rufinus is associated, is in his right position, so far as his name and his title are concerned, while at least the title of Antiochus the Elder seems to be wrong. Therefore it would seem that Rufinus was transferred to the later reign not only because of confusion of the names of the emperors but because of his association with an Antiochus Chuzon. This would normally be done only if there were two Antiochus Chuzons. Thus it looks, from Malalas' testimony at least, as though the two Antiochi were not entirely a doublet (which does not, of course, preclude the possibility of a mistake on the part of Malalas with regard to the office of the elder Antiochus). In other words, the mistaken association of Rufinus with Antiochus the Younger is an argument in favor of the actual existence of an Antiochus the Elder, since it seems plausible to suppose that it was because he had originally been connected with the elder Antiochus (rightly or wrongly) that Rufinus came to be mistakenly associated with the younger Antiochus. And if the elder Antiochus

¹⁸ P. 362, 21.

was not prefect, it would seem unlikely that he can have been responsible for the extension of the walls, at least in an official capacity.

Evagrius' testimony that the wall was extended under Theodosius II agrees with these conclusions, and some importance may be attached to the circumstance that Evagrius knew the divergent tradition and rejected it. Apparently Malalas displaced the extension of the wall in one direction and displaced Rufinus in this opposite direction; possibly the reason why he was able to make this double shift was that there were not only the two emperors of the same name who could be confused but there were two Antiochus Chuzons, one in each reign to contribute to the disorder. Whether a confusion of the Antiochus Chuzons would arise from a confusion of the emperors or *vice versa* it seems impossible to determine.

There is a final piece of evidence which indicates from still another point of view that the condition of Malalas' account arises from a confusion of names and not from a divergent tradition or a controversy in which Malalas took a stand on a debated question. A passage preserved in the Tusculan Fragment of Malalas¹⁹ but lost from the text preserved in the codex Barocianus (which is in places an abridgment) shows that Malalas knew of Eudocia's visit to Antioch and described it in some detail, but did not mention that she was concerned with an extension of the wall. Had Malalas known a tradition that the empress had a share in the extension of the wall of Antioch, his account of the careers of the two Antiochus Chuzons would certainly have been quite different. Furthermore, Evagrius must have known this account by Malalas of the empress' visit, and the fact that he himself ascribes the extension of the wall to her and rejects Malalas' account of the extension suggests again that Evagrius had another source (apparently unknown to Malalas) which he considered to be superior in this matter.

One last point may illuminate the problem further. Evagrius says that the wall was extended at the petition of Eudocia, Malalas that the work was done at the behest of the prefect Antiochus. A plausible explanation of this discrepancy is that both were concerned with the work, the empress setting the idea in motion, Antiochus supervising its actual execution. Evagrius

¹⁹ *Spicilegium Romanum*, ed. A. Mai, II, 2 (Rome, 1839), p. 15.

would of course have been interested chiefly in the empress' friendliness toward the city, while Malalas would very likely have drawn his account ultimately from an official record of some sort, possibly of an epigraphic character. It would thus be not at all unusual to find the same work ascribed in different sources to agencies of quite a different rank. There is another instance in which Evagrius and Malalas ascribe the same building operation to different persons, one an emperor, the other a subordinate official,²⁰ and there is much evidence of comparable procedures in other ancient records.²¹

To summarize: Malalas says the wall of Antioch was extended under Theodosius I at the suggestion of the prefect Antiochus Chuzon; he says also that Theodosius II appointed to the praetorian prefecture Antiochus Chuzon, grandson of the elder Antiochus. An Antiochus was prefect under Theodosius II, but no Antiochus is known to have been prefect under Theodosius I. Evagrius declares that the wall was extended by Theodosius II, adding that "some say," wrongly, that Theodosius I made the extension. The solution is apparently to be found in the fact that Malalas states that Theodosius II appointed a certain Rufinus as praetorian prefect as successor to Antiochus the Younger. Malalas' description makes it certain that he really means the Rufinus who was prefect under Theodosius I. This suggests that Malalas confused both the two emperors and the two Antiochus Chuzons and thus both wrongly assigned the prefectship of Rufinus to the later reign and wrongly assigned the extension of the wall to the earlier reign.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY.

²⁰ Malalas says (p. 360, 7) that Theodosius II built a "basilica" at Antioch, "which the people of Antioch call that of Anatolius because the *stratelates* Anatolius supervised the work, receiving the money from the emperor when he became *stratelates* of the East; and for this reason, when he finished this construction of the *basilike*, he inscribed on it in gold mosaic this: 'The work of the Emperor Theodosius,' as was right." Evagrius (I, 18) says, of the same work, only: "Anatolius, sent as *strategos* of the eastern forces, built the so-called *stoa* of Anatolius, adorning it with all kinds of materials." The passages are discussed by the writer in an article on "The Architectural Significance of the Use of the Words *Stoa* and *Basilike* in Classical Literature," *A. J. A.*, XLI (1937), p. 199, and in "Imperial Building Records in Malalas," *Byz. Zeitschr.*, XXXVIII (1938), p. 8.

²¹ See the writer's article in the *Byz. Zeitschr.*, mentioned *supra*.

SOPHOCLES, *AJAX* 112: A STUDY IN SOPHOCLEAN SYNTAX AND INTERPRETATION.

The textual reading of Sophocles, *Ajax* 112 is *χαίρειν*, 'Αθάνα, *τᾶλλος ἐγώ σ' ἐφίεμαι*. The slightly varying readings noted by Jebb¹ and Pearson² do not affect *σ'* which is the crux of the line. The usual explanation is that *ἐφίεμαι* here = "command," "enjoin upon" and governs the accusative and infinitive. Thus the scholiast (cited by Jebb) understood it: *ἐφίεμαι σε τὰ δόλα κελεύειν καὶ χαίρειν ὡς πειθομένου μον.* So Campbell took it, citing Aeschylus;³ so too Jebb, with a Sophoclean parallel.⁴ But on examination neither passage proves satisfactory.⁵ Further, Jebb's comment is hesitant,⁶ that of Campbell and Abbott useless.⁷ No aid is found in familiar translations.⁸ It seemed therefore worth while to review the pertinent evidence; the results, set down in this note, affirm that *σ' = σε* on grounds of both linguistic and dramatic fitness.

Prima facie, three considerations might seem to support the

¹ Sir Richard Jebb, *Ajax* (Cambridge, 1907).

² A. C. Pearson, *Sophocles Fabulae* (Oxford, 1924).

³ Lewis Campbell, *Sophocles*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1879-1881), quotes Aeschylus, *Cho.* 1038-1039.

⁴ Sophocles, *O. T.* 1054-1055.

⁵ Campbell must have accepted *οὐδὲ ἐφέστιον | δλλην τράπεσθαι Δοξίας ἐφίειρο* as the correct text for Aeschylus, *Cho.* 1038-1039. (So too Verrall and Tucker.) Most editors, however, accept *έφ' ἐστιαν* (Turnebus) for *ἐφέστιον* of M, e.g. Dindorf, Sidgwick, Murray, Wilamowitz, Smyth, and with this reading the passage affords no more assistance than would accessible instances of *ἐφίεμai* used absolutely. Jebb's text of *O. T.* 1054-1055 is *ὄντιν' ἀρτίως μολεῖν ἐφίεμεσθα*, but the verb here means "desire" as Paley's note *ad loc.* implies (so cited in the Liddell and Scott Lexicon, revised ed., s. v. *ἐφίεμai*). This meaning is borne out by Sophocles, *O. T.* 1052. The translations at hand vary: "sought" (Campbell, Murray), "send to fetch" (Plumptre, Storr), "wait" (Sheppard), "summon" (Jebb); cf. Masqueray (*Les Belles Lettres*, 1922): "l'homme dont nous souhaitions tout à l'heure la venue."

⁶ "It seems best to suppose that the construction is"

⁷ *Sophocles for the Use of Schools* (Oxford, 1899), "ἐφίεμai is here followed by the accusative and infinitive in preference to the dative." But why "in preference"? Cf. note 31 *infra*.

⁸ Some of them indeed deal too lightly with *ἐφίεμai*, e.g. Plumptre, Storr, Campbell, Morshead, Jebb.

unorthodox view that σ' is an elision of $\sigma\omega\iota$: diphthongal elisions are found, and that even in the plays of Sophocles; $\epsilon\phi\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\iota$ = "command" takes the dative in 116 *infra*; $\epsilon\phi\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\acute{\iota} \tau\omega\alpha \pi\omega\iota\epsilon\nu \tau\iota$, as Jebb said, is hard to parallel. These points in prosody and syntax call for comment.

Even in Homer diphthongal elisions are limited to $\alpha\iota$ and $\omega\iota$;⁹ elisions of $\mu\omega\iota$ are readily accessible;¹⁰ those of $\tau\omega\iota = \sigma\omega\iota$ are found more frequently than the Liddell and Scott Lexicon (revised ed., s. v. $\sigma\acute{\omega}$) admits;¹¹ those of $\sigma\omega\iota$ are exceedingly rare.¹² If elisions of $\rho\omega\iota$ are omitted, $\omega\iota$ as well as $\alpha\iota$ elisions are fewer in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. In Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns diphthongal elisions are quotable but not common.¹³ Sappho has some instances but at least two of them may be combatted.¹⁴ Aristophanes elides only $\omega\iota\mu(\omega\iota) \dot{\omega}\varsigma$ ¹⁵—a significant fact in view of Comedy's close contact with everyday life and also in the light of its greater freedom in versification as compared with Tragedy. Theocritus seldom employs diphthongal elision,¹⁶ because he makes freer use of hiatus and at times prefers the epic device of shortening,¹⁷ rather than of eliding, diphthongs. Tragedy very sparingly admitted even ι elisions;¹⁸ and

⁹ Monro, *Hom. Gr.*, pp. 349 ff.; Van Leeuwen, *Enchirid. Dict. Epic.*, pp. 79 ff.

¹⁰ *Iliad*, VI, 165; IX, 673 (= X, 544); XIII, 481; XVI, 207; XVII, 100; XXIV, 757; *Odyssey*, IV, 367; X, 19; XXIII, 21.

¹¹ *Iliad*, III, 235; XXI, 585; XXIII, 310; *Odyssey*, I, 60, 347.

¹² Liddell and Scott Lexicon, old ed. (relying on Heyne), denied all elisions of $\sigma\omega\iota$ and $\tau\omega\iota$; *ibid.*, revised ed., admits only *Iliad*, I, 170 as elision of $\sigma\omega\iota$. But e. g. *Iliad*, XXI, 122 is a possible instance.

¹³ E. g. for $\omega\iota$: Hesiod, *Theog.*, 126; *Hom. Hymn to Venus*, 10; for $\alpha\iota$: $\ddot{\alpha}\rho\chi\omega\mu' \dot{\alpha}\epsilon\delta\omega\iota\nu$ *Hom. Hymns* II, XI, XIII, XVI, XXII, XXVI, XXVIII.

¹⁴ Smyth, *Melic Poets*, Sappho, 1, 20 (elision of $\omega\iota$ or $\alpha\iota$); 2, 13 (perhaps a "stop-gap"); E. Lobel's ΣΑΠΦΟΤΣ ΜΕΛΗ adds to the $\omega\iota$ elisions.

¹⁵ At least ten instances.

¹⁶ Theocritus, IV, 58; VII, 19 for $\mu(\omega\iota)$; V, 112, perhaps, for $\rho\omega\iota$.

¹⁷ Tragedy sometimes used the same device, e. g. Aeschylus, *Pers.* 853 for $\sigma\acute{\iota}$; *ibid.* 39, 542, 640 for $\alpha\acute{\iota}$.

¹⁸ This has some bearing on $\omega\iota$ -elisions; *Iliad*, 14 instances, *Odyssey*, 4 instances of ι elisions in dative singular of substantives; 2 instances (*Iliad*, XVI, 854; *Odyssey*, II, 250) of dative of participle. Jebb (Sophocles, *O. C.* 1436, Appendix) sweeps away ι elisions of substantives in Tragedy; Tucker (Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 7) similarly rejects $\sigma\acute{\iota}\tau\iota\nu(\iota)$ as untenable. Cholmeley (Theocritus, XI, 22) admits $\alpha\dot{\nu}\theta(\iota)$ and also $\eta\pi\alpha\tau(\iota)$ in *Megara* 85, but the latter is *penitus corruptus* (Wilamowitz).

οι elisions, as well as all other diphthongal ones, were contrary to its canon, as Jebb points out. Yet Sophocles has four instances in *-οι*¹⁹ and perhaps one in *-αι*.²⁰ In a number of passages in Tragedy apparent *-οι* elisions in dative cases of pronouns can be successfully shown to be elisions of accusative forms.²¹

On the other hand, elisions of *ε* are of common occurrence²² and enjoy a marked advantage.²³ While *σοι*, like *μοι*, in Tragedy normally suffers not elision but crasis, *σε*, even when emphasized, can be elided.²⁴ As, in the present passage, the pronoun *σ(ε)* is only slightly stressed, this is an *a fortiori* argument in its favour.

Further, the syntax seems completely defensible. *ἔφεμαι* bears here in the middle its common meaning of "command," "enjoin upon" familiar in Greek since the time of Homer.²⁵ Although

¹⁹ οἴμ(οι) ὡς four times: *Ajax* 354, 587; *Ant.* 320, 1270.

²⁰ Sophocles, *Trach.* 216 *ἀείρομ' οὐδ' ἀπώσομαι* (to avoid a cyclic dactyl in place of a trochee), cited by Hardie, *Res Metrica*, p. 41, as diphthongal elision in Tragedy. Pearson, perhaps influenced by the scholiast's lemma noticed by Jebb, restores the diphthong.

²¹ An excellent example is Sophocles, *Ajax* 191 where *μ'* (*ἄναξ*) is taken as accusative by Jebb, who offers a difficult explanation. An extreme case is Euripides, *I. A.* 1491-1492, where editors explain *μ'* (*ἐλέος*) as accusative despite *ἐννοομένῳ*. The opposite change, from dative to accusative, is frequent and natural; Sophocles has at least eight instances, of which one entails elision (*Ajax* 1006-1007).

²² Monro, *Hom. Gr.*, p. 349.

²³ Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, § 50, and Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, § 59, err, however, in saying that elision never occurs in monosyllables except those ending in *ε*. Sophocles has *σ(ε)* emphatic in *O. T.* 329, 405; *El.* 1499; *Phil.* 339; cf. Euripides, *Troad.* 918; *El.* 273; *Hel.* 580. In Euripides, *Suppl.* 456, however, Murray reads (*πρὸς τὰ*) *σὰ* which Dindorf, with Markland, elided. Sophocles, *Phil.* 347 illustrates the elision and prodelision of *ε* in one and the same pronoun. On the other hand *ε* in verbs before *ἄν* was, according to Elmsley, rarely elided. Hence in Euripides, *Ion* 354 *εἰχ' ἄν* of L and P is changed by Murray, following Hermann, to *εἰχεν ἄν*.

²⁴ Aeschylus, *Cho.* 551 (Tucker also has *ibid.* 379, but in that vexed passage *ούς* is the common reading); Sophocles, *O. T.* 64; *O. C.* 801 both have *σ(ε)*, though emphatic. (Jebb also read in Euripides, *Hipp.* 323 *σ' ἀμαρτάνω*, but Murray restores the pronoun.) See Verrall, *Studies in Latin and Greek Scholarship*, especially pp. 287-288 on elision of *σε*.

²⁵ In Homer the middle of *ἔφεμαι* governs dative of person (*Odyssey*, XIII, 7) and accusative of thing (*Iliad*, XXIV, 300; cf. Sophocles, *O. C.* 766); sometimes both objects are present (*Iliad*, XXIII, 82, if *τοι* = *σοι*; cf. Aeschylus, *Pr. V.* 4).

the verb with the same meaning is found with the dative in 116 *infra* and in *El.* 1110-1111²⁶ (cf. Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 242), it is well to remember that there are other instances of verbs in Tragedy governing either the dative or the accusative conjoined with the infinitive.

The argument based on the dramatic nexus of the line appears to settle the matter absolutely in favour of $\sigma\epsilon$. This aspect has been largely overlooked by the commentators but assuredly warrants the closest attention: it is an excellent instance of Sophoclean resourcefulness; by it the poet achieves a tremendous effect in an outwardly unobtrusive way.

Line 112 accords well with the character and the condition of the speaker; no verb would better suit than $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\mu\alpha i$ = "command" the military quality of Ajax, his distempered mind, and his illusory situation. It might be noted that the result here is less shocking than in 116; this the poet brings about by the word-order and the syntax: $\chiai\rho\epsilon w$,²⁷ with its seeming acquiescence, is put to the front; $\tau\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'$, implying exception to that acquiescence, is imbedded inconspicuously in the body of the line along with $\sigma(\epsilon)$; the latter's remoteness from its infinitive entails just enough attention to divert the audience momentarily from the enormity of $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\mu\alpha i$ used towards a deity. The brief interval between 112 and 116 gives that expression of $\nu\beta\rho\mu s$ time to sink into the consciousness of the listeners; then ensues the repetition of the insult by Ajax in a more drastic form; by a simple shift of construction²⁸ deity is drastically subordinated to his command. Line 116 exemplifies thus the repetition of a word after a brief interval, not by coincidence, but consciously for a dramatic purpose. It is the "key-word" of the present passage²⁹ and reveals that Ajax is labouring under an "inferiority complex." Incidentally, the time that elapses in the play between the award of the arms and the suicide of Ajax is longer than in the Homeric

²⁶ Sophocles, *El.* 143 is not pertinent; $\mu\omega i$ is ethical dative and $\epsilon\phi\epsilon\mu\alpha i$ = "desire" with the genitive (cf. Sophocles, *Phil.* 1315; *O. C.* 1605; Euripides, *Ph.* 531).

²⁷ Cf. Headlam, Aeschylus, *Agam.* 125 ff.

²⁸ Three other shifts in construction, instructive though not so dramatically important, are found in this play: 381, 389; 600, 605; 1201, 1204, 1216.

²⁹ For the "key-word" *par excellence* in *Ajax*, cf. *A. J. P.*, XXXVII (1916), pp. 300-316; *ibid.*, XXXVIII (1917), p. 338.

legend and in the *Aethiopis*, in order to enable that feeling in Ajax to obtain a greater fixity.³⁰ After Ajax has reiterated³¹ more aggressively his insult, Sophocles naturally withdraws him from the scene. In the exchanges that ensue, the dramatist appears to aim at two things, viz.: to soothe the outraged feelings of his fellow-Athenians and to show that punishment by their patroness-goddess must be inflicted upon their eponymous hero. That there can be no compassion for him evokes from the gentle poet one of those poignant expressions of melancholy of which he is such a consummate master.³²

S. JOHNSON.

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA.

³⁰ Sophocles is at pains to make this time-lag very clear: *Ajax* 929-931, 934, 1336-1337.

³¹ Some critics are so far from having an inkling of the dramatic significance of the repetition that they propose emendations to eliminate it: e. g. Schneidewin would read in 112 σ' εὐχομαι, noticing that ἐφελμαι recurs in 116.

³² *Ajax* 125-126.

JUVENAL, SAT., I, 1, 147-150.

nil erit ulterius quod nostris moribus addat
posteritas; eadem facient cupientque minores;
omne in praecipiū vitium stetit. utere velis,
totos pande sinus.

For the phrase *omne in praecipiū vitium stetit* one of two interpretations is generally accepted. Wilson and Duff¹ following the note of Richards² have held that it means, "vice always stands above a sheer descent" or "on a steep incline," and therefore, they say, inevitably tumbles headlong to its lowest point; hence posterity can go no further. The older interpretation of Mayor and Friedländer, that vice is "at its zenith" ("auf dem Gipfel") has found acceptance albeit with hesitation by Ramsay in his Loeb translation.

Housman disagreed with both groups and in his review of Wilson's Juvenal³ has set forth a third interpretation: it means, he says, "'every vice has come to a dead halt at the cliff's edge,' has reached, as we might say, the end of its tether; has gone as far as nature suffers it to go."

To my mind, none of these interpretations is conclusive. The errors in that of Wilson, Duff, and Richards have been pointed out by Housman;⁴ these three scholars have in turn explained the weaknesses of the interpretation of Mayor and Friedländer.⁵ Housman was on the right path, but I feel that his interpretation stops just short of the full explanation which is desired.

First let us re-examine the possible meanings of the phrase *in praecipiū stare* (or *esse*).

1. It sometimes means "to be in a precarious position," i. e.

¹ *D. Iuni Juvenalis Saturarum libri V*, ed. by H. L. Wilson (Boston, etc., 1903); *D. Iuni Juvenalis Satura XIV, Fourteen Satires of Juvenal*, ed. by J. D. Duff (Cambridge, corrected reprint of 1925).

² *C. R.*, VI (1892), pp. 124-125.

³ *C. R.*, XVII (1903), pp. 466-467.

⁴ Briefly, he shows that *in praecipiū stetit* can hardly mean the same as *praeceps ruit* and that, even if it could, the phrase so interpreted would be meaningless in this context.

⁵ Their criticisms are based on the fact that *in praecipiū stare* must suggest instability, not merely height.

to be on a spot from which fall toward one of two opposite extremes is probable. Graphically it is the position of an object balanced on the apex of a triangle. With this meaning agree the following passages cited by Richards: Petronius, *Sat.*, 55 *quam in praecipiti res humanae essent vario sermone garrimus*, i. e. Trimalchio's guests discuss the rapid and unforeseen changes from high to low, sadness to happiness, and *vice versa*, to which human life is subjected; Horace, *Sat.*, II, 3, 292-293 *casus medicus levavit aegrum ex praecipiti*, where the "crisis" of the disease is meant, the point at which the sick man may either get well or die.⁶

2. More commonly it means "to be in danger," "to be on a dangerous spot" from which fall is or seems to be inevitable. Here belong Richards' quotations from Vergil (*turris in praecipiti stans*, *Aen.*, II, 460), Seneca (*in praecipiti voluptas: ad dolorem vergit nisi modum teneat*, *Ep.*, 23, 6), and Tacitus (*Caesar irritas leges, rem publicam in praecipiti, conquestus*, *Ann.*, IV, 30, 4). Graphically the figure is that of an object standing unsteadily on a point from which there can be motion in only one direction, downward. It is the extreme from which there is bound to be retreat or fall toward the opposite extreme.

It should be clear that the latter of these fits the passage from Juvenal: *nil erit ulterius*, he says, "vice has gone as far as it can go." So far the editors are substantially in agreement, but here they come to the crossroads. Richards, Duff, and Wilson want Juvenal to elaborate on this statement and inform us that since vice is always *in praecipiti*, it had by its very nature to reach that lowest point at which it now stands.⁷ Housman shows clearly enough that, aside from the still open question of whether we can make *in praecipiti stetit* mean *praeceps ruit*, this "sapient saw," as he calls it, has nothing to do with what Juvenal has just said. In other words, these commentators have lost sight of the picture which Juvenal has painted in the phrase. They want him to say that vice has slipped to its lowest point, whereas he is saying that it has climbed to its highest, and is there unsteadily perched, like a mountaineer on a peak. It was toward this explanation that Mayor and Friedländer properly pointed. Hous-

⁶ Cf. also Ovid, *Met.*, XI, 378.

⁷ Cf. Seneca, *Dial.*, III, 7, 4 *vitiorum natura proclivis*.

man has followed them, but has made the necessary addition of the idea of insecurity to that of finality.

Here he stops, and leaves his interpretation still hanging. What is the point of the line, "sapiens saw" or not? Why does Juvenal bother to say once more that vice has reached its farthest possible point? Has he not already said as much in vss. 147-148? The explanation, I believe, lies precisely in the idea of insecurity, which the later commentators saw must be inherent in the phrase *in praecipiti*. The words *omne in praecipiti vitium stetit* are not a gnomê, and *stetit* is a true perfect.⁸ They describe the moral situation of that particular moment and form a connecting link between vss. 147-148 and the exhortation of vss. 149-150: *utere velis, totos pande sinus*. Juvenal is saying, "Vice has gone as far as it can go. It has come to a stop (*stetit*) at an extreme point. But the extreme point is never secure.⁹ After it, then, with all your might! You may yet, with the weapons of satire, save the day." This gives double point to the interlocutor's worried *unde ingenium par materiae*¹⁰ and explains Juvenal's impatient rejoinder, *qui dedit ergo tribus patruis aconita, vehatur pensilibus plumis*, etc.,¹¹ where he says in effect "shall we sit back and swallow our shame, without raising a finger to reform its source, the viciousness of our day?" In the phrase *omne in praecipiti vitium stetit* it is the reformer rather than the satirist who speaks. Juvenal sees in the very fact of Rome's utter depravity the opportunity for the vigorous moralist to turn her course toward betterment.

FRANK O. COBLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

⁸ Cf. Housman, *loc. cit.*

⁹ This is a commonplace in ancient thought: cf. Horace, *Odes*, II, 10, 9-12.

¹⁰ Vss. 150-151.

¹¹ Vss. 158-159.

CATULLUS, 5, 7-11 AND THE ABACUS.

Da mi basia mille, deinde centum,
dein mille altera, dein secunda centum,
deinde usque altera mille, deinde centum.
Dein, cum milia multa fecerimus,
conturbabimus illa. . . .

The purpose of this brief note is to clarify the meaning of *conturbabimus* in the passage quoted. Editors¹ are agreed, and rightly so, that *conturbo* here means "throw into confusion," but, in my opinion, none of them has grasped or, at any rate, clearly explained the exact sense in which Catullus intends the word to be taken. Riese thinks that the confusion is to be produced by a profusion of additional kisses, "nicht mehr nach Tausenden oder Hunderten, sondern in ungeordneter Menge." Merrill's only comment on the word is "the confusion of the count is already effected in the poem by the hurrying succession of *mille* and *centum*." Ellis, Baehrens, and others refer to the phrases *rationem* or *rationes conturbo*, or simply *conturbo*, in the sense of "go bankrupt." But, apart from the inappropriateness of that idea to the context, it must be noted that, in the mercantile *terminus technicus* to which they refer, *conturbo* is used either absolutely (so almost always, according to the *Thesaurus*²) or with the object *rationes*, while in our present passage it has as its object the word *illa*, that is, *milia multa*. We may note that the *Thesaurus* lists the present occurrence of *conturbo* not under the heading of mercantile expressions but under the general uses of the word³ and so is in tacit agreement with the interpretation which I shall advance.

The ground for this interpretation is to be found in a consideration of the alternate recurrence of *mille* and *centum* in the first three lines quoted. The obvious purport of these lines is that

¹ E. Baehrens, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1885); R. Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1876); W. Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus* (2nd ed., Leipzig, Teubner, 1929); E. T. Merrill, *Catullus* (Boston, Ginn, 1893); A. Riese, *Die Gedichte des Catullus* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1884).

² S. v. *conturbo*, II, 3.

³ S. v. *conturbo*, I.

Catullus desires a multitude of Lesbia's kisses; why, however, does he number them in alternating thousands and hundreds?

To some, it has seemed that the alternation of numbers was meant to produce the effect of a wild confusion of caresses; so Riese and Kroll. Merrill, as we have seen, believes that the hurrying succession of *mille* and *centum* has the effect of confusing the count. The elaborate explanation of Baehrens, based on the alternating waves of the sea, is so far-fetched as scarcely to merit consideration.

In so far as they imply that Catullus is attempting to impart a sense of confusion by his alternation of *mille* and *centum*, the interpretations of Riese, Kroll, and Merrill seem to me to have been formed without due regard for the procedures of Roman arithmetic. Catullus pretends to be keeping an account of the kisses which he receives; it is natural, therefore, for him to think in terms of Roman methods of addition and to choose his words accordingly.

In calculations running into the thousands, whether concerned with kisses or with more prosaic commodities, the Roman habitually used a counting-board, or abacus.⁴ In its simplest form, the Roman abacus consisted of a board marked with vertical lines, separating the surface into several columns. If, for simplicity's sake, we disregard the spaces used for fractions, we may say that the column on the extreme right denoted units, the next column tens, the next hundreds, the next thousands, and so forth. Addition was accomplished by the use of pebbles (*calculi*), each of which counted one when placed in the units column, ten when placed in the tens column, and so forth.⁵ Counting by single thousands and hundreds, then, far from being a confusing or elaborate procedure, would be a simple

⁴ See A. Nagl, *Die Rechentafel der Alten* (Vienna, Hölder, 1914 = *Sitzb. der K. Akad. der Wissen. in Wien, Phil.-hist. Klasse*, CLXXVII [1914], Abh. 5), especially pp. 15-18. See also Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, I, cols. 5-10, and Supplementband III, cols. 9-10.

⁵ A more elaborate abacus had grooves in which buttons moved back and forth, but the principle was the same. See the articles cited in the preceding note. A similar instrument, the soroban, is in current use among the Japanese: see C. G. Knott, "The Abacus in its Historic and Scientific Aspects," in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XIV (1886), pp. 18-71.

matter of placing single pebbles alternately in the fourth and third columns from the right.

According to my interpretation, then, Catullus thinks of himself as keeping score of Lesbia's kisses on an abacus. First a pebble in the thousands column, then one in the hundreds, then another in the thousands, and another in the hundreds, then still another in the thousands, and one in the hundreds, and then, when the thrice-told tale is done, the lovers shake the board violently (*conturbabimus*), the pebbles fly in all directions, and the score is forever obliterated.

Conturbo in this passage is thus used in its proper sense of a violent physical disturbance and is not to be listed among the more attenuated uses of the word. I shall conclude with the remark that Kroll's note, which compares the Greek *φυρᾶν τὰς ψήφους*, may perhaps be taken as anticipating my interpretation; but Kroll does not make this explicit, nor does he connect it with the alternation of *mille* and *centum*, to which, as we have seen, he attributes a far different connotation from that which I have suggested.

HARRY L. LEVY.

HUNTER COLLEGE OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK.

THE BOULE OF 500 FROM SALAMIS TO EPHIALTES.

After the battle of Salamis, the Areopagus obtained an ascendancy over the Boule of 500 which it did not relinquish until the reforms of Ephialtes almost 20 years later. It is upon the Boule, rather than the Areopagus, that I wish to focus attention, for, while the Areopagus was an important institution, it is the Boule that returns after Ephialtes' reforms and its history in this dark period also has interest and significance.

In the *Res Pub. Ath.* (20-22), Aristotle tells us that Cleisthenes created ten tribes and that fifty Athenians from each tribe made up the new Boule. Then (23, 1) he says: *τότε μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου προῆλθεν ἡ πόλις ἀμα τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξανομένη· μετὰ δὲ τὰ Μηδικὰ πάλιν ἵσχυσεν ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ καὶ διώκει τὴν πόλιν, οὐδενὶ δόγματι λαβοῦσα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίας αἰτίᾳ.* (Cf. 23, 1, 2, 3; 25, 1; *Pol.*, VIII (V), 4, 1304 a 20.)

Walker (*C. A. H.*, V, pp. 98, 99, 472, 473) has studied the section in Aristotle in the light of Plutarch, *Them.*, 10, who first gives Aristotle's facts (with acknowledgment) and then offers an alternative version on the authority of Cli(to)demos. The latter says that Themistocles ingeniously obtained the funds for Salamis. Walker is skeptical of the ascendancy of the Areopagus, the reforms of Ephialtes, and the truth of Aristotle's facts.

I do not find in Plutarch or any other author anything to contradict that statement of Aristotle. To it I add the important fact that the Areopagus achieved this ascendancy without special legislation. Apparently the Areopagus simply usurped the power, while the Boule remained inactive.

A further suggestion lies in Aristotle's following statement (24, 1), where the connection is determined by the phrase *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*. Aristotle says: *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θαρρούσης ἡδη τῆς πόλεως καὶ χρημάτων ἡθροισμένων πολλῶν, . . .* This would imply that after the Persian wars, in a period of prosperity, the economic and political tension was relaxed and the Areopagus could assume an authority which in more difficult times would have aroused the keenest interest.

The Athenian inscriptions in this general period are few, fragmentary, and difficult to date. Indeed, I can find no certain reference to prytanies and precious little reference to the Boule (*I. G.*, I², 5). Kahrstedt (*Untersuch. z. Magistratur*, p. 87) has explained the absence of any epigraphic reference to prytanies by denying their existence in this period. According to him, there were no prytanies until they were introduced by Ephialtes.

Despite the general excellence of Professor Kahrstedt's incisive and intelligent interpretations of texts, there are reasons against accepting this judgment which rests upon frail evidence. If the prytanies had just ceased to assemble, then the Boule would never have existed. A Boule without prytanies is possible, but not Cleisthenes' Boule. That Council consisted of ten prytanies that presided in turn over the entire Boule. For this reason, Cleisthenes' Boule could neither exist nor function without prytanies—unless, of course, there had been a constitutional modification, and this, Aristotle says, did not take place. My own explanation of this paucity of epigraphical material is much tamer, but it agrees with Aristotle. The Boule was simply inactive.

In this connection it seems that the fragments of Telecleides

have escaped notice (cf. Koerte, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Telekleides"). This dramatist wrote a comedy (cf. Kock, *C. A. F.*, I, pp. 215 ff., especially nos. 22, 24, 25) revealing the luxurious life in the time of Themistocles. Since this comedy (Koerte, *loc. cit.*) was written long after Themistocles, its political references and its chronology may not have been precise. The humor of the comedy consisted undoubtedly in its criticism of excessive luxury; and the luxurious period probably fell, as has been noted, in the years after the Persian wars when Themistocles was a leader of the people (so Aristotle above). The political significance of the criticism is indicated by the title of the comedy, *The Prytaneis*.

From this we may infer that the play refers to the period after the Persian wars when more funds would be available for the prytaneis. In view of the author and the date, a specific historical allusion to Themistocles' archonship or some minor event in it seems improbable.¹ The point of the comedy is that the prytaneis are the luxurious ones. When they should have been attending to business, as Telecleides says, they were eating cheese and drinking wine (nos. 24, 25). We see, then, that the prytaneis were not only in existence but that they were having a gay time of it.

The evidence of Aristotle, the inscriptions, and Telecleides combine to give us a clear picture of the Boule from Salamis to Ephialtes. The increase in wealth permitted the Areopagus to usurp power without the effective complaint of the people. It did not attempt to abolish or change the Boule as this would have created a serious issue. Instead the Areopagus and its supporters permitted the Boule to act as guests rather than as servants of the state.

MILTON GIFFLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

¹ On the archonship of Themistocles we now have Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXVII (1936-37 [published in 1940]), pp. 263-270. Wade-Gery does not mention Telecleides.

*IN DIE MORTIS = IN DIE(M) MORTIS
AND ROMAN MARITAL FELICITY.*

C.I.L., VI, 29149 runs: *D. M. M. Vlpius Cerdō titulum posuit Claudiā Tychenī coniugi karissim(ae) cum qua vix(it) annis []¹ II mens(ibus) VI dieb(us) III hor(is) X in die mortis gratias maximas egi apud deos et apud homines.*

In the relatively humorless wastes of epigraphy, especially Latin epigraphy, this has occasionally furnished a touch of comic relief; for example, J. C. Orelli (Zürich, 1828, no. 4636) calls it a "marvellous witticism" ("mirum dicterium!"); and H. H. Armstrong ("Autobiographic Elements in Latin Inscriptions," *Michigan Humanistic Series*, III [1910], p. 243) energetically asserts: "How insincere these protestations sometimes are may be inferred from the one epitaph set up by an honest man, CIL 6. 29149. He begins by dedicating it to his 'dearest wife,' but goes on to say that 'on the day of her death I gave greatest thanks in presence of gods and men'; this shows clearly the value of conventional praise when compared with the truth" (italics mine).

But this understanding of the epitaph, I venture to suggest, involves a misinterpretation of the record. To take the words *in die mortis* as meaning "on the day of her death," should of course arouse a preliminary suspicion of the correctness of the translation, since such is certainly not the ordinary way to express this idea;² and that same suspicion should be but heightened by the astounding cynicism, or else simplicity, presupposed on the part of the widower, something that stands wholly without parallel among epitaphs in antiquity.³

¹ There is room for just two full-sized letters like X or L, according to Huebner's presumably accurate transcript (that of Sir Henry Ellis, *The British Museum. The Townley Collection* [1836], II, 269, is obviously inexact), and the lining up requires them. These might be, of course, II (but improbable because of the space to be filled), VI, XV, XX, XL, or even LX. In other words, it was not an extremely short married life.

² For the limitations of the usage of *in* with *die* and *diebus* see A. H. Saloniūs, *Vitae Patrum* (1920), p. 131; and especially *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, V, p. 1043, 68 ff. The closest parallel I know is the highly ambiguous *in die fati sui* of *C.I.L.*, XIII, 3858 = E. Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*, 3308.

³ Modern examples of much the same thing (unhappily too numerous)

The simple and reasonable explanation, which restores his normal character to the author and shifts the classification of the epitaph from the portentous to the commonplace, is to take *in die mortis* as equivalent to *in diem mortis*, whether by a mere mistake, a misuse of case (a number of illustrations conveniently recorded by H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae*, III, p. 865), or the still commoner omission of a faintly pronounced, or wholly unpronounced, final *m* (for a few dozen examples out of thousands, see *idem*, pp. 824-5). Indeed exactly the same phrase occurs also in *C. I. L.*, VI, 17677, ll. 5 f. *qui in die mortis sue nunquam nemine lesit*, where not merely the general sense (a person truly on his deathbed is seldom in a position actually to injure anybody), but also the obvious omission of final *m* in *nemine(m)*, render otiose the editors' assurance: "intellege *in die(m) mortis*." Compare also E. Diehl, *op. cit.*, 2805 *vixit usque ad die (=ad diem) mortis sue annos plus minnusve (sic) qua<d>raginta*.

Cerdo merely wanted to say that he had lived with his most dear wife, down to the very day of her death, a privilege for which he was duly thankful; or else that he had been duly thankful, down to the day of her death (i. e. throughout the whole of their married life), that he had been married to her. The form of statement is just a bit ambiguous of course (but then the two ideas really amount to much the same thing in any event), and that is all there is to it.

W. A. OLDFATHER.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

are not in point; these merely illustrate a general level of intellectual and aesthetic culture distinctly lower than that of antiquity, as I have argued elsewhere. Similarly, perhaps, a "wit" might endeavor to raise a laugh out of the single phrase in a late Christian inscription (probably 573-4 A. D., *C. I. L.*, XI, 1409) *Hic (her husband) non valuit cum ea amplius vivere praeter men(ses) VII d(ies) XXIII*, were it not that the context proves this to be an expression of regret, and not a so-called "honest confession."

EURIPIDES, *ION*, 1610.

The *ἡμέλησε* of the manuscripts has been preserved by all the editors, but it is void of sense, even for the usual view of the anti-Apollinean tendency of the play. Creusa contrasts her present attitude toward Apollo to her former one: *aἰνῶ Φοῖβον οὐκ αἰνοῦσα πρίν* (1609), and solemnly pays her worship to his temple (1611, stressing the contrast between *πάροιθεν* and *νῦν* [1612]). As reason for her change of mind she gives the god's restoration of her child to her (*ἀποδίδωσι*). But while she might offer as reason for her former resentment the fact that the god had hidden her son for many years, the context makes it impossible for her to charge him with neglecting Ion after the constant care of Apollo has become manifest and she herself, even before Athena's final sanction, has emphasized Apollo as Ion's *εὐεργέτης* (1531, 1540, 1545). On the other hand, a preservation of *ἡμέλησε* would require something other than the restoration of Ion as contrast: for example, that Apollo now takes care of the child; but nothing of this kind is to be found in the text. Furthermore, Athena's approval of her change of mind (1614) would be out of place if Creusa's speech had contained any reproach to Apollo. All difficulty can be removed by simply reading *ἡμέλησα* for *ἡμέλησε*. The change in the MSS is easily explained by the strong if false appearance of the god's neglect. Creusa neither is nor feels herself entirely free from guilt; it is one of the deepest aspects of Greek tragedy that we share a responsibility even for actions finally caused by superhuman power. A sort of bad conscience drives Creusa back to the place where she exposed the babe (350); her later uneasiness, which makes her try to ask the oracle secretly about the fate of the exposed child (334; cf. 390), may also be traced back to that. And at 963 she asserts that the child *ἄδικ' ἐπασχεν ἐξ ἔμου*. To the restored son she tries to excuse her step by her fear (1497, cf. 1500): *ἐκτεινα σ' ἄκουσα*. This seems to be sufficient proof that in line 1610 she contrasts her own neglect of the child to the grace of the god who has given him back to her.

FELIX WASSERMANN.

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.

REVIEWS.

TENNEY FRANK. *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V: *Rome and Italy of the Empire*. General Index to Volumes I-V. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. Pp. xvi + 445; v + 140. \$5.75 (two volumes).

When Tenney Frank died, on April 3, 1939, those who knew him and his work, especially those who had followed the progress of his *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, were apprehensive about the fate of the fifth volume, *Rome and Italy of the Empire*, which like the first, *Rome and Italy of the Republic*, he had undertaken to write himself. Fortunately, the major part of the work had been finished. Shortly before going to Oxford as George Eastman Visiting Professor he had jotted down this memorandum: "I should like to add three chapters, on the Economics of Septimius Severus, the Third Century, and Diocletian, but if I fail to complete them, the chapters that are ready can be printed (after editing by Mrs. Loane) as an incomplete volume." He had already made provisions that this trusted friend and pupil was to finish the chapter on Rome, Ostia, and Pompeii and that Prof. Howard Comfort was to add a section on *Terra Sigillata* to the chapter on Industry.

Immediately after Prof. Frank's death, Dr. Helen Jefferson Loane and Dr. Evelyn Holst Clift undertook the editing of their teacher's manuscript. They faithfully endeavored to carry out his intentions and to interpret and preserve the spirit of his research with which they were so familiar. For the fine job they have done they have earned the gratitude of all students of Roman history. They have shown resourcefulness and discrimination in rounding off some of the original chapters with much new material drawn from the lectures which Frank had just given in Oxford and at the London School of Economics. That material he himself had intended to incorporate in his work. Two other disciples, Professors T. R. S. Broughton and Lily Ross Taylor, helped to assemble a goodly amount of information scattered through the manuscript and added new evidence at certain points. The published volume, therefore, is more than the manuscript as left by Tenney Frank. If we do not have the full three chapters which he hoped to write, we do have valuable sections on Septimius Severus and the third century, also a new edition with translation of the Edict of Diocletian by Miss Elsa Graser, another pupil. That he was a great historian, we all knew; the existence of so many able pupils is eloquent proof that he was a great teacher as well.

Although *Rome and Italy of the Empire* is by no means the survey that was originally planned, its contribution to the study of Roman economics is considerable. It freshens and systematizes much of our previous knowledge, it brings out a wealth of information formerly so scattered or hidden as to be almost inaccessible, it examines with masterful understanding many of the problems involved, and, best of all, it establishes a clear perspective of the

economic evolution of the first century A.D. More than ten pages of bibliography of modern works give the measure of the learning and industry that went into the writing of this volume. The promise made by the author in the preface to *Rome and Italy of the Republic* (p. viii) that he would not deal with theories, but would cling to the positivistic evidence of the facts has been adhered to also in *Rome and Italy of the Empire*.

Such being the book and the circumstances under which it was published, it would be churlish to call too much attention to a number of gaps, to point too vigorously to the schematic and superficial treatment of some chapters, especially the last, to dwell on a certain confusion and inconsistency of ideas, or to decry a lack of smoothness in organization and presentation. Some of these flaws could have been corrected if the editors had had the heart to use the pruning knife. I am sure Tenney Frank would have used it, and mercilessly.

The first three chapters deal chiefly with colonies, public finances, and currency from Augustus to Alexander Severus. They contain excellent sections on individual fortunes, the financial crisis of 33 A.D., the revenues of the Empire under Vespasian, the financial problems of Trajan and Hadrian, and the contents of coins. They also represent a successful attempt to weave together a story of finance, administration, general welfare, industry, commerce, and war booty.

The statement (p. 4) that a large number of the colonies of Augustus, possibly all, had the *ius Italicum* is conjectural. Certainly it is not supported by the evidence in the *Digest* (L, 15). No mention is made of Iulium Carnicum as a Claudian colony (cf. *C. I. L.*, V, 1838, 1841-2, 1862). Indeed, the number of colonies listed by Frank does not cover the whole ground. For instance, there is no mention of Aequum, Apri, Lixus, and Oppidum Novum, not to speak of more obvious foundations in Gaul and Germany, which Momigliano (*Claudius, the Emperor and his Achievement* [Oxford, 1934], pp. 64 f.) assigns to Claudius. Informed readers will not readily agree with certain observations about the aim of post-Augustan colonization, that is, that it was not undertaken for the sake of satisfying land-hunger on the part of citizens; that Italy was no longer attempting to populate the provinces; and that Claudius and Vespasian seem to have settled veterans only, and to a relatively small extent, in order to lighten the burden of the *aerarium militare* (p. 32).

Augustus, except for his efforts to establish peace and security and to create an adequate coinage, is represented as doing little towards furthering commerce and industry. Like the Republican Senate, he was not concerned with commercial or industrial problems. Peace on land and sea, protection of private property, the unusual expansion of coinage, and the free spending of state funds on public works, all made for a period of prosperity, however. Salaries and wages were increased and the standard of living of the poor raised. Commerce was extended to the advantage of provincial industries, and good profits were realized by a large number of people from Gades to India. If Italy did not derive as much prosperity from these conditions as might have been expected,

Frank ascribes the reason to the failure of the Roman economic structure to expand the basis of investment at home into manufacturing, trades, and production. The few great individual fortunes of the Augustan and Julio-Claudian periods in the peninsula came, according to him, as rewards for military service, through imperial favoritism, and through lucrative investment often aided by political pull.

This reviewer cannot accept Frank's estimate of Claudius. Frank started with the belief (*Roman Imperialism* [New York, 1914], p. 354) that Claudius modelled himself after Julius Caesar, reiterated that belief whenever he had an occasion (*A History of Rome* [New York, 1923], p. 428), and persisted in it to the end of his life (*Rome and Italy of the Empire*, pp. 40-42). Although fully abreast of the works of modern scholarship and extraordinarily sensitive to its results, he remained impervious to such evidence in Claudius' favor as *P. Lond.*, 1912 (letter to the Alexandrians), *B. G. U.*, 611 (*SC de recuperatoribus, in fine*; a plea for senatorial independence), or the edict of Paullus Fabius Persicus (Heberdey, *Forschungen in Ephesos*, II, pp. 112 ff.; Keil, *Jahresh. österr. Inst.*, XXIII [1926], pp. 282 ff.), and out of sympathy with the reappraisal of tradition as represented by Carcopino, De Sanctis, and Rostovtzeff, among others. The picture he gives of Claudius is that of a lawless despot who, to cover the costs of his reign, "must have" resorted to extensive confiscations.

Thoughtful students are apt to be disturbed by another type of argument, the probable which at one point becomes certain. For example, on page 15 it is stated: "The buildings . . . may well have been paid for in large part from Spanish, Gallie, and Balkan booty." On the following page one finds this: "The booty from Spain, Gaul, and the Balkans certainly contributed towards the later buildings. . . ." The editors, handling as they did an unfinished work, should have been more watchful. Another case requiring revision is what seems to be the assignment of the colonization of Archelais and Iconium to Vespasian instead of Claudius (pp. 31 f.). Frank could not have misunderstood what is so clear from the texts to which he refers; his apparent attribution of these colonies to Vespasian is plainly due to an unfortunate use of loose English.

The fourth chapter, dealing with the finances of Italian municipalities, is solid meat throughout, especially good for those who wish to get a clear account of municipal services and revenues. But the account is not full, since it is not made up of all inscriptions available but only of typical ones. Nor are its revelations altogether new; Liebenam's *Städteverwaltung*, for instance, has been systematically exploited. The whole inquiry is abundantly documented, however, businesslike, and effective.

A geographical survey of the regions of Italy in the fifth chapter describes, chiefly with the aid of Strabo, their natural products, their industries, and their commerce.

The sixth chapter is especially well documented and thoroughly convincing. With faultless judgment and a sure hand, Frank draws a sketch of the status and organization of agriculture in the first century A. D. He doubts that the confiscations of the triumvirs and the Julio-Claudian emperors affected any large part of Italy

or that they revolutionized the size of landholding. The latifundia were general only south of Beneventum and throughout Etruria, although some existed in parts of Campania and Latium; they were less prevalent elsewhere. He describes a number of large estates, putting in due relevance the case of Caecilius Isidorus, a freedman who had lost heavily in the civil wars, yet left an estate in 8 B.C. that included 4116 slaves, 3600 yokes of oxen, and 257,000 other animals. The remarks of Seneca, Juvénal, Martial, and Petronius about large estates, even Pliny's statement that large estates had caused the ruin of Italy, he considers with good reason as being put forward for epideictic purposes; and he regards the evidence at present available as proving that Italian agriculture was still prosperous in the seventies of the first century. Frank has collected valuable data on the price of land, products, and labor, and on the yield of several crops. The entire chapter is so good that one wishes the author had had the time to explore as thoroughly agriculture in the second century.

One minor observation: *similago e tritico fit* is translated, "wheat yields a fine flour" (p. 144). May it not be that *similago* is the Italian *sémola*? And *sémola* is not flour, but a grainy meal as different from flour as sand is from dust; and yellowish, not white like flour. The nearest thing to it in appearance in the American market is corn meal. It is with *sémola* that *pasta*, that is, macaroni and spaghetti, is made. When wheat is milled into flour, nine parts in weight or thereabouts become flour, the rest chaff. When it is milled into *sémola*, half or more in weight becomes *sémola*; another part, still large, flour; and the smallest part (always in weight) chaff. This ratio, which here is given only as roughly approximate, might suggest that when Pliny states that a peck of wheat ought to yield half a peck of *similago*, he means *sémola*. Would philologists check on this suggestion?

Chapter seven attempts to discover which industries were worked by the factory system. Frank finds no evidence of iron factories at Puteoli, but believes that something like factories prevailed in Noricum. The making of iron tools was, according to him, partly in the hands of individual smiths, partly in the hands of firms that produced articles in large amounts under a quasi-factory system.

In the glass industry conditions favorable to monopolistic production existed. Skilled Oriental craftsmen, realizing that Rome was their best market, set up their main "factories" in Italy. According to Pliny, glass factories developed at the mouth of the Volturno River in Campania where the sand was suitable for the basic material. Information concerning this industry is by no means complete. For instance, there is no reference to the statement (Pliny, *N.H.*, 36, 195) that an ingenious craftsman had invented, or was trying to invent, a non-shatterable glass.

The manufacture of bronze and copper ware seems to have developed into a real factory system at least in Capua. The literary references to mass production of clothing in several centers would point to the existence of rather large factories run by slave labor. Despite the large and constant demand for lead water pipes, the factory system failed to emerge in this industry. But it emerged in brick making, apparently also in silverware and furniture making.

Except for a few more data in the following chapter, this investigation of industry is surprisingly inadequate. To avoid an impossibly long list of addenda, let us pose the problem thus. At one end—let us roughly call it that of heavy industries—no systematic study is made of the building industry despite the fact that it was of major importance throughout the first century A. D. In the field of light industries, there is no survey of the paper industry. Paper is mentioned incidentally on page 144, and on page 229 Pliny is quoted to show the existence in Rome of something like a factory that reprocessed the third best grade of Egyptian papyrus. But I recall no statement on the large consumption of this article for writing purposes, in medicine (Celsus, 5, 8; 6, 4; Seribonius Largus, 114, 237; Pliny, *N. H.*, 21, 84; 24, 88; 28, 214; 29, 106; 34, 170), as wrapping material (Horace, *Epist.*, 2, 1, 270; Pliny, *N. H.*, 12, 45; 13, 76; Juvenal, 13, 116), and in the culinary art (Apicius, 8, 369). There is no reference either to *chartapola* (Schol. Iuv., 4, 24; Diomedes gramm., 1, 326), to the paper famine under Tiberius which caused the Senate to appoint administrators to regulate distribution (Pliny, *N. H.*, 13, 89), or to the trade's endeavor to improve the quality of the bond (*ibid.*, 13, 78-80). Somewhere between the heavy and light industries stands a group of manufactures of which the leather industry might be considered as fairly typical. There is a short paragraph on tanning (p. 260), another short paragraph on shoemaking (p. 225; shoes are mentioned also on page 17), but nothing on saddle and harness making which was considerable when beasts furnished the chief means of transportation, to say nothing of equipment for the plow. As a matter of fact, the index to *Rome and Italy of the Empire* does not show leather, or saddle, or harness. The words carriage, cart, chariot, wagon, vehicle, do not occur either; but there is a good paragraph on land traffic in the text (pp. 278 f.).

It is clear that Frank did not intend to make this work an exhaustive survey of all available economic data but that he aimed rather at focussing the reader's attention on the more significant evidence. This is obvious in every chapter, especially so in the eighth, "Rome, Ostia, and Pompeii," where he singles out a few aspects for a kind of treatment that may be best characterized as the sample method. He himself brings this method to our notice in so many words (p. 227; see also p. 233). His intimate knowledge of Roman topography and archaeology gives unique interest to the section on Rome. But I would hesitate to accept the statement that, since it required nearly 200 wagonloads per day for four years to transport the travertine of the Coliseum from the Emporium to its destination, and since the stone had to be hauled through the Forum, more or less disrupting business along the way, Vespasian came to the rescue by enlarging the Forum northward. Again Frank believes that Trajan enlarged Rome's harbor "at the mouth of the Tiber in contemplation of the difficulties of transport [of imported materials] involved in building his Forum," but the proof is lacking. By the way, "at the mouth of the Tiber" is all right if employed loosely; the harbor was one mile or more to the north.

Despite its weak points, chapter eight is among the most interesting. A veteran in the trade, Frank knows how to handle his

material. For instance, he remarks neatly: "Unlike normal cities, which pay for part of their imports by manufacture and the profits of trade, the capital balanced its expenditures by means of state salaries and the return on provincial investments." Or take this case. Trajan gave special privileges to those who milled and baked twenty-five bushels of wheat a day. On the basis of some figures of Pliny's, Frank translates this amount into a daily output of about 1800 loaves of bread. Or take the availability of over 500 shops for private traders in the great *basilicae* and *mercati* of the city. It leads him to conclude that the state from the earliest period had aided the machinery of distribution. (But this would show that the Republican Senate was not altogether unconcerned with commerce.) Even those familiar with Roman economics will be delighted with the new facts presented in these pages or the new interpretation of facts already known. For example, Vespasian refused to consider the use of a hoisting machine designed to reduce the cost of construction in public buildings, telling the inventor of this labor-saving device, "I must feed my poor." From this it is deduced that large numbers of free laborers were employed in public works, and that the wheat dole was continued so long because it served as part of the wages given to the indigent so employed.

The flaws herein noted as well as the author's words make it clear that this is an unfinished work. The large amount of footnotes in comparison with the practical absence of them in *Rome and Italy of the Republic* makes this still clearer. The editors have been wise in publishing them too. Their inclusion gives us a glimpse of what we have lost when death prevented the author from weaving this mass of information into those text patterns which he knew so well how to fashion.

This reviewer feels that neither Tenney Frank nor his editors should apologize for not inserting in this volume all the material they might have liked on the period from Septimius Severus to Diocletian. The economic phenomenon of the third century interests students of the Roman Empire only as the end of an era, or at best as the transition from one set of constitutional forms, social organization, and cultural orientation to another. The story of the Rome created by the Senate, by Caesar, and by Augustus ends with the Antonines. One may, therefore, regret that Tenney Frank did not concentrate on the first and second centuries to the total exclusion of the third. The study might have been more compact, much more of the pertinent material might have been collected and no doubt more effectively organized, and perhaps the whole book might have been finished by the author himself.

The *General Index* is an invaluable key to the contents of the five volumes. The editors warn us of certain limitations they saw fit to impose on the first index (of subjects). The statement that they have included the most important items is of course correct. Seventy-nine pages of print, two columns to the page, are impressive indeed; even so this index is not very much more than the sum of the indices of the several volumes. This would have been the place to catch the omissions and fill the gaps noted as each volume appeared, but the opportunity was not used to the fullest. A lack of rigorous planning leads to such inconsistencies as the following, noted at ran-

dom. *Argentarii, capulatores, cisiarii, horrearii, margaritarii, pistores, saccarii, stuppatores, urinatores* are listed; but *centonarii, frumentarii, gemmarii, gladiarii, palangarii, pelliones, plostrarii* are not. Curiously enough, *sagarii* is listed in the index to the fifth volume, but not in the *General Index*. Readers of the *Economic Survey* must then resort to roundabout ways to discover or recall some of the data in which they are interested, but there is no assurance that they will be rewarded for their trouble. They will eventually get at *pelliones* if they look under "Hides, Dealers in"; but not under "Wine," or under "Oil," or under "Olive oil," will they come upon any clue that might lead to *palangarii*.

The list of literary passages quoted in translation is good. But why stop there? A list of all literary references would have been of greater service. It would have shown at once how fully Frank, Grenier, Larsen, and the other contributors have exploited this mine of information. As it is, scholars must wait years before they can check what material has been neglected or inadequately utilized. Perhaps a luxury in other types of work, a complete list of literary source items is a necessity in a work of the scope and scale of the *Economic Survey*. Here is the place to urge upon American scholars in the ancient field the need of appending such lists to their publications. And not upon scholars only, but upon publishers too.

The documentary counterpart of this desideratum has been generously realized in the indices of inscriptions, papyri, ostraca, and parchments which fill no less than forty-nine pages. An accompanying list of abbreviations makes these indices more serviceable. This reviewer has happened to notice in the *General Index* the omission of *C. I. L.*, XIV, 255 cited in volume five, page 99. In this same volume five, Dessau's collection is generally referred to as *I. L. S.*, but one will look in vain for these siglae in the *General Index*; one has to look under the name Dessau to reach his quarry.

Let these minor observations on details mislead no one into thinking that the *General Index* is not of immense value to the readers of the *Economic Survey*. We are grateful to Professors Broughton and Taylor who planned it and to the group of devoted women who compiled it as a tribute to the memory of Tenney Frank.

In the center of all these activities stood Mrs. Frank, but she modestly assigns the whole credit to others.

Tenney Frank had as a scholar the will and energy characteristic of the sons of the Kansas prairie. Trained as a classicist, he grew by his native talent into the greatest historian of Ancient Rome this country has produced. When one looks at the friends and pupils who in less than one year from his death published the volumes under review, Horace's *Non omnis moriar* comes to mind. As a contributor to the *Economic Survey* this reviewer would like to say with them in the words of Tacitus: *Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore extinguntur magnae animae, placide quiescas, nosque, domum tuam, ab infirmo desiderio et muliebribus lamentis ad contemplationem virtutum tuarum voces, quas neque lugeri neque plangi fas est: admiratione te potius, te immortalibus laudibus, et, si natura suppeditet, similitudine decoreremus.*

VINCENT M. SCRAMUZZA.

SMITH COLLEGE.

W. E. J. KUIPER. Two Comedies by Apollodorus of Carystus. Terence's *Hecyra* and *Phormio*. (*Mnemosyne*, Supplementum Primum.) Leyden, Brill, 1938. Pp. 101. 2.50 Guilders.

Here, as in his *Grieksche Origineelen en Latijnsche Navolingen*, Kuiper employs "every available method—from deduction where data exist to speculation where the field is unencumbered by facts" (Post, rev. in *A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], p. 367). The astonishingly precise results are so clearly and so plausibly presented that the reader is overawed by the brilliance that can discover so much from so little. The novelty of the method lies in its basic point of departure, viz., that any action belonging to Exposition, Preparation, Complication, Anagnorisis, or Dénouement must have originally appeared in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th act respectively. On this basis the Greek act divisions are determined by scrutiny of action, exits, and entrances. Divisions of Terence not measuring up to the quantitative norm of act length are therefore evidence of abridgment. The nature of the curtailment is then postulated and supported by the inconsistencies, contradictions, etc. in the remaining narrative. Thus the older method (Leo's) appears merely as the last step in Kuiper's.

The reconstruction must stand or fall on the soundness of the method as a whole, for the proofs adduced from the text to support the postulations are frequently so debatable that by themselves they could never have suggested, not to say proved, the results (see examples below). Acceptance of the whole requires complete adherence to the divisional theory developed in *Grieksche Origineelen en Latijnsche Navolingen*—adherence which I fear scholars will not give with the easy assurance of Kuiper (especially if Antiphon must stand in *angiportu* over the entr'acte at *Epidicazomenos* IV-V). Moreover it is continually assumed that Apollodorus was so closely dependent upon Menander that he wrote on identical dramatic theories (established by Kuiper's own reconstruction of six Menandrian plays), and that Terence revised both exemplars in such a way that original similarities would remain. These exacting assumptions will not be widely admitted even after a sympathetic reading of *Grieksche Origineelen en Latijnsche Navolingen*.

The details of the originals are too elaborate to permit retelling. Suffice it to say that in the Έκυρά Bacchis was recognized as Myrrina's daughter by Phanias of Imbros, and that her ring was not Philumela's, but an identical one which years ago Myrrina had similarly lost to Phanias. In the Επιδικαζόμενος Pamphila was Demipho's legitimate daughter and her recognition was so linked to that of Phanium that its omission necessitated a change in the other. Chremes originally pretended that Stilpo was a deceased friend and left all but Demipho in ignorance of the truth. Both plays had divine prologues and various extra verses in existing scenes. To the *Phormio* Kuiper adds three scenes; to the *Hecyra*, five, including an entire fifth act.

In such a pyramidal argument the weakness of individual points is the more serious. Any reader familiar with Plautus and Terence will add a large number to the following examples. The very existence of some inconsistencies may be challenged: the plural in *Hec.*

717 does not prove that both *senes* must begin the interview with Bacchis; are there really any repetitions in what Bacchis tells Phidippus, 770-92? The mention of maids when Bacchis enters Myrrina's house and the failure to mention them when she comes out does not prove a Terentian change, 792, 808. Some rest on Kuiper's feeling of "absurdity" or insufficient "firm connection" with the action (must a Greek *senex* have greeted his gods *outside* the house at *Ph.* 314?). The author seems to adopt the pre-Prescott theory that all Greek *vía* was perfect and that every inconsistency must be Roman butchering. In some cases it is hard to find a basis for Kuiper's statements (Pamphilus does not exit "from sheer necessity" at *Hec.* 495). It is strange that the author, who usually over-emphasizes the argument from character, thinks that, because Chremes sees Demipho a line sooner than he sees Nausistrata (*Ph.* 796), it is proved that she did not enter before 797. On the contrary, if one may argue at all from character, seeing Demipho first is more natural, for Chremes has but one fixed idea: to find Demipho, tell him about Phanium, and to recover what they paid Phormio. His verbal slip is perfectly in character, and creates a tense and highly amusing situation by forcing him to explain his excitement without betraying himself to his wife. It is inconsistent that the author, who sturdily defends the marriage of half sister and brother (Plautus, *Epid.*), summarily rejects on moral grounds any consideration of Sostrata for Bacchis' mother. Kuiper seems over-anxious to rehabilitate every *meretrix* who marries a free youth, and his personal preference for a double anagnorisis prejudices the investigation. Thus he is compelled to deny categorically the disconcerting similarity between Bacchis and Habrotonon of the *Epitrep.*, and the efforts to show traces in Terence of Pamphila's free born character are little short of pitiful.

With scores of similar questions, each weakening the chain, the reader may finally conclude that Kuiper has constructed two magnificent comedies of the *vía* type, but has fallen far short of proving that Apollodorus wrote them. The very excellence of the hypothetical restorations enjoins upon Kuiper the burden of showing why Terence changed them. Granted that Terence preferred to drop divine prologues in order to increase the surprise, it is flatly false to assert that this "forced" the dropping of half the anagnorisis (pp. 48, 93) in each play. The evidence for Terence's dislike of token methods of recognition is overstated. That Bacchis was left a *meretrix* because of the impropriety of being "illegitimate daughter of a respectable matron [why not?] and former mistress of the husband of her half-sister" is not convincing. The argument for the change in the *Phormio* is admittedly intellectual and so elaborate as to betray its weakness. The reader is warranted in his doubt that Terence would have spoiled so fine a play.

The only two citations from Donatus are employed with prejudice. Whatever evidence is derived from the note on *Hec.* 826, *re* the original form of Bacchis' monologue, depends on the exact number of lines to which the note refers. Difference of opinion is justified, especially if, as Kuiper fails to admit, Donatus had not the Greek before him. The note at *Ph.* 645 simply does *not* prove that Demipho had a daughter.

But no amount of criticism can deny the fact that this book is one of the finest attempts to restore the *vía* from the Latin texts. It is, of course, not definitive but will remain as a standard work to study, confirm, or refute. From the vast store of knowledge and the critical acumen of the author all students may profit. An unintentional but important by-product of Kuiper's work is the confirmation of the old truism that Plautus revised less carefully than did Terence. For, though both authors have concealed from us their originals, the very weaknesses of Kuiper's arguments are the result of Terence's having concealed the evidence so well.

It is to be hoped that the author continues the publication of his investigations in the English language. The occasional solecisms, which cause more careful re-reading, never interfere with the clarity of the argument. An unfortunate misprint on p. 86, line 6 (read *now* for *not*) causes momentary dismay by reversing the intended meaning. A tabular analysis of the originals conveniently codifies the results.

JOHN N. HOUGH.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

HENRIËTTE BOAS. *Aeneas' Arrival in Latium: Observations on Legends, History, Religion, Topography and Related Subjects in Vergil, Aeneid VII, 1-135.* (*Allard Pierson Stichting, Archaeologisch-historische Bijdragen, VI.*) Amsterdam, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers-mij., 1938. Pp. 260.

Presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, the present monograph has the expressed purpose (p. 1) of throwing "light on the historical and related questions in the *Aeneid*, as well as on the historical background of the work," so far as such questions rise in connection with the opening hundred and thirty-five lines of the seventh book. Though the writer had intended to carry the commentary to verse 192, she was obliged to stop (p. 3) at line 135 for want of space and also to leave untreated within the verses included "several greater and minor problems" originally envisaged for discussion.

The work is decidedly meticulous, and a vast amount of material has quite obviously passed through the hands of the writer in the preparation of her study. *Inventio*, however, rather than *dispositio*, marks the handling of the materials. For, while there is a necessary system imposed by the exigencies of a treatment following the order of the verses in the poem, one looks somewhat vainly for a consistent, crisp synthesis of the materials used and for a logical marshalling and appraisal of the countless details with which the pages teem. In her eagerness to present all possible explanations of a given problem and in her somewhat exuberant readiness to hazard additional elucidations of her own, the writer has at times confused rather than clarified a difficulty.

The reasoning is not always cogent, as not a few examples might be adduced to show. Thus, in the case of Circe's domain, the

gemitus iraeque leonum vincla recusantum (vv. 15-16) is tied up with the historical use of Circeii as a place of deportation to suggest that the straining of the lions at their chains "may be an underlining of the hypothesis of Fr. Sforza as to the hidden hostile intentions which Vergil in writing the Aeneid had against Augustus" (p. 49). The fine lines (vv. 25-36) on the mouth of the Tiber as the Trojans sail in give rise to six pages (pp. 61-66) of inquiry as to the motive and purport of such a description; this leads up (pp. 66-68) to a questioning of Vergil's reasons for *fluvio Tiberinus amoeno* (v. 30), as against possible uses of *Tiberis fluvio amoeno* and *Tiberis amoenus*. One is tempted to waive considerations of deeply pondered choice here and to suppose that to Vergil, as to us, the phrase may have recommended itself for sheer beauty and stateliness. The suggestion that the Laurentes (pp. 111-112) may have derived their name from the tree *laurus*, as from a progenitor, encounters the possible objection that *laurus*, being feminine in gender, could not stand for a male forebear; but the writer is willing to suppose that matriarchy was in vogue in primitive Italy and that the Laurentine may originally have been a matriarchal society. Elsewhere (p. 197) it is questioned why *sub alta . . . Albunea* (vv. 82-83) appears, with *Albunea* instead of *Albulae*, the probable name of the site; yet the writer does not seem to point out the impossibility of *Albulae* (or, here, *Albulis*) in hexameter verse.

Despite the detailed nature of the volume, careful readers will note omissions; and, of course, the writer herself does not profess to be all-inclusive. Interesting is her statement, after remarks on the use of *pars* in *et partes petere agmen easdem partibus ex isdem* (vv. 69-70), that "perhaps we should not enter too deeply into this question" (p. 145). One may wonder whether the line *corpora sub ramis deponunt arboris altae* (v. 108) needs any underlying motivation, such as Dr. Boas (p. 249) gives it by suggesting that it may foreshadow the dietary habits of Augustus. It was natural for Aeneas and Iulus and the Trojan chiefs, freshly disembarked, to dine in just such a picnic fashion. Further, as Mr. Mackail¹ points out, the verse is a combination of two half-lines from Lucretius (I, 258, II, 30), a sufficient reason for its use by Vergil.

A conscientious effort has been made to employ all pertinent studies, and it may be captious to cite absences. Yet a reference to Miss DeGraff's dissertation on Naelius² would have been in place in the author's remarks on the rise of the Aeneas-story (pp. 20-21); and, in view of the generous use made of the Blackwell "Virgilian Studies," the failure to mention Butler's edition³ of the sixth book of the *Aeneid* is a bit surprising.

English is not a native tongue for Dr. Boas; her willingness to use that language, however, rather than Dutch, and thus to make her book more widely accessible, is truly commendable. Hence one

¹ *The Aeneid: Edited with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 262, *ad loc.*

² DeGraff, *Naevian Studies* (Dissertation, Columbia University: Geneva, W. F. Humphrey, 1931); see ch. i, "Aeneas the Roman."

³ Butler, *The Sixth Book of the Aeneid: with Introduction and Notes* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1920).

approaches only with a feeling of ungraciousness a criticism of her English. The lapses are regrettably frequent, in idiom, punctuation, and technical presentation. "August" is frequent for "Augustus," parallelling the use of "Tibull" (p. 154) and "Propercē" (p. 173). American readers would find difficulty with "5 KM to the West of Tibur" (p. 195); "Aeneads" is frequent for the "Aeneadae"; and there are numerous puzzling formations, technical in character, such as the designation of the sheep (p. 212) as a "lustratious animal." The slips in general presentation are fairly numerous; examples are seen in "Hor. Sat. I, 50" (p. 84, note 26); "pedibus per mutuum nexit" (v. 66) for "per mutua" (p. 135); the faulty use of double quotation marks within double quotation marks (pp. 143-144); further, the printing of suprascript numerals to call attention to footnotes, but followed by the half parenthesis, is, of course, not English or American usage. An interesting lapse in the bibliography is the placing (pp. 252-253) of six studies by W. Warde Fowler under 'W' rather than 'F,' as if the name were a hyphenated "Warde-Fowler."

For the advanced student of the *Aeneid*, however, Dr. Boas has provided a very useful gathering of detailed and technical material on the opening lines of the seventh book. To present so much in one volume, and in a text which is a model of legible and attractive print, is to perform a genuine service.

WILLIAM CHARLES KORFMACHER.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY.

WILLIAM COFFMAN McDERMOTT. *The Ape in Antiquity.* (*The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Archaeology*, No. 27.) Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938. Pp. xii + 338; 10 plates. \$5.00.

This learned and many-sided book has grown out of a dissertation suggested by Professor David M. Robinson. The author has already published two papers on the ape in Greek and Roman Literature in *T. A. P. A.*, LXVI (1935), pp. 165-175 and LXVII (1936), pp. 148-167. The present monograph is based for nomenclature and identification on D. G. Elliot, *A Review of the Primates (Monographs of the American Museum of Natural History, I-III [1913])*. Ape is used as a general term, monkey for an ape with a tail, and baboon for the hamadryas baboon or the dog-headed cynocephalus, the sacred animal of Egypt.

Part I, the general account of the ape in the different countries, begins with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and Syria in Chapter I; then follow the spread of the ape in the eastern and western Mediterranean (Chapter II), the geographical and historical knowledge (Chapter III), and the biological and miscellaneous knowledge of the ape (Chapter IV). Chapter V describes the ape as a pet and a source of humor, Chapter VI as an evil beast. Part II brings a catalogue of the representations in art, 605 numbers, many of

which are used to illustrate the general account. This is followed by a bibliography and an index. Sixteen objects are published on 10 plates: 6 primitive figurines, a black-figured Attic cylix, a fragment from a Cabirium vase, a vase in the shape of an ape's head and one in the shape of an ape, a terracotta relief of a gorilla with its young, a mosaic and a marble relief, and three terracotta lamps. Only published material is used, but this seems to be as complete as could be expected. For the Egyptian material use might have been made of the wonderful modern publications of Nina de Garies Davies, *The Tomb of Rekhmere* (1935), Pls. VII and XIV, and others instead of the inexact color plates drawn by Wilkinson in 1878.

The knowledge of the ape was spread from Egypt by means of figure vases and amulets to the Aegean Islands, Syria, and the Greek mainland. Corinthian vases in the shape of squatting apes imitate Egyptian faience vases. In contrast to Egypt, the ape had no religious significance in Greece, and therefore it is not treated with respect but is a roughly handled pet. In Mesopotamia apes are not indigenous, but representations influenced by Egypt and perhaps India are found from the third millennium to the Hellenistic period (cf. E. D. van Buren, *Clay Figurines of Babylonia and Assyria* [1930], pp. 180-2, Nos. 893-907). The Phoenicians probably are responsible for making the ape familiar in many sections in which it was not indigenous. But the Cretans had already put them on seals, made figurines, and painted the splendid blue monkeys, probably greenish guenos, on the wall of the House of the Frescoes (Evans, *Palace of Minos*, II, 2, pp. 447 ff., Pl. X). Next are the silver bowls from Cyprus and Praeneste with the hunting of a gorilla (Densmore Curtis, *Memoirs of the American Academy of Rome*, III [1919], pp. 38 ff., Pls. 20-21; Myres, *Handbook of the Cesnola Collection*, pp. 463 f., No. 4550). Figurines are frequent in Rhodes and Boeotia, but they come from all parts of the islands, the mainland, and Asia Minor. In literature they appear from the seventh century onward.

In the western Mediterranean the Barbary ape from the north coast of Africa was in an early period known to the Etruscans (cf. pp. 28 ff.), and from them it was taken over by the Romans as simia. The paintings in the Tomba della Scimmia and Tomba Golini or dei Velii show the apes as pets on the leash without religious significance (Dueati, *Storia dell' Arte Etrusca*, I, pp. 315 f., 412 f.; II, Pl. 133, Fig. 345; Pls. 183-4, Figs. 464-6). In the Roman Empire the apes are more frequent than in the Republican period. Thus most of the works given by the author to the artistic tradition in Egypt, pp. 49 f., belong to Roman art, when Egypt had become a province of the Roman Empire under Augustus and thus interest in Egyptian landscape and fauna had been stimulated, so that these representations have nothing to do with Egyptian art tradition. Thus also the mosaic of Praeneste, No. 485, used for the chapter on Ethiopia, pp. 65 ff., gives a panorama of Egypt as the Romans saw it, not as the Egyptians did. McDermott rightly dates the mosaic in the period of the Emperor Hadrian, not of Sulla, as Delbrueck, *Hellenistische Bauten in Latium*, I, pp. 50 f. and 83 ff., had done.

The author displays in general sober judgment in interpretation.

He thus refutes the fantastic ideas of Anna Roes, who sees in the ape, as in everything in geometric art, solar symbols (cf. note 5 on pp. 26 f.); and the equally unjustified idea of Eisler (*Orpheus der Fischer*, text to Pl. XXX and *Vorträge Bibliothek Warburg*, II, 2 (1922-3), p. 14, Fig. 6; p. 68 and p. 111, note 3), that the representations of Orpheus playing among the animals and the ape imitating Orpheus on the mosaic of Sousse, No. 489, Pls. VI-VII, are pagan persiflage of Christ as the good shepherd.

The story of Hanno and the gorillas, discussed on pp. 51-55, is interesting in the period of Tarzan, but it is probably of no greater scientific value than the books of Edgar Rice Burroughs. Apes certainly did not perform in the theatre, but in the circus (cf. pp. 121 f. and 299, No. 502 with 313 f., No. 554). I cannot believe that the only bone figurine of an ape with swastikas on his breast, No. 288 (pp. 210 f.), is meant to be the caricature of an actor. If the large mouth pulled to the side in a comico-tragie way reminds one of a mask, the same is true for many other apes like the terracotta monkey No. 172 in Berlin (Schneider-Langyel, *Griechische Terrakotten* [1936], Fig. 99).

It was a difficult task to arrange the mass of variegated material in a catalogue, which makes up more than half of the book (pp. 159-324). McDermott groups the material into: Chapter I. Figurines, Chapter II. Vases, Chapter III. Paintings, Mosaics, and Reliefs (excluding vases). This part and particularly the third chapter is the weakest part of the book. The author has attempted to keep the order within the subdivisions chronological. This has been achieved for the single divisions of the figurines, which are divided into A. Terracotta, B. Bronze, C. Miscellaneous material. But there are too many subdivisions which overlap. Among the eleven subdivisions of the terracottas no. 4 "apes' heads" and no. 11 "molds for apes" are examples of this; but also among the bronzes are figurines which belong to the subdivisions of terracottas, like Nos. 189-197, which would belong to A8, apes wearing some type of garment. The vases decorated with reliefs, II A 2, overlap with B, molded figure vases, as well as with Chapter III B, reliefs (excluding vases). I do not see the reason why they are separated from each other by the long list of paintings and mosaics. The whole list of reliefs, Nos. 497-605, is composed of too many different things. The terracotta lamps, Nos. 514-564, belong to terracotta relief vases. The seals III B 7, are separated by B 6, coins, from the gems, B 5, to which they belong, as gems were mostly used as seals. The chronological arrangement breaks down sadly when the Mycenean seals are put at the very end of the catalogue. No. 496 ought to be cancelled, as there is no ape on this Orpheus mosaic.

The bibliography for each number is careful and full. There are few omissions: No. 325, the phlyakes vase at Catania: Rizzo, *Röm. Mitt.*, XV (1900), pp. 268 f., Fig. 2. Bieber, *Denkmäler*, p. 143, No. 107; *idem*, *History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, p. 264, Fig. 357. Very few clerical errors: p. 17, 4th line from end, read "by no means." Sometimes sources of different periods are thrown together too closely. Thus Sophocles, *Ichneutae*, presented in ca. 410 B. C., is quoted on p. 44 to illustrate the Hieroglyphica of ca. 400 A. D. Furthermore, the word ape is here used by Sophocles

not at all to illustrate the appearance of the choreutae, which was that of the satyrs, but as an abusive nickname (cf. Bieber, *History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, pp. 15 ff.).

Despite these little mistakes the book is a model of a reliable and exhaustive monograph. It would be desirable soon to have a similar one on horses, which is being prepared by S. D. Markman, a graduate of Columbia University.

MARGARETE BIEBER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

PAUL SCHNABEL. *Text und Karten des Ptolemäus*. Leipzig, Köhler, 1938. Pp. vii + 128; 8 plates. Buckram M. 10; paper M. 8.

This is Volume II of *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Geographie und Völkerkunde*, the first German historico-geographical collection of source material ancient and modern, of which three volumes have already appeared, edited by Professor A. Herrmann of Berlin with the coöperation of a score of German and Austrian scholars.

So many studies of Ptolemy's *Geography* have appeared in Germany since the World War that critical research in this field may almost be said to be a German undertaking. Most of these studies have been concerned with the geographical content, but a few, of which the present volume written primarily for geographers is a landmark, with the history of the text and its relationship to the accompanying maps. The author, a professor at Halle, is well known for his Ptolemaic researches and has been engaged on the present work since 1930, when his essay "Die Entstehungsgeschichte des kartographischen Erdbildes des Kl. Ptolemaios" appeared in the *Sitzb. d. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin*, Phil.-hist. Kl., XIV.

The clarification of the history of the text of the *Geography* is the major problem in Ptolemaic research, important for philological and historical geographers and for our knowledge of the lands of the Roman Empire. Hitherto it has been difficult even for philologically trained users of the work to extract from existing editions a satisfactory picture of the two recensions of the text which have survived from antiquity and have been generally regarded as Ptolemaic, and which are at the basis of all surviving Greek manuscripts, forty-six of which are extant. Ever since G. J. Voss in the middle of the seventeenth century first maintained that the maps which accompany certain MSS did not go back to Ptolemy but were the work of an unknown Agathodaemon of uncertain date, the question has been argued whether Ptolemy drew the maps or they were the work of late Byzantine scholars who drew them on the basis of the original text.

Recently the problem has been attacked by several scholars, notably by C. Müller ("Rapports sur les manuscrits de Ptolémée," in *Arch. des missions scient. et litt.*, 2^e Série, IV [1867], pp. 279 f.), O. Cuntz (*Die Geographie des Ptolemaeus*, 1923, pp. 1 f., rev. by the writer in *Amer. Geogr. Rev.*, Apr. 1927, pp. 349-50), L. Renou (*La géographie de Ptolémée, l'Inde*, 1925, pp. v f.), and

above all by J. Fischer in *Tomus Prodromus* of his monumental *Claudii Ptolemaei Geographiae Codex Urbinas gr. 82, I-IV*, 1932 (rev. by the writer in *A. H. R.*, July, 1933, pp. 726-7). The latter regarded the problem whether the maps were a genuine inheritance from antiquity or a creation of the 13th-15th centuries as so important that he devoted his life to its solution and, through his exhaustive study of the Greek MSS which contained maps, came to definite conclusions: (a) that the view that Ptolemy added no maps to his text was contradicted by various passages which prove without doubt that he added a world-map and several sectional ones, and that Ptolemy merely "prepared material" for maps rests on a false rendering of a passage in the text; (b) that the world-maps accompanying some of the MSS cannot go back to Ptolemy, since they do not correspond with his text; and (c) that the maps of our best preserved MS—*Vaticanus Urbinas*—were not drawn by the author of that MS on the basis of its text.

Schnabel, who acknowledges his indebtedness to Fischer, is opposed, however, to his statement that he could predicate the genuineness of the preserved sectional maps, since he has not proved this, but has omitted this striking circumstance: while he has adduced evidence that the maps in the *Urbinas* were not drawn on the basis of that text, he has overlooked the possibility that they might well have been drawn supplementary to one of the many codices from which the *Urbinas* is derived. Thus he did not settle the question whether they went back to Ptolemy or not.

Schnabel's problem is manifold, first to try to settle the relationship of the various maps to the history of Ptolemy's text and of their content to the two ancient recensions of the text; to discuss the age and origin of these recensions and how far the maps owe their origin to the author of one or the other; and, finally, to answer the question whether the maps were the work of the authors of the recensions or were found by them already at hand when they wrote. Most of the discussion occupies the first three chapters which are concerned with the manuscripts, their text-families and text-groups, and the text-recensions, while in the last the author discusses the maps appended to certain manuscripts and their genuineness.

While seven of the twenty-one "important" MSS—X, A, N, S, Z, V, C—have no maps, six—K, F, V, R, O, and D (daughter MS of V)—contain maps and two others—W, G—may once have had them. The world-map at the end of Bk. VII of the *Geography* appears in two MSS, and twenty-six sectional ones found in the text of Bk. VIII in three—K, V, Fragm. F (world-map missing in the last); the world-map at the end of Bk. VII and the 64 sectional maps in Bks. II-VII appear only in MSS O and the predecessor of A; while the twenty-six sectional maps at the close of the text appear in R and the predecessor of X. In this complicated analysis Schnabel concludes that wherever the evidence shows that the maps contain material which can be proved older than the text of the recension to which they belong, if this material can be shown to be genuinely Ptolemaic but has got lost in the text of that recension, then we can treat the maps, despite their manifold later reworking, as "in letzter Linie" the work of Ptolemy himself.

Since the six oldest MSS—X, K, F, U, G, V—date from the

thirteenth century, none being older than A. D. 1200, they were written over a millennium after Ptolemy's death—which, at the latest, was *ca.* 175. Consequently, between Ptolemy's original text and these oldest MSS all sorts of intervening copies—“*Mittelglieder*”—, later lost, may have existed. Thus Schnabel rightly finds it absurd to believe that a Byzantine codex of *ca.* 1200 can have preserved the original text of the *Geography* or that Ptolemy was the last to have touched the work, to say nothing of the supposition that no change was made in the drawing of the maps, rough drafts of which by his pupils must have been in circulation and published after the master's death.

In two ways Schnabel had the advantage over his predecessors. Through his travels in Italy, France, England, and elsewhere, he was able to study all the important MSS on the spot and to make photographs of most of them; and he was the first to be able to use the codex *Constantinopolitanus Seragliensis* 57—which he regards as more important than the *Urbinas*—discovered in 1927 by A. Deissmann and published in 1930. Nor should we omit reference to the important supplements contributed by the general editor after illness in 1935 forbade the completion of the volume by the author. Here he has drawn two survey tables (pp. 120-1); one of these is a genealogical tree showing “the most important” Greek codices and their maps in the two recensions Ξ and Ω with their text- and family-groups, preserved and lost MSS of the 13th-15th centuries, etc.; the other lists all known Greek codices of the *Geography*, in one column twenty-one important ones from the point of view of text criticism, in the other the twenty-five unimportant ones. Here Schnabel's unified system of notation is used, Latin capitals to designate the important ones, and Latin lower-case letters for the unimportant, an improvement over Müller's earlier mixed notation by Latin and Greek capitals for both texts. But the editor's chief contribution is the inclusion of reproductions for the first time of the four best preserved African maps from the *Constantinopolitanus* (Pls. I-VIII).

Through his careful examination and analysis of the entire complex of Ptolemaic manuscripts of the *Geography*, Schnabel has laid a new foundation for the future recovery of a critical text, attempted so often by his predecessors. He has clarified the question of the relationship between text and maps and thus has immeasurably advanced Ptolemaic research. This little book will prove indispensable for all future scholars who use the *Geography* in any way.

WALTER WOODBURN HYDE.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

EINAR HÅRLEMAN. *De Claudio Mamerto Gallicae Latinitatis Scriptore Quaestiones*. Uppsala, A. B. Lundequistka Bokhandeln, 1938. Pp. ix + 103. Diss.

The reputation of Claudianus Mamertus, the philosopher-theologian of fifth century Vienne and friend of Sidonius, is based upon his able defence of the incorporeity of the soul against the corporeal

concept expounded by Faustus, bishop of Riez. This defence is embodied in his treatise *De Statu Anima*, in three books, dedicated to Sidonius. Since 1885, the year in which Engelbrecht published his edition in *CSEL* (vol. XI), little if any interest has been shown in Claudianus. It is only recently that this forerunner of Scotus and the schoolmen, as he is referred to, has begun to receive attention. In 1936 F. Bömer published a monograph *Der lateinische Neoplatonismus und Neupythagoreismus und Claudianus Mamertus in Sprache und Philosophie* (Leipzig, Harrassowitz), to which I shall return below. Bömer's work is followed by the volume under review.

"Quaestiones" as part of any title is vague. Hence to do justice to this dissertation a brief outline of its contents is indicated. In the "Exordium" (pp. 1-8) the author surveys the relation of the manuscripts. From an examination of several passages he argues cogently that Engelbrecht showed undue preference for the readings of *G* (*Vindobonensis*) while failing to evaluate properly *M* (*Lipsiensis*), which "ad contextum statuendum non minus quam reliquos universos vel etiam plus illis valere" (p. 5). Further proof of the great value of *M* is advanced in the first chapter (pp. 9-56), which discusses critically many passages in Engelbrecht's text. On the basis of this discussion Härleman adopts many readings of *M* and corrects other readings which Engelbrecht and others, in disregard of the manuscript tradition, had introduced. These corrections are not haphazard but are supported by the author's solid knowledge of Claudianus' stylistic and grammatical peculiarities, which are fully analyzed. Some may be mentioned here: *cum* causal followed by both indicative and subjunctive; the impersonal use of *debet* and *potest*; the use of the present subjunctive for the imperative; excessive use of *ἄταξ* λεγόμενα, etc. The author does well to compare some of these usages with those of Sidonius, Faustus, and other writers of Gaul.

I shall now turn to the third chapter (pp. 81-100), because it is really a continuation of the first. Here Härleman examines the rhetorical element in Claudianus' work, parallelism, parallelism with homoioteleuton, the clausulae, and the use of the *oratio tripartita*, consisting of words or clauses symmetrically arranged into three cola, employed particularly when speaking of the Trinity and other religious matters. This examination again justifies Härleman's defence of the readings of *M* and his restorations where Engelbrecht ignored the manuscript tradition. The chapters so far discussed are, then, a thorough review of the work of his predecessor and in textual matters constitute a solid advance.

Did Claudian translate a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* (66 b-67 a = Claudianus II, 7) or did he derive it from a secondary source? This question which has vexed students of Claudianus is the subject matter of chapter II (pp. 57-80). Schanz (*Gesch. der röm. Lit.*, IV, 2, p. 547) believes that "Platons Dialoge sind ihm vertraut, wobei die Frage, ob er sie in der Ursprache gelesen hat, offen bleiben muss." Bömer (mentioned above) was of the opinion that Claudianus did not translate the passage from the original Greek but used a Latin translation of Plato which was published after Cicero but before Quintilian. Bömer's arguments do not carry conviction. While his philosophical approach to the problem (in which Härleman is not interested) is unquestionably good, his treatment of Claudianus' *consuetudo loquendi* is somewhat sketchy. Here Härleman is on

more solid ground because of his intimate knowledge of Claudianus' linguistic usages. He examines the passage from the syntactical, semasiological, rhythmic, and stylistic points of view and arrives at the plausible conclusion that Claudianus is himself the translator (pp. 71, 75-76, 80). This chapter also contains a short discussion of Claudianus' indebtedness to Cicero.

Härleman's is a twofold contribution. By the evaluation of the readings of the *Lipsiensis* (*M*) and other textual observations he has contributed to the improvement of the text; he has also solved a literary problem by proving that Claudianus translated Plato. Härleman writes a fluent and clear Latin and his book is well printed and rather well documented. One misses in the bibliography mention of the *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum* and the *Glossaria Latina*. If clausulae are employed as a tool of criticism the contributions of H. D. Broadhead, *Latin Prose Rhythm* (Cambridge, 1922) and Susan H. Ballou, "The Clausula and Higher Criticism" (*T. A. P. A.*, XLVI [1915], pp. 157-171) ought to have been mentioned. One practice I find anomalous. Is a reader of a dissertation written in Latin helped or only confused by French versions of passages under discussion? I observed a similar procedure in another Uppsala dissertation, by E. G. Elg, *In Faustum Reiensem Studia* (1937). The use of Latin has the advantage of demonstrating the universality of scholarship. Why negate this advantage by the implied admission of Latin's inadequacy?

JACOB HAMMER.

HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK.

L. A. A. JOUAI. De Magistraat Ausonius. Nijmegen, J. J. Berkhout, 1938. Pp. 282.

Ausonius, the last poet of the undivided empire, is of course one of the better known literary figures of the fourth century. Even so, one might be inclined to express some surprise that a book of almost 300 pages should be devoted to his career as a magistrate. The surprise, however, will disappear when one realizes that it was Ausonius' official career that was responsible, if not for his writing, then at least for his publishing. Accordingly it is practically impossible to treat the magistrate apart from the man of letters; nor has Dr. Jouai made any attempt to do so. His book is not confined to Ausonius' *cursus honorum*; it is a monograph on his whole life and works. It is true that, despite the fame of poems like the *Mosella* and the *Ordo Urbium Nobilium*, Ausonius can be regarded only as a second-rate poet (he himself, incidentally, claims to be a *grammaticus* or *rhetor* not a *poeta*); nevertheless his political, scholarly, and literary activities were such that most students of the fourth century would agree that he warrants a book of this length. Not but that one who tried to confine himself exclusively to Ausonius' official career at the court at Trier would have plenty to write about. For, although that official career occupied only some twenty years or less (365-383?) of the more than eighty that Ausonius lived, it nevertheless carried him into the very highest offices and was also

the means for his advancing his relatives and friends. Jouai does full justice to it, displaying an enviable familiarity with Ausonius' writings, prose as well as poetry (pp. 43-243). He describes in detail Ausonius' tutorship of the youthful Gratian and, after the latter's accession, the succession of important offices which Ausonius filled. He likewise investigates the appointments which Ausonius succeeded in procuring for members of his family; and this means that his book contains a complete account of Ausonius' family connections, forbears as well as posterity. Jouai does not shirk difficulties; and difficulties, particularly of the chronological sort, there are bound to be in the case of a man who hardly ever alludes to contemporary events in his own writings and is himself hardly ever mentioned in contemporary documents. Thus, the date of the composition of Ausonius' most famous work, his poem on the Moselle which he wrote with the encouragement of the emperor Valentinian, is a matter of dispute: Jouai ponders the question and on the internal evidence, especially lines 380 and 451, assigns it to 370. The questions whether Ausonius asserted much influence on Gratian and whether he was a Christian get similar careful treatment; and, as Jouai appraises the importance in the fourth century of every office that Ausonius filled, he is obliged to tackle such thorny problems as the *comitatatus* in its various forms, Valentinian's relations with the senate, and the position of the senate in general at that time. The result is that historians, no less than students of Latin literature, will find much to interest them in this work; indeed they will find nothing less than an excellent picture of the empire in the fourth century. At times, perhaps, it may be doubted whether Jouai's passion to shirk no difficulty and to treat every aspect of his subject has not led him into some exaggeration. Thus, one feels sceptical when he suggests that Ausonius influenced the content and style of the legislation of the period or when he concludes, on psychological grounds, that Ausonius was vexed at his failure to fill the consulship a second time. Most of us, however, would conclude that the price of advance is frequently exaggeration.

Jouai also does not overlook the periods which Ausonius spent away from the court. Pp. 13-42 describe his life at Burdigala or with his maternal uncle Arborius at Tolosa before he was summoned by Valentinian to Trier (310-365). Pp. 244-252 similarly describe his last years in retirement at Burdigala after Gratian's assassination (383-393?). These periods combined cover a much longer period of time than did his official career, but most students find them of inferior interest and Jouai is therefore justified in allotting them proportionately less space.

Jouai, then, has succeeded in producing a book that is quite thorough and well rounded out. It is fully documented and is also provided with genealogical tables, a full bibliography, an index, and a French summary for Dutchless readers. One can confidently adduce it as an additional proof, if one were needed, that the countrymen of Erasmus are painstaking scholars.

E. T. SALMON.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY,
HAMILTON, ONTARIO.

Laureae Aquincenses Memoriae Valentini Kuzsinszky Dicatae, I.
(*Dissertationes Pannonicae*, Ser. II, No. 10.) Budapest, 1938.
Pp. 341; 80 plates. Pengö 40.

This volume is the first of a pair in honor of a distinguished scholar; it consists of sixteen studies dealing with Danubian subjects. Four of these articles are in Hungarian without any summary in a major language except a subtitle in the table of contents; they may be written off as a total loss to the generally available corpus of world scholarship. A few paragraphs of Latin, no matter how execrable, would have told us at least a minimum about the cults of Aquincum, while 120-odd pages of Hungarian merely erect to nationalistic pride a monument more resistant than bronze.

Articles are as follows: A. Betz, "Illyrisches-Keltisches aus dem Ager Carnuntinus," pp. 1 ff. (two first-century grave stelae); L. Bartucz, "Anthropologische Untersuchung des hunnenzeitlichen Grabes aus Szekszárd," pp. 8 ff. (in Hungarian); A. Brelich, "La Religiosità di Aquincum," pp. 20 ff. (in Hungarian); J. Csalog, "Ein Grab der Hunnenzeit in Szekszárd," pp. 143 ff. (in Hungarian); R. Egger, "Ein neuer Germanenstein," pp. 147 ff. (epitaph of a Quadian slave from Vienna); Fr. Eichler, "Nachlese zu den Sigillaten aus Brigetio in Wien," pp. 151 ff., including six text-plates (numerous corrections and supplements to Juhász, *Die Sigillaten von Brigetio*, and new decorated pieces by Comitialis, Onniorix, Reginus, and Respectus); Fr. Fremersdorf, "Rheinischer Export nach dem Donauraum," pp. 168 ff. (Rhenish glass, sigillata, black pottery, and terra cottas found along the Danube as far as Romania, principally observed by Fremersdorf in 1929; further investigation would reveal much more. The principal route was from Ladenburg on the Neckar via numerous stations to Faimingen on the Danube; another was from Strassburg via Offenburg); S. Garády, "Die Feststellung der römischen Strasse Aquincum-Brigetio entlang der Arany-árok in Altöfen, Budapest," pp. 183 ff. (in Hungarian); K. Kiss, "Die chronologische Reihenfolge der Fabrikate des Töpfers Pacatus von Aquincum," pp. 188 ff. (in Hungarian with German translation; a brilliant and detailed analysis of the ceramic styles of Aquincum sigillata, distinguishing an "earlier potter" and his types from Pacatus who was partly contemporary with him and partly later, the former being a mere artisan imitating models imported from Lezoux and Rheinzabern while the latter was more original, working in three recognizable periods and two principal styles; some additional remarks on the Pannonian sigillata from Mursa/Osijek; profusely illustrated); H. van de Weerd and R. Lambrechts, "Note sur les Corps d'Archers au Haut Empire," pp. 229 ff. (known archery corps are listed; they were regularly recruited from the Orient—not locally—but were commanded by Italians; units of archers were augmented especially during and after Hadrian's principate in order to combat the Persians more effectively, but were also used widely throughout the Empire; *cataphractarii* are less numerous than light-armed bowmen); C. Praschniker, "Ein neugefundener Jünglingsstorso aus Aquincum," pp. 243 f.; B. Saria, "Emona als Standlager der Legio XV Apoll-

linaris," pp. 245 ff. (this legion was quartered at Emona/Laibach/Ljubljana under Augustus; under Tiberius it was removed to Carnuntum, and Emona became a *colonia*); A. Stein, "Zu den Kaiserdaten in der Mitte des III. Jahrhunderts," pp. 256 ff. (polemic against Mattingly's chronology in "The Palmyrene Princes and the Mints of Antiochia and Alexandria," *Num. Chron.*, 1936, pp. 89-114); R. Syme, "The First Garrison of Trajan's Dacia," pp. 267 ff. (I. The Military Situation, II. Legions in Pannonia and Moesia, III. Legions and Legates of Dacia, IV. The Remarkable Career of Maximus, V. The Defense of Dacia); J. Szilagyi, "Die römische Okkupation von Aquincum," pp. 287 (in Hungarian with German summary; a new fragmentary inscription of *ca.* A. D. 20 from Aquincum is discussed in connection with *Mon. Anc.*, V, 30); A. Alföldi, "Tonmodel und Relief-medallions aus der Donauländern," pp. 312 ff. (discusses these categories in relation to imperial and other festivals, and gives a preliminary catalogue of 59 examples; profusely illustrated).

Like its companions in the same series, this volume makes important contributions not merely to our knowledge of the Danubian provinces but also to a more general understanding of Roman antiquity.

HOWARD COMFORT.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

HUGH MACLENNAN. *Oxyrhynchus: an Economic and Social Study.*
Dissertation, Princeton, 1935. Pp. 93.

The task undertaken in this monograph is an unusual one for the writer of a doctoral dissertation to attempt. We have here decidedly an extensive rather than an intensive study. A period of more than 700 years of the history of the town and nome of Oxyrhynchus is examined in a work of about 80 small pages, and a large part of the text contained in these pages consists of translations of the papyrus documents from that district. A treatise of this kind is obviously liable to the danger of "sketchiness," and this danger has by no means been escaped by Dr. MacLennan. The long period of preliminary study necessary for papyrological work has impeded, in all countries, the entrance of young scholars into the field, and the conflict between the difficulty of the subject and the pressure for the doctor's degree seems to be clearly illustrated by this dissertation.

Dr. MacLennan has sharply limited his study of the ancient and modern sources. He appears to have paid little attention to papyri from Oxyrhynchus which are not contained in the volumes of *P. Oxy.* or *PSI*; and, for the period of the principate, his study of modern historical work has been sharply concentrated upon Professor Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. The general economic and social trends which Rostovtzeff has traced in Egypt and in the Empire MacLennan follows out in brief chapters for Oxyrhynchus, presenting translations of documents mostly taken from *P. Oxy.*, and mostly those which Rostovtzeff has already cited to illustrate his observations.

In the treatment of the later period a similar bibliographical narrowness is evident; it can be illustrated by the fact that the author devotes about one-eighth of his dissertation to an account of the Apion estate (pp. 66-77), and discusses the other estates of the period with what seems to be complete unawareness of the existence of E. R. Hardy's important dissertation, *The Large Estates of Byzantine Egypt* (New York, 1931).

An illustration of MacLennan's unfamiliarity with the customary formulae of the papyri is given by his treatment (p. 79) of *P. Oxy.*, XVI, 1891. He implies that this loan agreement of A.D. 495 is a contract oppressive to the borrower. In order to establish this as a fact he would have had to compare it carefully with other promissory notes written under different conditions and at different times. If he had done so, he would have promptly discovered that there is nothing unfair or unjust, according to ancient usage, in the provisions of this agreement for interest payment or for collection in case of default. He takes the phrase (lines 19-20) "you shall have the right of execution upon both myself and all my property" as placing the debtor in imminent danger of serfdom—a serfdom which was the creditor's motive, he thinks, in making the loan. But phrases of this character occur in all sorts of contracts throughout the period from which we have Greek papyri, even in marriage agreements. That famous early document, the Elephantine marriage contract of 311 B.C., has an equivalent provision (*P. Eleph.*, 1, 12-13).

Without further analysis of the dissertation, we may conclude that, while its author has perhaps done as much work as the writer of the average doctoral dissertation and has doubtless considerably increased his own knowledge in the process, he has not succeeded in making a contribution which is of value to scholars. His informal style, however, makes his book rather interesting, and it may be useful for other purposes. Unfortunately it contains fairly frequent examples of inaccuracy in reference and quotation.

CLINTON W. KEYES.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

CH. MUGLER. L'Évolution des Constructions Participiales Complexes en Grec et en Latin. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1938.
Pp. 172.

The material which forms the subject of this monograph is taken from selected portions of the works of several authors regarded as typical of their age and literary form. The term *complex participial constructions* is to be understood as referring to those constructions in which a participle is followed by an additional participle, by a dependent clause having the same subject as the participle, by a dependent clause with a different subject, or by an absolute construction. The participles governing these expressions are them-

selves divided into five classes: the attributive participle (or rather, in accordance with current English terminology, the circumstantial participle in all its varieties); the participle as used after such verbs as ὅπαω, μανθάνω, etc., corresponding to the infinitive in *oratio obliqua*; and the three absolute constructions, genitive, dative, and accusative. Few grammarians give the dative absolute such free recognition as it receives in the present work, and one is tempted to ask whether the author has not overstated the matter when he speaks (p. 90) of *datifs réellement absolus*. Certainly the construction in question reached an advanced stage of development and nearly detached itself from syntactical dependence on the rest of the sentence, but in all the examples cited on pp. 89 ff. I can find none in which the dative substantive has not at least a trace of dependence on some other word, usually being taken as a dative of interest with the verb. See Kühner-Gerth, II, pp. 423 ff.

The Greek authors used are Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plato; Thucydides marks the high point in the use of complex participial constructions; and it is he who first makes free use of the future participle. In Plato and, we are led to believe, in the other authors from the fourth century on, there is a reversion, not necessarily to a simpler sentence structure but to a style characterized more by the use of dependent clauses and less by that of participles.

In treating the Latin material the author takes care to point out the different nature of the problem: Latin in the first place had nothing like the variety of participles found in Greek, and the free use of participial constructions was, the author believes, foreign to the natural speech-habits of the people. Plautus in particular shows little inclination toward constructions of this type. The striking use of certain participial constructions in Caesar is observed and attributed to his fondness for brevity; but Cicero shows a strong reaction in favor of the use of clauses with finite verbs. The author's remarks on the Ciceronian usage have a particular interest; he places great emphasis on it and attributes it to a conviction on the part of the orator that free use of participles was not in keeping with the spirit of the language. However this may be, the constructions in question increased in frequency and complexity in the authors of the Empire, reaching their fullest development in Tacitus, Suetonius, and Ammianus Marcellinus.

The work casts light on many points of historical syntax, and its value is increased by the large number of statistical tables. Naturally the conclusions might suffer certain changes in detail if more material were studied, but the book would reach such proportions that the reader might have to do without the quoted passages and be satisfied with the statistics.

On p. 24 read VI. 7 for IV. 7; III. 3 for III. 4; on p. 35 read I 485 for 485; Ξ 203 for E 203 twice; on p. 36 ὅτι avec l'ind. for ὅτε avec l'ind.; on p. 135 XXVI. 6 for XXVII. 6; XXIX. 7 for XXX. 7.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

CARTHAGE COLLEGE.

Codices Latini Antiquiores. A Palaeographical Guide to Latin Manuscripts Prior to the Ninth Century. Edited by E. A. LOWE. Part III, Italy: Ancona-Novara. (Edited under the auspices of the Union Académique Internationale for the American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Institution of Washington). Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. vii + 48. \$24.

Part III of Professor Lowe's indispensable work is characterized by the same thorough, careful, and intelligent scholarship which marked the previous volumes. In the arrangement and treatment of the material it follows the same general plan, with the exception of one small but helpful detail. Whereas hitherto a serial number was given only to the major portion of a divided manuscript, beginning with this volume every such manuscript, no matter how small the portion, will be given a serial number the first time it appears in the work.

Two volumes, this one and the one to follow, will deal with the manuscripts in the libraries of Italian cities which have been selected in alphabetical order. The cities included in this part are: Ancona, Assisi, Bologna, Brescia, Cava, Cividale, Florence, Ivrea, Lucca, Milan, Modena, Mombello, Monte Cassino, Monza, Naples, Novara. The plates present specimens from one hundred and two different manuscripts and, since in some cases more than one example is given, of almost two hundred different pages. The general treatment of the distinguishing features of these Codices Italici, with which must be included the Codices Vaticanani contained in Part I, has been reserved for the Introduction to Vol. IV.

The fact that such great libraries as the Laurentian in Florence, the Ambrosian in Milan, the National in Naples have furnished a large share of the material for this volume is assurance enough of its interest and importance. For the expert palaeographer it must be a veritable store-house of treasures, containing as it does specimens of practically all types of Latin writing with the editor's careful and thorough description of every text. There are early papyri from Egypt and Herculaneum, including the Old Latin version of *Exodus* in Florence, which was purchased in 1937 (No. 294), and the first century fragment of the *de Bello Actiaco*, here produced for the first time by photographic process (No. 385); numerous plates of the Bobbio palimpsests; such important examples of Insular Script as the Bangor Antiphonary (No. 311) in Milan and the *Comm. in Psalms*, ascribed to Theodore of Mopsuestia, with its Irish glosses (No. 326, also in Milan); two examples of Visigothic minuscule from Monte Cassino (Nos. 372-3). To the general reader also this volume offers much: the Ambrosian palimpsest of Plautus (No. 345), the Cod. Mediceus of Vergil; the Milan palimpsest containing the *Aeneid* with a Greek version (No. 306; cf. a similar "school edition" on a papyrus, No. 367, also at Milan in the Univ. Catthol. del Sacro Cuore); the papyri fragments in Florence of bits of the *Aeneid*, of Cicero's speeches, of Sallust (Nos. 287-288-289); the Naples palimpsest (Vind. 16 and Neap. iv, A, 8) of fragments of Lucan's *Pharsalia* (No. 392); the fifth century fragment in rustic capitals of Cicero's speeches (No. 363, at Milan).

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL,
but all are listed under Books RECEIVED. Contributions
sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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